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Brazilian Corruption Overseas: The Case of Odebrecht in Angola

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Corruption in Latin America

Abstract

This chapter analyzes the mechanisms of corruption that allowed Odebrecht to develop activities in Angola with the assistance of the Brazilian government in the period ranging from the beginning of Odebrecht’s investment abroad, in the late 1970s, to its systemic collapse in 2015. The chapter argues that Odebrecht replicated in Angola the methodology of corruption that it used to infiltrate the Brazilian government, with tremendous success.

I would like to thank Professor Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida and Professor Adriana Schor for their generous and invaluable support.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Between 2002 and September 2015, the BNDES financed as much as US$ 3.5 billion in civil works in Angola. Of that total, about US$ 2.6 billion went to Odebrecht. In the process, Odebrecht became the largest employer and the “shadow ministry” of public works in Angola. Mathias Alencastro, “Diamond Politics in the Angolan Periphery: Colonial and Postcolonial Lunda 1917–2002,” unpublished PhD thesis, Oxford, 2015. 240–245.

  2. 2.

    While corruption is an umbrella term used to describe a variety of practices, this chapter refers to two specific practices used by Odebrecht. These are the illegal campaign donations, which rose significantly in the 2000s, and the bribing of senior government officials for the approval of contracts.

  3. 3.

    A note on sources: this chapter makes use of the plea agreements of the so-called “Lava Jato” (Car Wash) investigation, an ongoing criminal investigation being carried out by the Federal Police of Brazil. The relations between the Brazilian government and Angola have led to several accusations of key political players. The information from the plea deals has been double checked with other available sources, i.e., interviews and archives. While the plea agreements provide an extraordinary amount of information for the study of Brazil-Africa relations, they must not be taken at face value: in multiple cases, prosecutors demonstrate their complete ignorance about Angolan political dynamics and international politics more generally.

  4. 4.

    For an overview of Brazil’s political economy under military rule, see Atul Kohli, State-Directed Development, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2004), 125–152.

  5. 5.

    Pedro Henrique Pedreira Campos, Estranhas Catedrais – As Empreiteiras Brasileiras e a Ditadura Civil-Militar, (Rio de Janeiro, Eduff, 2017). 356–384.

  6. 6.

    Projeto de Resolução Número 127, Diário do Congresso Nacional, Seção II, Suplemento Número 104, 17 de Agosto de 1982.

  7. 7.

    Covas aconselhou Odebrecht a se aproximar de Lula, segundo executivo, Folha de São Paulo, 13 Abril 2017.

  8. 8.

    PF intima Delfim Netto na Lava Jato, Estado de São Paulo, 10 June 2016.

  9. 9.

    Mathias Alencastro, “Diamond Politics”.

    Justin Pearce, A Guerra Civil em Angola, (Lisbon, Tinta da China, 2016).

  10. 10.

    Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, Magnificent and Beggar Angola: Angola Since the Civil War, (New York, Oxford University Press, 2015).

  11. 11.

    Aslak Orre, “Entrenching the Party-state in the Multiparty Era: Opposition Parties, Traditional Authorities and New Councils of Local Representatives in Angola and Mozambique”, PhD thesis, University of Bergen, 2010, 88–91.

  12. 12.

    Tony Hodges, Angola: From Afro-Stalinism to Petro-diamond Capitalism, (London, James Currey, 2001), 133–147.

  13. 13.

    Justino Pinto de Andrade, ‘The Process of Change in Angola: Civil Society, Political Parties, Economic Factors and General Population’, in Nuno Vidal and Patrick Chabal, eds., Southern Africa, Civil Society, Politics and Donor Strategies, (Brussels and Luanda: Media XXI and Firmamento with Angolan Catholic University, University of Coimbra and Wageningen University, 2009), 4.

  14. 14.

    Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, ‘Business Success, Angola-style: Postcolonial Politics and the Rise and Rise of Sonangol’, Journal of Modern African Studies, XLV (2007), 595–619.

  15. 15.

    For an overview of Odebrecht’s investments in Angola, see José, Joveta, “A politica externa de Angola: Novos regionalismos e relações bilaterais com o Brasil” PhD Thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, 2011. 2099–2233.

  16. 16.

    Rafael Marques, Diamantes de Sangue: Tortura e Corrupção no Cuango, (Lisbon, Tinta da China, 2011), 34.

  17. 17.

    Christine Messiant, ‘The Eduardo Dos Santos Foundation: Or, How Angola’s Regime is Taking Over Civil Society’, African Affairs, C (2001). 287–309.

  18. 18.

    Odebrecht tinha ‘departamento’ de propina no Brasil, dizLava Jato, Folha de São Paulo, 2016.

  19. 19.

    See “Lava Jota” for a compilation of the key depositions from Odebrecht officials to Brazilian prosecutors. https://jota.info/lavajota/.

  20. 20.

    A relação da Odebrecht com o sistema político em 5 pontos centrais, Nexo, 17 April 2017.

  21. 21.

    Mathias Alencastro, “Diamond Politics”.

  22. 22.

    Fernando Henrique Cardoso makes several mentions of Odebrecht in his memoirs, and describes Emílio Odebrecht as a sort of political consultant. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Diários da Presidência, (São Paulo, Companhia das Letras, 2017), III, 527–530.

  23. 23.

    FHC recebeu vantagens indevidas em eleições, diz dono da Odebrecht, Folha de São Paulo, 11 April 2017.

  24. 24.

    Claúdio Oliveira Ribeiro, ‘Crime e Castigo: as relações Brasil-África no governo Sarney’, Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, LI (2008).

  25. 25.

    Interview between the author and a Brazilian senior diplomat, September 2017.

  26. 26.

    Idem.

  27. 27.

    Shiguenoli Miyamoto, O Brasil e a comunidade dos países de língua portuguesa (CPLP), Revista Brasileira de Politica Internacional, LII (2009).

  28. 28.

    Interview between the author and a Brazilian senior diplomat, June 2017.

  29. 29.

    Interview between the author and a former Vale official responsible for operations in Mozambique, August 2017.

  30. 30.

    Interview between the author and a former secretary of the Workers Party, September 2017.

  31. 31.

    See the work of Adriano Belisario at the Intercept. He compiled the data of campaign donations from Odebrecht throughout the past two decades and ranked it by party. Oposição Recebeu Menos de 2% de doações da Odebrecht para eleições nacionais nos anos 1990, Adriano Belisario, The Intercept Brasil, 27 September 2017.

  32. 32.

    A equação brasileira, Agência Publica, 2016. Despite the lack of transparency from the Banco do Brasil, analysts believe that Odebrecht benefited from most of the contributions.

  33. 33.

    The number collapsed to US$ 51 million after President Dilma Rousseff (2010–2015) took office. She put an end to several arrangements of Odebrecht with the Brazilian government.

  34. 34.

    Fernando Álvares Correia Dias, Financiamento às exportações pelo BNDES: das Indústrias aos Serviços de Engenharia, Working Paper 172, Federal Senate, April 2015.

  35. 35.

    Olivier Vallée, ‘Du Palais aux Banques: la Reproduction Élargie du Capital Indigène en Angola’, Politique Africaine, CX (2008), 22.

  36. 36.

    Deposition number 52614/2017-GTLJ/PGR.

  37. 37.

    Although these claims could not be verified, Odebrecht officials support that Odebrecht and the Angolan government overpriced the projects that were submitted to the BNDES for financing. Angolan investigative journalist Rafael Marques also makes a similar argument in the following interview: No Brasil, Rafael Marques fala sobre a Odebrecht em Angola, Deutsche Welle, 2016.

  38. 38.

    Presidência da República: O Epicentro de Corrupção em Angola, Rafael Marques, Maka Angola, 2010. Website: https://www.makaangola.org/2010/09/presidencia-da-republica-o-epicentro-da-corrupcao-em-angola/.

  39. 39.

    Biocom is one of the flagship projects of Odebrecht in postwar Angola. It sought to introduce the technology of ethanol production in Angola. Com BNDES e negócios com políticos, Odebrecht ergue ‘império’ em Angola, João Fellet, British Broadcasting Corporation, 2012.

  40. 40.

    Presidente José Eduardo dos Santos, de Angola, recebeLula. http://www.institutolula.org/jose-eduardo-santos-presidente-de-angola-recebe-lula.

  41. 41.

    Odebrecht, Relatório Anual, 2014. Available at: https://www.odebrecht.com/sites/default/files/rsodebrechtangola2014_1.pdf.

  42. 42.

    Interview between the author and a Brazilian political marketing advisor with long standing experience in Angola, October 2016.

  43. 43.

    Servidor de propina da Odebrecht passou por Angola, Estado de São Paulo, 24 April 2017.

  44. 44.

    Documentos suiços ligam Odebrecht a US$ 17,6 milhões em propina, Valor Econômico, 24 July 2015.

  45. 45.

    Judicial decision number 5019727-95.2016.4.04.7000/PR.

  46. 46.

    Odebrecht em Angola, fim do império, Folha de São Paulo, 2017.

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Alencastro, M. (2019). Brazilian Corruption Overseas: The Case of Odebrecht in Angola. In: Rotberg, R.I. (eds) Corruption in Latin America. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94057-1_5

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