Abstract
A ring signature scheme can be viewed as a group signature scheme with no anonymity revocation and with simple group setup. A linkable ring signature (LRS) scheme additionally allows anyone to determine if two ring signatures have been signed by the same group member. Recently, Dodis et al. [18] gave a short (constant-sized) ring signature scheme. We extend it to the first short LRS scheme, and reduce its security to a new hardness assumption, the Link Decisional RSA (LD-RSA) Assumption. We also extend [18]’s other schemes to a generic LRS scheme and a generic linkable group signature scheme. We discuss three applications of our schemes. Kiayias and Yung [22] constructed the first e-voting scheme which simultaneously achieves efficient tallying, public verifiability, and write-in capability for a typical voter distribution under which only a small portion writes in. We construct an e-voting scheme based on our short LRS scheme which achieves the same even for all worst-case voter distribution. Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) [6] is essentially a ring signature scheme with certain linking properties that can be naturally implemented using LRS schemes. The construction of an offline anonymous e-cash scheme using LRS schemes is also discussed.
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Tsang, P.P., Wei, V.K. (2005). Short Linkable Ring Signatures for E-Voting, E-Cash and Attestation. In: Deng, R.H., Bao, F., Pang, H., Zhou, J. (eds) Information Security Practice and Experience. ISPEC 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3439. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-31979-5_5
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