Abstract
Projects financed by the World Bank have, on a number of occasions, attracted criticism for involving violations of workers’ rights. The revised World Bank safeguard policies, adopted in 2016, address some of these concerns by submitting projects financed by the Bank to specific labour standards requirements. The present chapter offers an in-depth analysis of the safeguard policies’ labour component. After providing some context, it examines the substantive labour standards requirements and looks at the procedural framework through which these requirements are to be implemented. The chapter also explores the safeguard policies’ potential to positively affect labour standards in practice and points to some general features which may limit their effectiveness.
This chapter draws on previous research by the author, in particular Ebert (2013, 2014). The author is grateful to Janelle Diller, Simon Hentrei, Violetta Ritz and the editor of this volume for useful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies.
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Notes
- 1.
Woods (2001), p. 88.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
See e.g. the report by Human Rights Watch (2014) on endemic forced labour in World Bank funded projects in the Uzbek cotton industry and the one by Bank Information Center (2015) on widespread child labour in a Bank-sponsored transport sector project in Uganda. In the latter case, the Bank eventually cancelled the project due to the numerous social issues it raised; see World Bank, World Bank Statement on Cancellation of the Uganda Transport Sector Development Project (TSDP), Press Release of 21 Dec 2015, available at http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/12/21/wb-statement-cancellation-uganda-transport-sector-development-project. Accessed 9 Aug 2017.
- 5.
A key actor from civil society has been the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC).
- 6.
See Murphy (2014), pp. 401, 409–410, 418–424.
- 7.
See Ragazzi (2012), para. 2. The terms ‘World Bank’, ‘Bank’ and ‘IBRD and IDA’ are used in an interchangeable manner.
- 8.
See Guder (2011), para. 1.
- 9.
Apart from the IBRD and the IDA, these are the International Finance Corporation, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, and the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. The latter institution is not directly relevant to the subject of the chapter and shall not be addressed in the following.
- 10.
For the purpose of this chapter, the term ‘safeguard policies’shall be defined as comprising those instruments that set out obligations for WBG staff and borrowers with a view to avoiding adverse social and environmental impacts of activities supported by the WBG.
- 11.
World Bank (2016) Environmental and Social Framework.
- 12.
By contrast, the WBG’s technical and political oversight mechanisms, such as the Independent Evaluation Group or the Executive Board, shall not be addressed here. Also, the question of whether the WBG’s members are themselves subject to certain labour standards-related obligations under international law, including international human rights law, is beyond the paper’s scope of analysis. See on this question in general McBeth (2010), pp. 178–184; Fujita (2013), pp. 7–12.
- 13.
The World Bank carries out a number of additional activities, e.g. the administration of specific trust funds. See Schlemmer-Schulte (2014), para. 87 et seq.
- 14.
Note that also the IBRD and the IDA can engage in activities with the private sector. Among others, the two institutions can issue guarantees for investments by private companies which are complementary to those issued by MIGA. See Schlemmer-Schulte (2014), paras. 56, 79–83 and Guder (2011), para. 17.
- 15.
See Schlemmer-Schulte (2014), para. 56. Its Articles of Agreement require the IBRD to act as a ‘lender of last resort’ and limit its financial services to countries that would otherwise have insufficient access to such loans. See ibid., referring to Art. III Sec. 4 (ii) IBRD Articles of Agreement.
- 16.
- 17.
See World Bank (2013) Operational Policy 10.00—Investment Project Financing, revised July 2014.
- 18.
- 19.
See Schlemmer-Schulte (2014), para. 55.
- 20.
See the World Bank Group (2014) Directive on Country Engagement, OPCS 5.01-DIR.01. The CFP replaces the Bank’s earlier Country Assistance Strategies. See on this Tan (2011), pp. 113–114. The Bank, jointly with the IMF, also used to employ Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), in which low-income countries set out their development strategy, as the basis for the financial assistance provided to these countries by these two institutions. This device was also seen to serve as a tool to influence economic policy making at the domestic level at an early stage; see Tan (2011), pp. 3–5. The World Bank has discontinued this joint approach as of 2014 although the IMF carries on with a slightly adjusted Poverty Reduction Strategy. See IMF (2016), p. 1.
- 21.
See further IBRD/IDA/IFC/MIGA (2016) Guidance on the Systematic Country Diagnostic, OPS5.01-GUID.104).
- 22.
See Schlemmer-Schulte (2014), para. 98.
- 23.
Earlier reports feature the IFC and the World Bank as co-publishers; see e.g. IFC and World Bank (2013).
- 24.
- 25.
See Schlemmer-Schulte (2014), para. 86.
- 26.
O’Brien (2014), p. 154.
- 27.
See the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up, International Labour Conference, adopted on 18 June 1998 and further La Hovary (2009), pp. 21 et seq.
- 28.
Murphy (2014), p. 405.
- 29.
See on this process Anner and Caraway (2010), pp. 156–159.
- 30.
See on this issue Maupain (2013), pp. 72–79 and in general Darrow (2003), pp. 152–154. In this regard, the Bank’s practice was to invoke the non-political interference clause of Art. IV (10) IBRD Articles of Agreement. For a historical account of the—often rather selective—application of this provision see Janse (2014).
- 31.
See on this question McBeth (2010), pp. 179–181.
- 32.
Murphy (2014), p. 407. This has also involved secondments of trade union officials to the World Bank. Ibid p. 409.
- 33.
Anner and Caraway (2010), p. 167.
- 34.
See Global Unions (2007), p. 7 for examples.
- 35.
- 36.
This includes minimum wage issues, hours of work, and leave.
- 37.
See on this Santos (2009), pp. 63–64.
- 38.
See Global Unions (2007), pp. 8–11.
- 39.
- 40.
- 41.
- 42.
See World Bank (2015), p. 118.
- 43.
Kuddo et al. (2015), p. 1.
- 44.
World Bank (2012), pp. 257–258, 292 and 297–298, respectively.
- 45.
For examples see ITUC (2011), pp. 19–26.
- 46.
IFC also engages in long-term investments through equity and provides financing through financial intermediaries. See Asrani and Dann (2014), para. 11 mentioning also some additional financial services provided by IFC.
- 47.
See Loewenfeld (2008), pp. 586–587.
- 48.
The IFC has also partnered with the ILO for the so-called ‘Better Work Programme’. This programme involves company-level monitoring, carried out by local ILO staff, of labour standards compliance in the textile sector of the participant countries, alongside training and advisory activities. See further on this Diller (2015), p. 335.
- 49.
IFC (1998) Policy Statement on Forced Labor and Harmful Child Labor.
- 50.
IFC (2012) Performance Standards on Social & Environmental Sustainability (hereinafter IFC, Performance Standards).
- 51.
The relevant areas consist of ‘Resource Efficiency and Pollution Prevention, Community Health, Safety, and Security, Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement, Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Management of Living Natural Resources, Indigenous Peoples, and Cultural Heritage’, see IFC (2012) Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability.
- 52.
See IFC, Sustainability Policy, paras. 3–5; Also, IFC’s ‚Access to Information Policies’ establish what information the staff of the two institutions is to provide to the public.
- 53.
See on this Krajewski (2013), p. 207.
- 54.
MIGA (2013) Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability; MIGA (2013) Policy on Environmental and Social Sustainability (hereinafter MIGA, Sustainability Policy) and MIGA (2013) Access to Information Policy.
- 55.
See further Ebert (2014), pp. 233–234.
- 56.
IFC (2012) Performance Standard 1. Assessment and Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts (hereinafter IFC, Performance Standard 1); MIGA (2013) Performance Standard 1. Assessment and Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts (hereinafter MIGA, Performance Standard 1), para. 5, respectively.
- 57.
IFC (2012) Performance Standard 2. Labor and Working Conditions (hereinafter IFC, Performance Standard 2) and MIGA (2013) Performance Standard 2. Labor and Working Conditions (hereinafter MIGA, Performance Standard 2), paras. 13–17 and 21–22, respectively.
- 58.
IFC/MIGA, Performance Standard 2, para. 10, 18–19, 23, respectively.
- 59.
Ibid., para. 20.
- 60.
IFC/MIGA, Sustainability Policy, para. 21, respectively.
- 61.
IFC/MIGA, Performance Standard 1, para. 7, respectively.
- 62.
Ibid., para. 16.
- 63.
This may include an analysis of relevant documents, interviews, and on-site visits. IFC, Sustainability Policy, para. 28 and MIGA, Sustainability Policy, para. 26. Different—and somewhat reduced—requirements exist for operations relating to financial intermediaries and for advisory and certain technical activities. See IFC, Sustainability Policy, paras. 32–37 and 38–39 and MIGA, Sustainability Policy, paras. 30–37.
- 64.
This involves, among others, ‘annual monitoring reports’ to be prepared by the client company, see IFC, Sustainability Policy, para. 45 and MIGA, Sustainability Policy, para. 43.
- 65.
For example, IFC has created a Social and Environmental Development Department with which inquiries and complaints can be filed online. See ITUC (2011), p. 19.
- 66.
World Bank (2007), pp. 149–154; 232–233.
- 67.
World Bank (2013) Operational Policy 4.03—Performance Standards for Private Sector Activities and World Bank (2013) Bank Procedures 4.03—Performance Standards for Private Sector Activities.
- 68.
Examples include indigenous peoples, involuntary resettlement, cultural resources, and environmental matters. See World Bank (2005), Operational Policy 4.10—Indigenous Peoples, revised April 2013; World Bank (2001), Operational Policy 4.12—Involuntary Resettlement, revised April 2013; World Bank (2001) Operational Policy 4.12—Involuntary Resettlement, revised April 2013; World Bank (2006) Operational Policy 4.11—Physical Cultural Resources, revised in April 2013 and World Bank (1999) Operational Policy 4.01—Environmental Assessment, revised in April 2013.
- 69.
See Bradlow and Naudé Fourie (2013), p. 18.
- 70.
See further below at 4.2.
- 71.
See World Bank (2016) Review and update of the World Bank’s Safeguard Policies Environmental and Social Framework, proposed Third Draft, Strengthening the effectiveness of our safeguard policies to enhance the development outcomes of Bank operations (hereinafter ‘Review and Update’), p. 8.
- 72.
World Bank (2016) A Vision for Sustainable Development.
- 73.
The full title is ‘World Bank Environmental and Social Policy for Investment Project Financing’ (hereinafter ‘ES Policy’).
- 74.
The first eight ESS are: Environmental and Social Standard 1. Assessment and Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts (hereinafter ‘ESS 1’); Environmental and Social Standard 2. Labor and Working Conditions (hereinafter ‘ESS 2’); Environmental and Social Standard 3. Resource Efficiency and Pollution Prevention and Management; Environmental and Social Standard 4. Community Health and Safety; Environmental and Social Standard 5. Land Acquisition, Restrictions on Land Use and Involuntary Resettlement; Environmental and Social Standard 6. Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Management of Living Natural Resources; Environmental and Social Standard 7. Indigenous Peoples; Environmental and Social Standard 8. Cultural Heritage.
- 75.
Environmental and Social Standard 9. Financial Intermediaries (hereinafter ‘ESS 9’).
- 76.
Environmental and Social Standard 10. Stakeholder Engagement and Information Disclosure (hereinafter ‘ESS 10’).
- 77.
World Bank, Press Release, ‘World Bank Board Approves New Environmental and Social Framework’, 4 Aug 2016, available at http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/08/04/world-bank-board-approves-new-environmental-and-social-framework. Accessed 9 Aug 2017.
- 78.
For comprehensive documentation see at https://consultations.worldbank.org/consultation/review-and-update-world-bank-safeguard-policies. Accessed 9 Aug 2017.
- 79.
See World Bank (2016) Review and Update, p. 11.
- 80.
See World Bank (2012) The World Bank’s Safeguard Policies proposed review and update. Approach paper.
- 81.
World Bank (2014) Environmental and Social Framework. First Draft for Consultation.
- 82.
World Bank (2015) Environmental and Social Framework. Second Draft for Consultation.
- 83.
World Bank (2016) Environmental and Social Framework. Setting Environmental and Social Standards for Investment Project Financing.
- 84.
See World Bank, Review and Update, p. 22.
- 85.
Ibid.
- 86.
Under ESS 2, the requirements on retrenchment are now contained in the sub-section on “Terms and Conditions of Employment”, rather than in a sub-section, and have been watered down in comparison to the IFC/MIGA Performance Standards; see ESS 2, para. 12. The latter require the client company to examine alternatives to the retrenchment and, where those are not viable, to set up a retrenchment plan complying with certain requirements. Also, the severance pay and outstanding salary payments have to be made within a reasonable timeframe. See IFC/ MIGA, Performance Standard 2, paras. 18–19, respectively.
- 87.
The Performance Standards note that they ‘have been in part guided by a number of international conventions and instruments’ and refer to the eight ILO Fundamental Conventions relating to the Core Labour Standards. See IFC Performance Standards, para. 2.
- 88.
See notably ESS 2, paras. 13–20.
- 89.
See ESS 2, paras. 10–12.
- 90.
Ibid., paras. 10–11.
- 91.
Cf. ibid., para. 11 and IFC/MIGA, Performance Standard 2, para. 10, respectively.
- 92.
See ESS 2, paras. 24–30.
- 93.
Cf. IFC Performance Standards, para. 23.
- 94.
See ESS 2, para. 25.
- 95.
Ibid., paras. 21–23.
- 96.
See World Bank (2016) Review and Update, p. 31.
- 97.
The term ‘Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work’ was coined by the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 1998. In its para. 2, it refers to ‘the principles concerning the fundamental rights […], namely: (a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; (b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; (c) the effective abolition of child labour; and (d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation’. In this regard, the Declaration makes reference to eight ‘Fundamental Conventions’ which further specify these rights.
- 98.
See further Ebert (2014), pp. 235–237.
- 99.
See ESS 2, paras. 13 and 16.
- 100.
Ibid., para. 13.
- 101.
Cf., in particular, ILO Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951, No. 100 and ILO Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958, No. 111.
- 102.
See, in particular, ILO Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948, No. 87 and ILO Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949, No. 98.
- 103.
See ESS 2, para 16.
- 104.
ESS 2, para. 3 (a) in conjunction with para. 4.
- 105.
Ibid., para. 3 (a).
- 106.
Ibid., paras. 3 (b)–(d) and 34.
- 107.
See Ibid., para. 5 in conjunction with paras. 31–33.
- 108.
Ibid., para. 31.
- 109.
ESS 2, paras. 32 and 33. Some minor improvements regarding the level of protection are apparent in comparison to IFC/MIGA, Performance Standards 2. Notably, ESS 2 obligates borrowers to include the requirements contained in ESS 2 into their agreements with relevant contractors while the relevant IFC/MIGA standards only required the contractor to ‘take commercially reasonable efforts’ to do so. Cf. ESS 2, para. 32. with IFC, Performance Standard 2, para. 25. Another new feature of ESS 2 is an obligation incumbent on the borrower to ensure that contractors ‘include equivalent requirements and non-compliance remedies in their contractual agreements with subcontractors’, ESS 2, para. 32.
- 110.
See ESS 2, para. 40. The relevant requirements are weaker than those included into the IFC/MIGA Performance Standards as under ESS 2 the borrower does no longer have to identify the relevant risks himself but only has to ‘require’ its supplier to do so. Cf. ibid. with IFC/MIGA, Performance Standard 2, para. 27, respectively.
- 111.
See ESS 2, para. 41. Where it is not possible to bring the primary supplier into compliance, the borrower has to change to a supplier which demonstrably is in line with the relevant standards, see ESS 2, para. 42.
- 112.
See ESS 2, para. 35. It is unclear whether the requirements concerning workers’ organizations are applicable to community workers at all. While the ESS 2 requirements on conditions of employment and occupation safety and health are expressly mentioned in the relevant provision and subject to certain procedural requirements, this is not the case for workers’ organizations.
- 113.
ESS 2, para. 37. With regard to occupational safety and health, only the general and industry-specific World Bank Group Environmental, Health and Safety Guidelines must be systematically applied; see ibid., para. 36.
- 114.
Ibid., paras. 40 and 41.
- 115.
ESS 2, para. 35.
- 116.
See World Bank, Review and Update, especially pp. 1, 10–11, 23.
- 117.
ESS 2, para. 3 (b).
- 118.
Ibid., footnote 4.
- 119.
ESS 2, para. 3 (c), footnote 5.
- 120.
Already IFC/MIGA Performance Standard 2 involved this problem, with the relevant Guidance Note merely noting that client companies ought not to take up ‘disguised employment relationships’. See IFC, Guidance Note 2, para. 8.
- 121.
- 122.
ES Policy, paras. 30–32. Apart from the requirements under ESS2 also domestic law is to be ‘take[n] into account’; see ESS 1, para. 26.
- 123.
Ibid., para. 32.
- 124.
See ESS 1, para. 25. This concerns notably ‘High and Substantial Risk projects, as well as situations in which the Borrower has limited capacity’.
- 125.
See ES Policy, para. 53. On the requirements the borrowers are to meet with regard to stakeholder consultations see also ESS 10, para. 6 et seq.
- 126.
See ES Policy, para. 20.
- 127.
Ibid., para. 46.
- 128.
See ibid. and ESS 1, para. 36 and for further analysis Dann and Riegner (2017), p. 12.
- 129.
See ES Policy, para. 56 and ESS 1, paras. 40, 45–50.
- 130.
See ES Policy, paras. 60–61.
- 131.
Ibid., para. 32 and IFC/ MIGA, Performance Standard 1, para. 7, respectively.
- 132.
- 133.
See on this argument relating to the IFC Performance Standards McBeth (2010), p. 215.
- 134.
ES Policy, para. 35.
- 135.
It is conspicuous that the relevant standards are framed as ‘policies’ rather than as legal requirements. Some authors attribute this to a general reluctance among WBG staff towards legal concepts and to a preference towards flexible arrangements, see Bradlow and Naudé Fourie (2013), p. 8.
- 136.
ESS 1 provides, for example that borrowers ‘will assess, manage and monitor the environmental and social risks and impacts of the project […] so as to meet the requirements of the ESSs in a manner and within a timeframe acceptable to the Bank’ (emphasis added). See ESS 1, para. 14.
- 137.
For example, the ES Policy stipulates that any ‘draft [Environmental and Social Commitment Plan] will be disclosed as early as possible, and before project appraisal’, see ES Policy, para. 47. See for further examples Dann and Riegner (2017), p. 11.
- 138.
Regarding the labour-related IFC/MIGA Performance Standards, some authors have argued that the labour standards-related requirements of the Performance Standard will mostly be effective in cases where trade unions exist to scrutinize the client company’s observance of these requirements. See Bakvis and McCoy (2008), p. 7.
- 139.
- 140.
See Bakvis and McCoy (2008), p. 6.
- 141.
See Murie (2009), pp. 15–16.
- 142.
See Murphy (2014), p. 409.
- 143.
See further Ebert (2014), pp. 246–247.
- 144.
- 145.
See CAO (2013) Operational Guidelines (hereinafter CAO, Operational Guidelines 2013), pp. 4–5.
- 146.
See on the eligibility requirements CAO, Operational Guidelines 2013, p. 13.
- 147.
Ibid., pp. 13–15, 18. Relevant means in this regard can include document analysis, hearings, interviews, as well as on-site visits. See further Arp (2012), pp. 141–142.
- 148.
See CAO, Operational Guidelines 2013, pp. 14, 22. Furthermore, the CAO Vice President as well as the WBG President and MIGA’s or IFC’s senior management can set in motion the compliance procedure. See ibid., p. 22.
- 149.
Ibid., p. 23.
- 150.
See ibid., p. 24.
- 151.
The Compliance Panel will examine the case based on sources such as document review, interviews, and on-site observations. See ibid., pp. 23–24.
- 152.
Ibid., p. 25.
- 153.
Cf. ibid., p. 4. Also, while the reports of the CAO are, in principle, public, the WBG President may prohibit publication of the compliance reports, ibid., p. 25.
- 154.
Ibid., p. 25.
- 155.
See the CAO’s database on cases. http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/. Accessed 9 Aug 2017. This paragraph is based on Ebert (2014), pp. 246–247.
- 156.
In general, the vast majority of cases filed with the CAO gets resolved at the dispute resolution stage. See Bradlow and Naudé Fourie (2013), p. 28.
- 157.
See CAO, Turkey/Standard Profil-01/Duzce, Regarding Labor Rights Concerns at Standart Profil, Stakeholder Assessment, 2 Feb 2009, p. 4.
- 158.
CAO, Turkey/Standard Profil-01/Duzce. Ombudsman Conclusion Report, June 2012, p. 2.
- 159.
See Berber Agtas (2009), pp. 38–89.
- 160.
See CAO, Colombia/Avianca-01/Colombia, Case Summary.
- 161.
Prior to this, the complainants had already raised these issues with IFC’s staff which had not addressed the matters at hand to the satisfaction of the complainants. See further ITUC (2011), p. 23.
- 162.
See CAO, Colombia/Avianca-01/Colombia, Case Summary.
- 163.
CAO, Complaint from Global Unions on behalf of unions representing employees of Avianca, Investigation of IFC Investment in Avianca S.A., 27 Apr 2015, C-I-R9-Y12-F165, 27 April 2015 (hereinafter CAO, Avianca), pp. 16–17.
- 164.
CAO, Avianca, pp. 17–19.
- 165.
Ibid., pp. 22–25.
- 166.
Ibid., pp. 26–27.
- 167.
Among others, the CAO stated that ‘Similarly, CAO is unable to support IFC’s argument that disclosure is discretionary in cases where a client has contentious relationships with its workers or their union representatives. Indeed, disclosure and consultation, while difficult, may be most important in such circumstances.’ See ibid., p. 25. This has also occurred in some CAO cases not concerning labour standards; see e.g. Bradlow and Naudé Fourie (2013), p. 43.
- 168.
See also ITUC (2015).
- 169.
See CAO (2017), p. 9.
- 170.
See further Ebert (2014), pp. 242–245.
- 171.
This is also accepted by organizations that tend to have a critical attitude regarding the WBG. See for example ITUC (2011), p. 14.
- 172.
See, for examples from other areas, Bradlow and Naudé Fourie (2013), pp. 48 and 59.
- 173.
- 174.
See, e.g. Tan (2008), p. 97.
- 175.
See Wong and Mayer (2015), p. 497.
- 176.
Naudé Fourie (2009), in particular pp. 323–328.
- 177.
See IBRD and IDA (1993), Resolution on the World Bank Inspection Panel (Res. No. IBRD 93-10, Res. No. IDA 93-6), para. 12.
- 178.
This does, of course, not amount to full independence from the Bank, also because the Panel has in part to rely on Bank Management and Staff to implement its findings. See on this Carrascott and Guernsey (2008), p. 600.
- 179.
See López-Jacoiste (2015), pp. 122–125.
- 180.
See further Carrascott and Guernsey (2008), pp. 595–597.
- 181.
See e.g. Wahi (2006), pp. 356–359.
- 182.
- 183.
See Kim (2008), p. 157.
- 184.
For further details, see Naudé Fourie (2009), in particular pp. 177–181.
- 185.
World Bank Inspection Panel (2014) Operating Procedures, para. 41.
- 186.
Ibid., para. 43 lit. a.
- 187.
World Bank Group (1999) Clarification of the Board’s Second Review of the Inspection Panel, para. 9 and World Bank Inspection Panel (2014) Operating Procedures, para. 49.
- 188.
As of June 2014, out of the 77 cases completed by the Panel only 27 were reportedly investigated. See Wong and Mayer (2015), p. 504.
- 189.
Ibid., pp. 505–506.
- 190.
Ibid., p. 506. See on this approach Bugalski (2016), pp. 42–44, who also notes problems of this approach due to, among others, the absence of a fully-fledged framework for dispute settlement under the Panel’s Operating Procedures.
- 191.
- 192.
See Wong and Mayer (2015), p. 506.
- 193.
Ibid., pp. 506–507.
- 194.
- 195.
See Barlas and Tassoni (2015), p. 493.
- 196.
- 197.
See Wong and Mayer (2015), p. 517.
- 198.
Ibid., p. 515 and Bugalski (2016), pp. 36–38 with specific examples.
- 199.
See Lukas (2015), p. 544.
- 200.
See further Wong and Mayer (2015), p. 516.
- 201.
See World Bank Inspection Panel (2013), Report and Recommendation, Republic Of Uzbekistan: Second Rural Enterprise Support Project (P109126) and Additional Financing for Second Rural Enterprise Support Project (P126962) (Report No. 83254-UZ), 9 Dec 2013, para. 101.
- 202.
See ibid., para. 104.
- 203.
World Bank Inspection Panel, Republic of Uzbekistan: Second Rural Enterprise Support Project (P 109126) and Additional Financing for the Second Rural Enterprise Support Project (P 126962), Final Eligibility Report and Recommendation, Report No. 93222·UZ, 19 Dec 2014, para. 19.
- 204.
Ibid., para. 18; see also paras. 20–24.
- 205.
Ibid., para. 37.
- 206.
Letter to the President of the World Bank by Cotton Campaign, 29 Jan 2015. http://www.cottoncampaign.org/uploads/3/9/4/7/39474145/letter_to_wb_president_january2015.pdf. Accessed 9 Aug 2017.
- 207.
See Press Release by Human Rights Watch, World Bank: No Probe of Link to Abuses in Uzbekistan. Decision on Forced Labor ‘Shocking,’ Rights Advocates Say, 2 Feb 2015, available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/02/world-bank-no-probe-link-abuses-uzbekistan. Accessed 9 Aug 2017 and Press Release by Bretton Woods Project, World Bank rejects investigation into Uzbek child and forced labour, 31 Mar 2015, available at http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2015/03/world-bank-rejects-investigation-into-uzbek-child-and-forced-labour/. Accessed 9 Aug 2017.
- 208.
See Joint Letter to the World Bank by The Cotton Campaign et al., 19 Nov 2015, available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/20/joint-letter-world-bank. Accessed 9 Aug 2017.
- 209.
See prominently ES Policy, paras. 23–29. For a critique of this proposed shift to a ‘Country Systems Approach’ under the earlier safeguards see already Tan (2008), pp. 97–98.
- 210.
See ES Policy, para. 24. Under the Bank’s preceding safeguards this had only been exceptionally possible and been applied in a negligible fraction of Bank-supported projects. See World Bank (2015) Operational Policy 4.00, Piloting the Use of Borrower Systems to Address Environmental and Social Safeguard Issues in Bank-Supported Projects and World Bank Independent Evaluation Group (2010), Safeguards and Sustainability Policies in a Changing World. An Independent Evaluation of World Bank Group Experience, p. 85.
- 211.
See ES Policy, para. 24.
- 212.
See Dann and Riegner (2017), p. 16.
- 213.
Cf. ES Policy, para. 23.
- 214.
Ibid. This wording is reproduced in ESS 1, para. 19 and World Bank (2016) Bank Procedure. Environmental and Social Procedure. Deliberative Working Draft (hereinafter ‘ES Procedure’), para. 45.
- 215.
See ES Policy, paras. 23–29; ESS 1, paras. 19–22; Draft ES Procedure, paras. 44–57 and World Bank (2016) Information Note, Assessing the Borrower’s Environmental and Social Framework. Deliberative Working Draft, para. 4.
- 216.
ES Policy, para. 23.
- 217.
Ibid., paras. 25–26. Where ‘gaps’ between the borrower’s ‘environmental and social framework’ and the ESS are apparent, the Bank can also assist the borrower to “address gaps[...] and strengthen the Borrower’s ES Framework”, ES Policy, para. 27.
- 218.
Draft ES Procedure, para. 46.
- 219.
For an argument in the same vein see Dann and Riegner (2017), p. 15.
- 220.
ES Policy, para. 37 (a).
- 221.
Ibid., para. 37 (b).
- 222.
See ESS 9, in particular paras. 7–9.
- 223.
ES Policy, para. 7. See for the scope of these operations World Bank (2013) Operational Policy 10.00—Investment Project Financing, revised July 2014, para. 1.
- 224.
ES Policy, para 7, Fn. 12.
- 225.
- 226.
On the Bank’s Poverty and Social Impact Assessments and limitations see, e.g., Darrow (2003), pp. 265–267 noting significant implementation deficits in this regard.
- 227.
Such elements continue to be included into World Bank’s development programming devices. See, e.g., the 2013 Country Assistance Strategy Paper on Benin, p. 44 which mentions the ‘passage of a new labor code’ as an envisaged ‘milestone’ under the results area on an ‘Improved Investment Climate’.
- 228.
- 229.
For a similar point see also Bugalski (2016), p. 30, analysing an earlier draft of the ESF.
- 230.
Tan (2008), p. 93. In particular, the shift of responsibility for social and environmental assessments from the Bank to its borrowers can be seen as a reaction to concerns that the approach of the existing safeguards was too costly and put the Bank at a disadvantage vis-à-vis its competitors. See ibid., pp. 98–99.
- 231.
This includes in particular the BRICS-led New Development Bank and the China-led Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank. See further Bugalski (2016), pp. 3–4.
- 232.
For a substantial analysis on human rights issues in general see Tan (2008), pp. 106–115.
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Ebert, F.C. (2018). Labour Standards and the World Bank. Analysing the Potential of Safeguard Policies for Protecting Workers. In: Gött, H. (eds) Labour Standards in International Economic Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69447-4_13
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