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Deciding Knowledge in Security Protocols Under Equational Theories

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Automata, Languages and Programming (ICALP 2004)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 3142))

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Abstract

The analysis of security protocols requires precise formulations of the knowledge of protocol participants and attackers. In formal approaches, this knowledge is often treated in terms of message deducibility and indistinguishability relations. In this paper we study the decidability of these two relations. The messages in question may employ functions (encryption, decryption, etc.) axiomatized in an equational theory. Our main positive results say that, for a large and useful class of equational theories, deducibility and indistinguishability are both decidable in polynomial time.

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References

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Science Department, University of California at Santa Cruz, USA

    Martín Abadi

  2. Loria, INRIA & CNRS, Nancy, France

    Véronique Cortier

Authors
  1. Martín Abadi
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  2. Véronique Cortier
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Departament de Llenguatges i Sistemes Informatics, Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya, Campus Nord - Ed. Omega, 240 Jordi Girona Salgado, 1-3 E-08034, Barcelona

    Josep Díaz

  2. Department of Mathematics and Turku Centre for Computer Science TUCS, University of Turku, 20014, Turku, Finland

    Juhani Karhumäki

  3. Department of Mathematics, University of Turku, Turku, Finland

    Arto Lepistö

  4. Laboratory for Foundations of Computer Science, University of Edinburgh,  

    Donald Sannella

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© 2004 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Abadi, M., Cortier, V. (2004). Deciding Knowledge in Security Protocols Under Equational Theories. In: Díaz, J., Karhumäki, J., Lepistö, A., Sannella, D. (eds) Automata, Languages and Programming. ICALP 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3142. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-27836-8_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-27836-8_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-22849-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-27836-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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