Abstract
Identity-based (ID-based) cryptosystems avoid the necessity of certificates to authenticate public keys in a digital communications system. This is desirable, specially for these applications which involve a large number of public keys in each execution. For example, any computation and verification of a ring signature, where a user anonymously signs a message on behalf of a set of users including himself, requires to authenticate the public keys of all the members of the set.
We use bilinear pairings to design a new ID-based ring signature scheme. We give bounds on the concrete security of our scheme in the random oracle model, under the assumption that the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem is hard to solve. Then we extend this scheme to scenarios where a subset of users anonymously sign on behalf of some access structure of different subsets.
This work was partially supported by Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología under project TIC 2003-00866.
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Herranz, J., Sáez, G. (2004). New Identity-Based Ring Signature Schemes. In: Lopez, J., Qing, S., Okamoto, E. (eds) Information and Communications Security. ICICS 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3269. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30191-2_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30191-2_3
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