Abstract
Several compositional forms of simulation-based security have been proposed in the literature, including universal composability, black-box simulatability, and variants thereof. These relations between a protocol and an ideal functionality are similar enough that they can be ordered from strongest to weakest according to the logical form of their definitions. However, determining whether two relations are in fact identical depends on some subtle features that have not been brought out in previous studies. We identify the position of a “master process” in the distributed system, and some limitations on transparent message forwarding within computational complexity bounds, as two main factors. Using a general computational framework, we clarify the relationships between the simulation-based security conditions.
This work was partially supported by the DoD University Research Initiative (URI) program administered by the Office of Naval Research under Grant N00014-01-1-0795, by OSD/ONR CIP/SW URI ”Trustworthy Infrastructure, Mechanisms, and Experimentation for Diffuse Computing” through ONR Grant N00014-04-1-0725, by NSF CCR-0121403, Computational Logic Tools for Research and Education, and by NSF CyberTrust Grant 0430594, Collaborative research: High-fidelity methods for security protocols. Part of this work was carried out while the second author was at Stanford University supported by the “Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG)”.
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Datta, A., Küsters, R., Mitchell, J.C., Ramanathan, A. (2005). On the Relationships Between Notions of Simulation-Based Security. In: Kilian, J. (eds) Theory of Cryptography. TCC 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3378. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30576-7_26
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30576-7_26
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