Abstract
Most attempts at analysing secure information flow in programs are based on domain-specific logics. Though computationally feasible, these approaches suffer from the need for abstraction and the high cost of building dedicated tools for real programming languages. We recast the information flow problem in a general program logic rather than a problem-specific one. We investigate the feasibility of this approach by showing how a general purpose tool for software verification can be used to perform information flow analyses. We are able to prove security and insecurity of programs including advanced features such as method calls, loops, and object types for the target language Java Card. In addition, we can express declassification of information.
A preliminary short version of this paper appeared in WITS’03, Workshop on Issues in the Theory of Security, April 2003.
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Darvas, Á., Hähnle, R., Sands, D. (2005). A Theorem Proving Approach to Analysis of Secure Information Flow. In: Hutter, D., Ullmann, M. (eds) Security in Pervasive Computing. SPC 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3450. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-32004-3_20
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-32004-3_20
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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