Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Automatic Approximation for the Verification of Cryptographic Protocols

  • Conference paper
Formal Aspects of Security (FASec 2002)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2629))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

This paper presents an approximation function developed for the verification of cryptographic protocols. The main properties of this approximation are that it can be build automatically and its computation is guaranteed to terminate unlike Genet and Klay’s algorithm. This approximation has been used for the verification of the Needham-Schroeder, Otway-Rees and Woo Lam protocols. To be more precise, the approximation allows us to check secrecy and authenticity properties of the protocols.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Aziz, B., Gray, D., Hamilton, G., Oehl, F., Power, J., Sinclair, D.: Implementing Protocol Verification for E-Commerce. In: Proceedings of the 2001 International Conference on Advances in Infrastructure for Electronic Business, Science, and Education on the Internet, SSGRR 2001 (2001), http://student.dcu.ie/~oehlf2/

  2. Abadi, M., Needham, R.: Prudent Engineering Practice for Cryptographic Protocols. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering 22(1), 6–15 (1996)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  3. Abadi, M., Tuttle, M.: A Semantics for a Logic of Authentication. In: Proceedings of the Tenth Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, pp. 201–216 (1991)

    Google Scholar 

  4. Burrows, M., Abadi, M., Needham, R.: A Logic of Authentication. Technical report, DIGITAL, Systems Research Center, N 39 (February 1989), http://www.research.digital.com/SRC/publications/

  5. Bolignano, D.: Vérification formelle de protocoles cryptographiques á l’aide de Coq (1995)

    Google Scholar 

  6. Bolignano, D.: An Approach to the Formal Verification of Cryptographic Protocols. In: ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 106–118 (1996)

    Google Scholar 

  7. Bouajjani, A., Touili, T.: Extrapolating Tree Transformations. In: Brinksma, E., Larsen, K.G. (eds.) CAV 2002. LNCS, vol. 2404, p. 539. Springer, Heidelberg (2002), http://verif.liafa.jussieu.fr/~touili/

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  8. Clark, J., Jacob, J.: A Survey of Authentication Protocol literature: Version 1.0 (1997)

    Google Scholar 

  9. Denning, D.E., Sacco, G.M.: Timestamps in key distribution protocols. Communications of the ACM 24(8), 533–536 (1981)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  10. Dolev, D., Yao, A.: On the security of public-key protocols. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 2(29) (1983)

    Google Scholar 

  11. Genet, T.: Decidable Approximations of Sets of Descendants and Sets of Normal Forms. In: Nipkow, T. (ed.) RTA 1998. LNCS, vol. 1379, pp. 151–165. Springer, Heidelberg (1998)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  12. Genet, T., Klay, F.: Rewriting for Cryptographic Protocol Verification. In: McAllester, D. (ed.) CADE 2000. LNCS, vol. 1831. Springer, Heidelberg (2000), http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/genet99rewriting.html

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  13. Goubault-Larrecq, J.: A method for automatic cryptographic protocol verification (extended abstract). In: Rolim, J.D.P. (ed.) FMPPTA 2000. LNCS, vol. 1800, pp. 977–984. Springer, Heidelberg (2000), http://www.dyade.fr/fr/actions/vip/publications.html

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  14. Gong, L., Needham, R., Yahalom, R.: Reasoning About Belief in Cryptographic Protocols. In: Cooper, D., Lunt, T. (eds.) Proceedings 1990 IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, pp. 234–248. IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos (1990)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  15. SET Working Group. SETTM Specification, books 1,2 and 3 (1996), http://www.setco.org/set_specifications.html

  16. TLS Working Group. The TLS Protocol Version 1.0 (1996), http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/tls-charter.html

  17. Gritzalis, S., Spinellis, D., Georgiadis, P.: Security Protocols over open networks and distributed systems: Formal methods for their analysis, design, and verification. Computer Communications 22(8), 695–707 (1999), http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/gritzalis99security.html

    Article  Google Scholar 

  18. Genet, T., Tong, V.V.T.: Reachability Analysis of Term Rewriting Systems with Timbuk. In: Nieuwenhuis, R., Voronkov, A. (eds.) LPAR 2001. LNCS (LNAI), vol. 2250, p. 695. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  19. Jacquemard, F., Rusinowitch, M., Vigneron, L.: Compiling and Verifying Security Protocols. Logic Programming and Automated Reasoning, 131–160 (2000)

    Google Scholar 

  20. Leroy, X., Doligez, D., Garrigue, J., Rémy, D., Vouillon, J.: The Objective Caml system release 3.02 (2001)

    Google Scholar 

  21. Lowe, G.: An Attack on the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Authentication Protocol. Information Processing Letters 56(3), 131–133 (1995)

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  22. Meadows, C.: A Model of Computation for the NRL Protocol Analyzer. In: CSFW (1994)

    Google Scholar 

  23. Meadows, C.: The NRL protocol analyser: An overview. Journal of Logic Programming 26(2), 113–131 (1996)

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  24. Monniaux, D.: Abstracting Cryptographic Protocols with Tree Automata. In: Cortesi, A., Filé, G. (eds.) SAS 1999. LNCS, vol. 1694, pp. 149–163. Springer, Heidelberg (1999), http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/monniaux99abstracting.html

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  25. Needham, R., Schroeder, M.: Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers. Communications of the ACM 21(2), 120–126 (1978)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  26. Oehl, F., Sinclair, D.: Combining two approaches for the verification of cryptographic protocols. In: Workshop Specification, Analysis and Validation for Emerging Technologies in Computational Logic, SAVE 2001 (2001), http://student.dcu.ie/~oehlf2/

  27. Oehl, F., Sinclair, D.: Combining ISABELLE and Timbuk for Cryptographic Protocol Verification. In: Workshop Sécurité des Communications sur Internet, SECI 2002 (2002), http://student.dcu.ie/~oehlf2/

  28. Paulson, L.C.: The Inductive Approach to Verifying Cryptographic Protocols. Journal of Computer Security 6 (1998), http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/lcp/papers/protocols.html

    Google Scholar 

  29. Rémy, D., Vouillon, J.: Objective ML: An effective object-oriented extension to ML (1998)

    Google Scholar 

  30. Woo, T.Y.C., Lam, S.S.: A Lesson on Authentication Protocol Design. Operating Systems Review 28(3), 24–37 (1994)

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Computer Applications, Dublin City University,  

    Frédéric Oehl & David Sinclair

  2. L.I.F.C., Université de Franche-Comté,  

    Gérard Cece & Olga Kouchnarenko

Authors
  1. Frédéric Oehl
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Gérard Cece
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  3. Olga Kouchnarenko
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  4. David Sinclair
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of BCIM, Institute for Computing Research, London South Bank University, 103 Borough Road, SE1 0AA, London, UK

    Ali E. Abdallah

  2. University of Newcastle, UK

    Peter Ryan

  3. Department of Computing, University of Surrey,  

    Steve Schneider

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Oehl, F., Cece, G., Kouchnarenko, O., Sinclair, D. (2003). Automatic Approximation for the Verification of Cryptographic Protocols. In: Abdallah, A.E., Ryan, P., Schneider, S. (eds) Formal Aspects of Security. FASec 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2629. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-40981-6_5

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-40981-6_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-20693-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-40981-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation