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Combining Different Proof Techniques for Verifying Information Flow Security

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Logic-Based Program Synthesis and Transformation (LOPSTR 2006)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 4407))

Abstract

When giving a program access to secret information, one must ensure that the program does not leak the secrets to untrusted sinks. For reducing the complexity of such an information flow analysis, one can employ compositional proof techniques. In this article, we present a new approach to analyzing information flow security in a compositional manner. Instead of committing to a proof technique at the beginning of a verification, this choice is made during verification with the option of flexibly migrating to another proof technique. Our approach also increases the precision of compositional reasoning in comparison to the traditional approach. We illustrate the advantages in two exemplary security analyses, on the semantic level and on the syntactic level.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Security Engineering Group, RWTH Aachen University, Germany

    Heiko Mantel, Henning Sudbrock & Tina Kraußer

Authors
  1. Heiko Mantel
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  2. Henning Sudbrock
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  3. Tina Kraußer
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Editor information

Germán Puebla

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Mantel, H., Sudbrock, H., Kraußer, T. (2007). Combining Different Proof Techniques for Verifying Information Flow Security. In: Puebla, G. (eds) Logic-Based Program Synthesis and Transformation. LOPSTR 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4407. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71410-1_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71410-1_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-71409-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-71410-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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