Abstract
Throughout the years, many cryptographically verifiable voting systems have been proposed with a whole spectrum of features and security assumptions. Where the voter casts an in-person (and possibly paper) ballot and leaves, as is common in a governmental election, the majority of the proposals fall in the category of providing unconditional integrity and computational privacy. A minority of papers have looked at the inverse scenario: everlasting privacy with computational integrity. However as far as we know, no paper has succeeded in providing both unconditional integrity and privacy in this setting—it has only been explored in boardroom voting schemes where voters participate in the tallying process. Our paper aims for a two-level contribution: first, we present a concrete system with these security properties (one that works as a backend for common ballot styles like Scantegrity II or Prêt à Voter); and second, we provide some insight into how different combinations of security assumptions are interdependent.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Note we do not refer to assistive technology (AT) that helps voters with disabilities cast a vote—for this reason, we dislike the term barehanded. Rather we mean devices that are trusted to perform a computation for the voter, not navigate an interface.
- 2.
Future work might explore the possibility of giving each shareholder a matrix that interpolates to the correct permutation matrix under the sequential composition of any k-out-of-n interpolations.
References
Adida, B.: Helios: web-based open-audit voting. In: USENIX Security (2008)
Bell, S., Benaloh, J., Byrne, M.D., Debeauvoir, D., Eakin, B., Kortum, P., McBurnett, N., Pereira, O., Stark, P.B., Wallach, D.S., Fisher, G., Montoya, J., Parker, M., Winn, M.: Star-vote: a secure, transparent, auditable, and reliable voting system. JETS 1, 8 (2013)
Benaloh, J.: Simple verifiable elections. In: EVT (2006)
Cohen, J.D., Fisher, M.J.: A robust and verifiable cryptographically secure election scheme. In: SFCS (1985)
Broadbent, A., Tapp, A.: Information-theoretically secure voting without an honest majority. In: WOTE (2008)
Burton, C., Culnane, C., Schneider, S.: Verifiable electronic voting in practice: the use of vvote in the victorian state election. In: IEEE Security and Privacy (2016)
Carback, R.T., Chaum, D., Clark, J., Conway, J., Essex, A., Hernson, P.S., Mayberry, T., Popoveniuc, S., Rivest, R.L., Shen, E., Sherman, A.T., Vora, P.L.: Scantegrity II election at Takoma Park. In: USENIX Security Symposium (2010)
Chaum, D.: Elections with unconditionally-secret ballots and disruption equivalent to breaking RSA. In: Barstow, D., et al. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 1988. LNCS, vol. 330, pp. 177–182. Springer, Heidelberg (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45961-8_15
Chaum, D.: Secret-ballot receipts: true voter-verifiable elections. IEEE Secur. Priv. 2(1), 38–47 (2004)
Chaum, D., Carback, R., Clark, J., Essex, A., Popoveniuc, S., Rivest, R.L., Ryan, P.Y.A., Shen, E., Sherman, A.T.: Scantegrity II: end-to-end verifiability for optical scan election systems using invisible ink confirmation codes. In: EVT (2008)
Chaum, D., Essex, A., Carback, R., Clark, J., Popoveniuc, S., Sherman, A.T., Vora, P.: scantegrity: end-to-end voter verifiable optical-scan voting. IEEE Secur. Priv. 6(3), 40–46 (2008)
Chaum, D., Ryan, P.Y.A., Schneider, S.: A practical voter-verifiable election scheme. In: di Vimercati, S.C., Syverson, P., Gollmann, D. (eds.) ESORICS 2005. LNCS, vol. 3679, pp. 118–139. Springer, Heidelberg (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/11555827_8
Chevallier-Mames, B., Fouque, P.-A., Pointcheval, D., Stern, J., Traoré, J.: On some incompatible properties of voting schemes. In: Chaum, D., Jakobsson, M., Rivest, R.L., Ryan, P.Y.A., Benaloh, J., Kutylowski, M., Adida, B. (eds.) Towards Trustworthy Elections. LNCS, vol. 6000, pp. 191–199. Springer, Heidelberg (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12980-3_11
Clark, J., Hengartner, U.: On the use of financial data as a random beacon. In: EVT/WOTE (2010)
Cramer, R., Franklin, M., Schoenmakers, B., Yung, M.: Multi-authority secret-ballot elections with linear work. In: Maurer, U. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1996. LNCS, vol. 1070, pp. 72–83. Springer, Heidelberg (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-68339-9_7
Cramer, R., Gennaro, R., Schoenmakers, B.: A secure and optimally efficient multi-authority election scheme. In: Fumy, W. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1997. LNCS, vol. 1233, pp. 103–118. Springer, Heidelberg (1997). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-69053-0_9
Demirel, D., van de Graaf, J., dos Santos Araujo, R.S.: Improving Helios with everlasting privacy towards the public. In: EVT/WOTE (2012)
Essex, A., Clark, J., Hengartner, U., Adams, C.: Eperio: mitigating technical complexity in cryptographic election verification. In: EVT/WOTE (2010)
Gallegos-Garcia, G., Iovino, V., Rial, A., Ronne, P.B., Ryan, P.Y.A.: (Universal) unconditional verifiability in e-voting without trusted parties. Technical report, IACR Eprint Report 2016/975 (2016)
Garay, J., Givens, C., Ostrovsky, R., Raykov, P.: Broadcast (and round) efficient verifiable secret sharing. In: ICITS (2014)
Goldwasser, S., Kalaj, Y.: On the (in)security of the Fiat-Shamir paradigm. In: FOCS (2003)
Hao, F., Zieliński, P.: A 2-round anonymous veto protocol. In: Christianson, B., Crispo, B., Malcolm, J.A., Roe, M. (eds.) Security Protocols 2006. LNCS, vol. 5087, pp. 202–211. Springer, Heidelberg (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04904-0_28
Henry, K., Stinson, D.R., Sui, J.: The effectiveness of receipt-based attacks on threeballot. IEEE TIFS 4(4), 699–707 (2009)
Hosp, B., Vora, P.L.: An information-theoretic model of voting systems. Math. Comput. Model. 48, 1628–1645 (2008)
Kiayias, A., Yung, M.: Self-tallying elections and perfect ballot secrecy. In: Naccache, D., Paillier, P. (eds.) PKC 2002. LNCS, vol. 2274, pp. 141–158. Springer, Heidelberg (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45664-3_10
Kiayias, A., Zacharias, T., Zhang, B.: End-to-end verifiable elections in the standard model. Technical report 2015/346, IACR Eprint Report (2015)
Locher, P., Haenni, R.: Verifiable internet elections with everlasting privacy and minimal trust. In: Haenni, R., Koenig, R.E., Wikström, D. (eds.) VOTELID 2015. LNCS, vol. 9269, pp. 74–91. Springer, Cham (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-22270-7_5
Locher, P., Haenni, R., Koenig, R.E.: Coercion-resistant internet voting with everlasting privacy. In: Clark, J., Meiklejohn, S., Ryan, P.Y.A., Wallach, D., Brenner, M., Rohloff, K. (eds.) FC 2016. LNCS, vol. 9604, pp. 161–175. Springer, Heidelberg (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53357-4_11
Malkhi, D., Margo, O., Pavlov, E.: E-voting without ‘Cryptography’. In: Blaze, M. (ed.) FC 2002. LNCS, vol. 2357, pp. 1–15. Springer, Heidelberg (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36504-4_1
Mannan, M., Kim, B.H., Ganjali, A., Lie, D.: Unicorn: two-factor attestation for data security. In: CCS (2011)
Moran, T., Naor, M.: Receipt-free universally-verifiable voting with everlasting privacy. In: CRYPTO (2006)
Moran, T., Naor, M.: Split-ballot voting: everlasting privacy with distributed trust. In: CCS (2007)
Neff, C.A.: A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting. In: CCS (2001)
Popoveniuc, S., Hosp, B.: An introduction to punchscan. In: WOTE (2006)
Rabin, T., Ben-Or, M.: Verifiable secret sharing and multiparty protocols with honest majority. In: Proceedings of the Twenty-first Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 1989, New York, NY, USA, pp. 73–85. ACM (1989)
Riva, B., Ta-Shma, A.: Bare-handed electronic voting with pre-processing. In: Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology, EVT 2007, Berkeley, CA, USA, pp. 15–15. USENIX Association (2007)
Rivest, R.L., Smith, W.D.: Three voting protocols: threeballot, VAV, and twin. In: EVT (2007)
Schoenmakers, B.: A simple publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme and its application to electronic voting. In: Wiener, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1999. LNCS, vol. 1666, pp. 148–164. Springer, Heidelberg (1999). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48405-1_10
Schoenmakers, B.: Fully auditable electronic secret-ballot elections. Xootic Mag. 8, 5 (2000)
Stadler, M.: Publicly verifiable secret sharing. In: Maurer, U. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1996. LNCS, vol. 1070, pp. 190–199. Springer, Heidelberg (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-68339-9_17
Zagórski, F., Carback, R.T., Chaum, D., Clark, J., Essex, A., Vora, P.L.: Remotegrity: design and use of an end-to-end verifiable remote voting system. In: Jacobson, M., Locasto, M., Mohassel, P., Safavi-Naini, R. (eds.) ACNS 2013. LNCS, vol. 7954, pp. 441–457. Springer, Heidelberg (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38980-1_28
Acknowledgements
We thank Claude Crépeau for helpful insights. We thank the anonymous reviewers who pointed out relevant work, suggested interesting ideas, and showed us where our paper needed more clarity. The second author acknowledges funding for this work from NSERC and FQRNT.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2017 International Financial Cryptography Association
About this paper
Cite this paper
Yang, N., Clark, J. (2017). Practical Governmental Voting with Unconditional Integrity and Privacy. In: Brenner, M., et al. Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10323. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70278-0_27
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70278-0_27
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-70277-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-70278-0
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)