Abstract
In this paper, we provide the first committed signature provably secure in the standard complexity model based on the strong RSA assumption. The idea behind the construction is that given any valid partial signature of message m, if a co-signer with its auxiliary input is able to generate variables called the resolution of message m such that the distribution of the variables is indistinguishable from those generated by the primary signer alone from the point views of the verifier/arbitrator, then from which a committed signature can be derived.
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Zhu, H. (2004). Constructing Committed Signatures from Strong-RSA Assumption in the Standard Complexity Model. In: Bao, F., Deng, R., Zhou, J. (eds) Public Key Cryptography – PKC 2004. PKC 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2947. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24632-9_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24632-9_8
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