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The Signing-Without-Reading Problem: An Analysis of the European Directive on Unfair Contract Terms

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Konsequenzen wirtschaftsrechtlicher Normen

Part of the book series: Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts ((ÖAR))

Abstract

In an ideal world, people read contracts before they sign them. In the real world, few people do so. And those who do try hard to read contracts, often do not fully understand them.

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Authors

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Hans-Bernd Schäfer Hans-Jürgen Lwowski

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© 2002 Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag GmbH, Wiesbaden

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De Geest, G. (2002). The Signing-Without-Reading Problem: An Analysis of the European Directive on Unfair Contract Terms. In: Schäfer, HB., Lwowski, HJ. (eds) Konsequenzen wirtschaftsrechtlicher Normen. Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts. Deutscher Universitätsverlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-81426-5_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-81426-5_10

  • Publisher Name: Deutscher Universitätsverlag

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-322-81427-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-322-81426-5

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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