Abstract
We integrate programming constructs for managing confidentiality in an ML-like imperative and higher-order programming language, dealing with both access control and information flow control. Our language includes in particular a construct for declassifying information, and constructs for granting, restricting or testing the read access level of a program. We introduce a type and effect system to statically check access rights and information flow. We show that typable programs are secure, that is, they do not attempt at making illegal read accesses, nor illegal information leakage. This provides us with a natural restriction on declassification, namely that a program may only declassify information that is has the right to read.
Work partially supported by the ANR-06-SETI-010 grant. The second author is supported by a PhD scholarship from Torino University.
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Boudol, G., Kolundžija, M. (2007). Access Control and Declassification. In: Gorodetsky, V., Kotenko, I., Skormin, V.A. (eds) Computer Network Security. MMM-ACNS 2007. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 1. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73986-9_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73986-9_7
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