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Generic Forward-Secure Key Agreement Without Signatures

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Information Security (ISC 2017)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 10599))

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Abstract

We present a generic, yet simple and efficient transformation to obtain a forward secure authenticated key exchange protocol from a two-move passively secure unauthenticated key agreement scheme (such as standard Diffie–Hellman or Frodo or NewHope). Our construction requires only an IND-CCA public key encryption scheme (such as RSA-OAEP or a method based on ring-LWE), and a message authentication code. Particularly relevant in the context of the state-of-the-art of postquantum secure primitives, we avoid the use of digital signature schemes: practical candidate post-quantum signature schemes are less accepted (and require more bandwidth) than candidate post-quantum public key encryption schemes. An additional feature of our proposal is that it helps avoid the bad practice of using long term keys certified for encryption to produce digital signatures. We prove the security of our transformation in the random oracle model.

This work has been supported in part by ERC Advanced Grant ERC-2015-AdG-IMPaCT.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK

    Cyprien de Saint Guilhem, Nigel P. Smart & Bogdan Warinschi

Authors
  1. Cyprien de Saint Guilhem
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  2. Nigel P. Smart
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  3. Bogdan Warinschi
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Nigel P. Smart .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Inria, Tokyo, Japan

    Phong Q. Nguyen

  2. Singapore University of Technology and Design, Singapore, Singapore

    Jianying Zhou

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de Saint Guilhem, C., Smart, N.P., Warinschi, B. (2017). Generic Forward-Secure Key Agreement Without Signatures. In: Nguyen, P., Zhou, J. (eds) Information Security. ISC 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10599. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69659-1_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69659-1_7

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