Abstract
In the ForMoSA project [18] an integrated approach for safety analysis of critical, embedded systems has been developed. The approach brings together the best of engineering practice, formal methods and mathematics: traditional safety analysis, temporal logics and verification, and statistics and optimization.
These three orthogonal techniques cover three different aspects of safety: fault tolerance, functional correctness and quantitative analysis. The ForMoSA approach combines these techniques to answer the safety relevant questions in a structured and formal way. Furthermore, the tight combination of methods from different analysis domains yields results which can not be produced by any single technique.
The methodology was applied in form of case studies to different industrial domains. One of them is the height control of the Elbtunnel in Hamburg [17] from the domain of electronic traffic control, which we present as an illustrating example.
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Ortmeier, F., Thums, A., Schellhorn, G., Reif, W. (2004). Combining Formal Methods and Safety Analysis – The ForMoSA Approach. In: Ehrig, H., et al. Integration of Software Specification Techniques for Applications in Engineering. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3147. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-27863-4_26
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