Abstract
Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game (aka. mechanism) so that a desirable outcome (according to a given objective) is reached despite the fact that each agent acts in his own self-interest. Examples include the design of auctions, voting protocols, and divorce settlement procedures. Mechanisms have traditionally been designed manually for classes of problems. In 2002, Conitzer and Sandholm introduced the automated mechanism design approach, where the mechanism is computationally created for the specific problem instance at hand. This approach has several advantages: 1) it can yield better mechanisms than the ones known to date, 2) it applies beyond the problem classes studied manually to date, 3) it can circumvent seminal economic impossibility results, and 4) it shifts the burden of design from man to machine. In this write-up I overview the approach, focusing on problem representations, computational complexity, and initial applications. I also lay out an agenda for future research in this area.
This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under CAREER Award IRI-9703122, Grant IIS-9800994, ITR IIS-0081246, and ITR IIS-0121678.
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Sandholm, T. (2003). Automated Mechanism Design: A New Application Area for Search Algorithms. In: Rossi, F. (eds) Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming – CP 2003. CP 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2833. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45193-8_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45193-8_2
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