Abstract
Combinatorial auction is one of the most popular market mechanisms and it has a huge effect on electronic markets and political strategies. On large scale e-markets, we need a good approximation algorithm for winner determination that is robust for changing the distribution and the number of bids in an auction. We proposed approximate algorithms for combinatorial auctions with massively large number of (more than 100,000) bids. In this paper, we show the robustness of our winner determination algorithms for combinatorial auctions with large number of bids. Experimental results demonstrate that our proposed algorithms are robust on changing the distribution and the number of bids in an auction. Finally, we shortly describe a theoretical limitation about our algorithms that concerns with giving truthfulness of the auction mechanism.
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Fukuta, N., Ito, T. (2007). Toward a Large Scale E-Market: A Greedy and Local Search Based Winner Determination. In: Okuno, H.G., Ali, M. (eds) New Trends in Applied Artificial Intelligence. IEA/AIE 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 4570. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73325-6_35
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73325-6_35
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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