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The Institutions of Corporate Governance

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Handbook of New Institutional Economics

I outline here the institutions of decision-making in the large public firm in the wealthy West, emphasizing those that try to thwart decision-making from going awry.

By corporate governance, I mean the relationships at the top of the firm—the board of directors, the senior managers, and the stockholders. By institutions I mean those repeated mechanisms that allocate authority among the three and that affect, modulate and control the decisions made at the top of the firm.

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Authors
  1. Mark J. Roe
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Université de Paris, 106 Bd de l’Hôpital, 75647, Paris, France

    Claude Ménard

  2. The Ronald Coase Institute, 5610 Wisconsin Ave, 20815, Chevy Chase, MD, USA

    Mary M. Shirley

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Roe, M.J. (2008). The Institutions of Corporate Governance. In: Ménard, C., Shirley, M.M. (eds) Handbook of New Institutional Economics. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-69305-5_16

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