Abstract
Most of the past studies on peer-to-peer systems have emphasized routing and lookup. The selfishness of users, which brings on the free riding problem, has not attracted sufficient attention from researchers. In this paper, we introduce a decentralized reputation-based trust model first, in which trust relationships could be built based on the reputation of peers. Subsequently, we use the iterated prisoner’s dilemma to model the interactions in peer-to-peer systems and propose a simple incentive mechanism. By simulations, it’s shown that the stable cooperation can emerge after limited rounds of interaction between peers by using the incentive mechanism.
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Jiang, J., Bai, H., Wang, W. (2004). Trust and Cooperation in Peer-to-Peer Systems. In: Li, M., Sun, XH., Deng, Qn., Ni, J. (eds) Grid and Cooperative Computing. GCC 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3032. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24679-4_72
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24679-4_72
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