Abstract
What are the epistemological implications of the cognitive science of religion (CSR)? The lion’s share of discussion fixates on whether CSR undermines (or debunks or explains away) theistic belief. But could the field offer positive support for theism ? If so, how? That is our question. Our answer takes the form of an evidential argument for theism from standard models and research in the field. According to CSR, we are naturally disposed to believe in supernatural agents and these beliefs are constrained in certain ways. The three main theories of this supernatural disposition are byproduct theories, adaptationist theories, and hybrid theories. We argue that our supernatural disposition—as understood by any of the main theories—is more surprising and improbable given naturalism than theism and thus serves as evidence for theism over naturalism.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
There are different notions of probability. The notion of probability we have in mind is the evidential or epistemic notion of conditional probability—roughly, the probability of a proposition given a body of evidence.
- 3.
The method remains neutral in the philosophical debate between Bayesians and “likelihoodists” on the nature of comparative confirmation and thus should be amenable to both parties and the non-committed. For relevant discussion, see Fitelson (2007).
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
Sober (2004).
- 7.
Barrett (2004) emphasizes this sort of naturalness.
- 8.
- 9.
Barrett and Visala (unpublished).
- 10.
Barrett (2011), 102.
- 11.
How might this happen more concretely? Any number of scenarios could illustrate. Suppose one of our human ancestors had an experience not unlike Martin Luther’s reported thunderstorm experience, upon which he resolved to abandon his worldly life and become a religious monk. Suppose our ancestor encounters a terrible thunderstorm and lightning strikes the ground near him. He feels it is no coincidence and attributes the near miss to a supernatural agent who controls the weather. This god might be upset with him and want him to change his ways. Our ancestor returns home and shares his experience and emerging belief with his tribe, who accept his testimony because it resonates with their cognitive biases too.
- 12.
Barrett summarizes his functional analysis here: “The natural tendency to see agency around us, to see purpose in the world, to demand explanation for uncommon fortune or misfortune, and to connect fortune or misfortune to reward and punishment may conspire to make gods readily understandable and provide impetus for entertaining their existence and activities.” Barrett (2011), 102–103.
- 13.
Barrett (2012b), 322.
- 14.
Barrett (2012b), 322.
- 15.
Barrett (2011), 131.
- 16.
- 17.
Ibid; also see Barrett (2004, Chapter 6), Barrett (2011, 132–133), and Barrett (2012a, Chapters 3–6) for further support and documentation. Additional CSR literature could also be cited in a more complete review but the present paper is concerned more with the philosophical implications of empirically plausible claims in CSR than with systematically documenting the support for those claims.
- 18.
Barrett (2012b, 323) makes this point more salient when he juxtaposes the 13 beliefs composing natural religion (including the beliefs quoted above) with 13 basic doctrines of Christian theism. He suggests that many basic doctrines of Christian theism are “only small elaborations” of the basic beliefs of natural religion. These doctrines include “The Creator of the cosmos is God”, “God is invisible and immortal,” “God knows everything”, “God punishes immoral behavior and rewards moral behavior”, “God, angels, and demons are persons with minds”, and “Some happenings in the world are caused by God, angels, or demons.”
- 19.
Barrett contrasts our theistic tendency with belief in atheism or naturalism, which he argues is comparatively unnatural: “[A]theism requires a narrow band of environmental conditions in order to thrive, and these environmental conditions must be deliberately produced by human activity. In contrast, theism finds almost all human environments fertile. The idea of a supreme God, as in that of the Abrahamic traditions, may be particularly prodigious, as the rapid spread of these faiths over the last two millennia demonstrates.” Barrett (2004, 122; also see Chapter 8)
- 20.
Barrett: “Christianity, Islam, and Judaism are known as the great monotheisms, all insisting that there is only one God, but even in these traditions, people believe in numerous supernatural beings, including angels, devils, saints, and ghosts. In a certain respect, believing in numerous superhuman agents appears to be the most natural type of belief system.” (2012a, 141–142).
- 21.
For a related characterization of evolutionary byproducts, see Powell and Clarke (2012), 464.
- 22.
Powell and Clarke (2012), 478.
- 23.
A functionless byproduct may make a negative contribution to fitness (i.e. it might be maladaptive) and yet still persist and proliferate if the following two conditions hold: (i) the fitness benefits of the underlying adaptive traits outweigh the fitness costs of the byproduct trait and (ii) there is no evolutionarily feasible way to dispense with the byproduct trait without also dispensing with the underlying adaptive traits.
- 24.
An exaptation in the evolutionary literature (e.g. Andrews et al. (2002)) can refer either to (i) a trait that originates as a byproduct and later is co-opted by natural selection to perform a function or (ii) a trait that originates as an adaptation for a particular function but later is co-opted to perform a different function. To avoid ambiguity, this paper uses the term exaptation to refer to (i). Let the term adaptation cover the case of (ii).
- 25.
For motivation and discussion of this feature, see the end of Sect. 10.4 of the present paper.
- 26.
To be clear: all six features cannot jointly obtain together because three of them are mutually incompatible, namely the third, fourth, and fifth features. That is, our supernatural disposition must be understood either according to the byproduct model, the adaptationist model, or the hybrid (exaptationist) model, for these models are mutually incompatible. Accordingly, we can put our argument more precisely this way: each of the six features is individually more surprising given naturalism than theism; thus the obtaining of a compatible subset of the six features is even more surprising. So if one prefers the byproduct model, then the joint obtaining of the first, second, third, and sixth features would serve as evidence for theism over naturalism. If one prefers the hybrid (exaptationist) model, then the joint obtaining of the first, second, fourth, and sixth features would serve as evidence for theism over naturalism. Finally, if one prefers the adaptationist model, then the joint obtaining of the first, fifth, and sixth features would serve as evidence for theism over naturalism.
- 27.
One background assumption our argument grants is that the emergence of life and intelligent human-like beings is not highly improbable given naturalism. If the emergence of such phenomena were highly improbable given naturalism—say if some sort of cosmic, biological, or cognitive fine-tuning argument were successful—then this would make for a stronger evidential case for theism over naturalism. But we wish to remain neutral on this issue and develop a stand-alone evidential argument that the emergence of our supernatural disposition in the course of human cognitive evolution is more surprising and improbable given naturalism than given theism.
- 28.
- 29.
See Sect. 10.5 of the present paper for elaboration of the suggestion.
- 30.
Byproduct theorists such as Justin Barrett (2004, 108) and Pascal Boyer (2003, 123) often characterize religious belief as the “probable” or “almost inevitable” result of our natural cognitive architecture, that is, as unsurprising and likely given how our brains have been built. But our question here is not: how likely is belief in supernatural agents given the way our brains have been built? Rather, our question is this: how likely given naturalism is it that our brains would be built this way (i.e. in such a way as to generate supernatural belief as a cognitive byproduct)? Alternatively put: given naturalism, how likely is it that this supernatural disposition would emerge in the course of human cognitive evolution?
- 31.
Murray and Goldberg (2009), 189.
- 32.
Powell and Clark (2012), 470–471.
- 33.
Gensler (2016), 110.
- 34.
For support, see Crisp’s (2016) motivation of the unexpectability of our philosophical capacities given naturalism.
- 35.
Are watching agents even needed to play the functional role identified by punishment theories? It is not clear. For example, belief in karma could apparently suffice. Justin Barrett suggested (in correspondence) that perhaps those disposed toward social paranoia (who are nervous to some extent about being caught) would outperform those not so disposed. No watchers needed.
- 36.
Marsh and Marsh (2016), 69.
- 37.
- 38.
See Barrett (1998) and Barrett (2004), 9. Hindu intellectuals, in contrast to the general Hindu population, tend to view Brahman according to the Advaita Vedanta tradition, on which Brahman is impersonal and pantheistically understood. But this tradition has never been popular among ordinary Hindus. See e.g. Sharma (1993), 14–15.
- 39.
Let the term humans refer to anatomically and behaviorally modern humans who are standardly understood to have emerged somewhere between 100,000 and 200,000 years ago. We could also talk more narrowly about anatomically and behaviorally modern humans with religious capacities. Or we could talk more broadly about the species Homo sapiens. Regardless which class we have in mind, it remains true that percentage-wise more than 99% of such humans have lived their lives since the dawn of the agricultural revolution 12,000 years ago. And the percentage is only rising as time goes on.
- 40.
Haub (1995).
- 41.
- 42.
Norenzayan ( 2013 ), 7-8.
- 43.
E.g. Barrett (2004), Chapter 6.
- 44.
For clarification regarding the “most or several” qualification, see note 26 of the present paper.
- 45.
Clark and Barrett (2011, 667).
- 46.
Baker-Hytch (2016) argues that God plausibly has reasons for not making our CSR-mechanisms more accurate.
- 47.
Barrett (2009), 97. Emphasis mine.
- 48.
- 49.
- 50.
Mawson (2012, 192–195) develops a related response to Maitzen’s (2006) divine hiddenness argument from demographic unevenness. Mawson argues Maitzen’s argument targets a rather narrow (and not the most plausible) form of theism . In the relevant literature, there are various versions of “inclusivism” and “exclusivism” with respect to salvation. The sort of inclusivism commended in this paper is a fairly minimalist version, which rejects the claim that explicit belief during one’s earthly life is a requirement for salvation and flourishing in the hereafter. This view is perfectly compatible with the disjunctive claim that explicit belief or implicit belief is required (e.g. see Cuneo (2013) on implicit belief). It is also compatible with the disjunctive claim that explicit belief is required either during one’s earthly life or afterwards at some point (e.g. when one receives fuller revelation from God).
- 51.
In Braddock (unpublished) we address this question in response to Marsh’s (2013) development of the “problem of natural non-belief.”
- 52.
My gratitude for comments on material in this paper is due to Justin Barrett , Kelly Clark, Hans van Eyghen, Jason Marsh, John S. Wilkins, and two anonymous reviewers.
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Braddock, M. (2018). An Evidential Argument for Theism from the Cognitive Science of Religion. In: van Eyghen, H., Peels, R., van den Brink, G. (eds) New Developments in the Cognitive Science of Religion. New Approaches to the Scientific Study of Religion , vol 4. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90239-5_10
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