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Improved Efficiency for CCA-Secure Cryptosystems Built Using Identity-Based Encryption

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Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2005 (CT-RSA 2005)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 3376))

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Abstract

Recently, Canetti, Halevi, and Katz showed a general method for constructing CCA-secure encryption schemes from identity-based encryption schemes in the standard model. We improve the efficiency of their construction, and show two specific instantiations of our resulting scheme which offer the most efficient encryption (and, in one case, key generation) of any CCA-secure encryption scheme to date.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Science Department, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, 94305, USA

    Dan Boneh

  2. Dept. of Computer Science, Univ. of Maryland,  

    Jonathan Katz

Authors
  1. Dan Boneh
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  2. Jonathan Katz
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Combinatorics & Optimization, University of Waterloo,  

    Alfred Menezes

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Boneh, D., Katz, J. (2005). Improved Efficiency for CCA-Secure Cryptosystems Built Using Identity-Based Encryption. In: Menezes, A. (eds) Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2005. CT-RSA 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3376. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30574-3_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30574-3_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-24399-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-30574-3

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