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Sincere Cooperation in the Common Commercial Policy: Lisbon, a “Joined-Up” Union, and “Brexit”

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European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2017

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((EUROYEAR,volume 8))

Abstract

The article elaborates on the significance of the duty of sincere cooperation as a legal principle in the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) of the European Union (EU), in particular as regards the relationship between the Union and its Member States. It argues that while the duty of sincere cooperation is a judicially enforceable duty vis-à-vis the Member States, it is losing some of its relevance in the context of the CCP. This is due to the fact that the Lisbon Treaty, as confirmed by the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU, expanded the scope of the CCP and clearly identifies it as an exclusive competence of the Union. Loyalty in the CCP, therefore, is mainly covered by the obligation to respect the exclusivity of the Union’s international powers in this area. While this does not equate to the disappearance of the Member States as actors in international economic governance, it does seriously constrain their leeway for autonomous action. In addition, the article applies this finding to a number of current developments surrounding the CCP. These include, firstly, the new Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy, which promotes the idea of a “joined-up” approach between different actors and policies; secondly, “Brexit” and the prospect of the United Kingdom negotiating new trade agreements of its own; thirdly, the position of the Member States in the WTO; and fourthly, the nature of the wave of new free trade agreements that the EU is negotiating and concluding.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Meunier and Nicolaïdis (2011).

  2. 2.

    Larik (2011), pp. 23–34.

  3. 3.

    Minister Eyskens in 1990 noted that the European Community was “an economic giant, a political dwarf, and a military worm”. Quoted in McCormick (2008), p. 192.

  4. 4.

    See statistics on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from the World Bank, GDP (current US$), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (last accessed 1 March 2017).

  5. 5.

    Article 110 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (original version of 1957).

  6. 6.

    Article 206 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

  7. 7.

    Article 21(2) lit. e Treaty on European Union (TEU).

  8. 8.

    Article 21(2) lit. b TEU.

  9. 9.

    Article 3(5) TEU.

  10. 10.

    Article 21(2) lit. h TEU.

  11. 11.

    European Commission, Trade for All: Towards a More Responsible Trade and Investment Policy, COM (2015) 497 final, Brussels, 14 October 2015; see previously European Commission, Global Europe: Competing in the World: A Contribution to the EU’s Growth and Jobs Strategy, COM (2006) 567 final, Brussels, 4 October 2006.

  12. 12.

    Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016.

  13. 13.

    European Council, Conclusions, EUCO 26/16, Brussels, 28 June 2016, para. 20.

  14. 14.

    Article 3(1) lit. e TFEU.

  15. 15.

    See Dederer (2013).

  16. 16.

    Article XI:1 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.

  17. 17.

    See, for instance, the Free trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part, OJ 2011 L 127/6.

  18. 18.

    See the reply of the European Commission to an opinion issued by 20 parliaments of the Member States, Maroš Šefčovič, Vice-President of the European Commission, Brussels, 16 October 2014, C (2014) 7557 final.

  19. 19.

    Hillion (2010), p. 87.

  20. 20.

    See De Baere and Roes (2015); Klamert (2014); Hatje (2001); Hyett (2000).

  21. 21.

    Klamert (2014), p. 183 et seq.; Delgado Casteleiro and Larik (2011); Neframi (2010); Hillion (2010); Kaiser (2009), p. 47 et seq.; Heliskoski (2001), p. 46 et seq.

  22. 22.

    Article 13(2) TEU.

  23. 23.

    Article 4(3) TEU.

  24. 24.

    Article 4(2) TEU; see seminally Millet (2013).

  25. 25.

    See from the more recent case law of the CJEU, opinion 2/13, ECHR, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, para. 173; CJEU, case C-66/13, Green Network, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2399, para. 7; CJEU, case C-41/11, Inter-Environnement Wallonie, ECLI:EU:C:2012:103, para. 43.

  26. 26.

    See the judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court (Second Senate) of 15 December 2015, 2 BvR 2735/14, paras. 40–50, where explicit reference is made to Article 4(3) and Article 4(2) TEU.

  27. 27.

    See first and foremost Article 3(1) TEU, which declares the promotion of peace, the Union’s values and the well-being of its people to be objectives of the EU. Also with specific regard to the EU’s external action, there is no shortage of broadly defined ambitions, see Articles 3(5) and 21 TEU.

  28. 28.

    See Piris (2010), p. 73.

  29. 29.

    Article 24(2) TEU.

  30. 30.

    Article 24(3) TEU.

  31. 31.

    Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016, p. 46.

  32. 32.

    Article 24(1) subpara. 2 TEU, read in conjunction with Article 40 TEU and Article 275(2) TFEU. See further on the “bipolarity” between CFSP and other EU policies, Dashwood (2014). But see, for an argument to extend the duty of sincere cooperation into the CFSP, Hillion (2014), p. 67.

  33. 33.

    Article 42(7) TEU. This provision, and not the one on mutual solidarity enshrined in Article 222 TFEU, was invoked for the first time in December 2015 by the French government following the terrorist attacks in Paris, see Council of the European Union, Outcome of the Council Meeting, 3426th Council meeting, Foreign Affairs, Brussels, 16 and 17 November 2015, 14,120/15 (OR en), Presse 69, PR CO 61, p. 6.

  34. 34.

    Article 222 TFEU.

  35. 35.

    From the recent case law in the context of internal EU policies see, for example, CJEU, case C-515/14, Commission v. Cyprus, ECLI:EU:C:2016:30; CJEU, case C-408/14, Aliny Wojciechowski v. Office national des pensions (ONP), ECLI:EU:C:2015:591. See also the CJEU, opinion 2/13, ECHR, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, para. 173; CJEU, case C-66/13, Green Network, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2399, para. 7; CJEU, case C-41/11, Inter-Environnement Wallonie, ECLI:EU:C:2012:103, para. 43.

  36. 36.

    See, for instance, CJEU, case C-308/06, Intertanko, ECLI:EU:C:2008:312, para. 52, where the CJEU found that in “view of the customary principle of good faith, which forms part of general international law, and of Article 10 EC [now Article 4(3) TEU], it is incumbent upon the Court to interpret” secondary Union legislation in a way that takes into account international legal rules which are binding on the Member States, but not the Union.

  37. 37.

    CJEU, case C-246/07, Commission v. Sweden (PFOS), ECLI:EU:C:2010:203, para. 104; and CJEU, opinion 2/91, ILO, ECLI:EU:C:1993:106, para. 36. See further Thies (2012), p. 721.

  38. 38.

    See the Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, CJEU, case C-246/07, Commission v. Sweden (PFOS), ECLI:EU:C:2009:589, para. 37.

  39. 39.

    CJEU, case C-433/03, Commission v. Germany (Inland Waterways), ECLI:EU:C:2005:462, para. 66; CJEU, case C-266/03, Commission v. Luxembourg (Inland Waterways), ECLI:EU:C:2005:341, para. 60.

  40. 40.

    CJEU, case C-433/03, Commission v. Germany (Inland Waterways), ECLI:EU:C:2005:462, paras. 68–70; see also CJEU, case C-459/03, Commission v. Ireland (Mox Plant), ECLI:EU:C:2006:345, paras. 179–181.

  41. 41.

    CJEU, case C-459/03, Commission v. Ireland (Mox Plant), ECLI:EU:C:2006:345, paras. 173–181.

  42. 42.

    See CJEU, case C-658/11, Parliament v. Council (Mauritius Pirate Transfer Agreement), ECLI:EU:C:2014:2025, in which the CJEU found the Council had violated the European Parliament’s right to be informed, as enshrined in Article 218(10) TFEU, which is specifically about the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements, including those which fall primarily into the CFSP. Article 4(3) TEU was not mentioned in this case.

  43. 43.

    CJEU, case C-433/03, Commission v. Germany (Inland Waterways), ECLI:EU:C:2005:462, para. 73.

  44. 44.

    Epping (2014), p. 49.

  45. 45.

    See Wouters et al. (2016); Hoffmeister and Kuijper (2006); Govaere et al. (2004).

  46. 46.

    CJEU, opinion 2/91, ILO, ECLI:EU:C:1993:106, para. 5; see also CJEU, case C-45/07, Commission v Greece (IMO), ECLI:EU:C:2009:81, para. 31.

  47. 47.

    Cremona (2011).

  48. 48.

    CJEU, case C-399/12, Germany v. Council (OIV), ECLI:EU:C:2014:2258. This case concerned the applicability of Article 218(9) TFEU to the establishment of a common EU position within the International Organisation of Vine and Wine (OIV). The CJEU confirmed the applicability of this provision, but did not make reference to Article 4(3) TEU. See further Govaere (2014).

  49. 49.

    CJEU, opinion 1/94, WTO, ECLI:EU:C:1994:384, para. 108.

  50. 50.

    CJEU, case C-13/00, Commission v. Ireland (Berne Convention), ECLI:EU:C:2002:184; CJEU, case C-239/03, Commission v. France (Étang de Berre), ECLI:EU:C:2004:598.

  51. 51.

    CJEU, case C-28/12, Commission v. Council (U.S. Air Transport Agreement), ECLI: EU:C:2015:282, para. 6.

  52. 52.

    CJEU, case C-28/12, Commission v. Council (U.S. Air Transport Agreement), ECLI:EU:C:2015:282, para. 53, where the CJEU found a violation of Article 13(2) TEU.

  53. 53.

    The doctrine originated in CJEU, case 22/70, Commission v Council (ERTA), ECLI:EU:C:1971:32.

  54. 54.

    CJEU, case C-45/07, Commission v Greece (IMO), ECLI:EU:C:2009:81, para. 21.

  55. 55.

    CJEU, case C-45/07, Commission v Greece (IMO), ECLI:EU:C:2009:81, para. 25.

  56. 56.

    CJEU, case C-45/07, Commission v Greece (IMO), ECLI:EU:C:2009:81, para. 26.

  57. 57.

    See Cremona (2009), p. 765 et seq.

  58. 58.

    CJEU, case C-246/07, Commission v. Sweden (PFOS), ECLI:EU:C:2010:203, para. 71; see also De Baere (2011).

  59. 59.

    CJEU, case C-246/07, Commission v. Sweden (PFOS), ECLI:EU:C:2010:203, para. 74.

  60. 60.

    CJEU, case C-246/07, Commission v. Sweden (PFOS), ECLI:EU:C:2010:203, para. 77.

  61. 61.

    CJEU, case C-246/07, Commission v. Sweden (PFOS), ECLI:EU:C:2010:203, para. 104.

  62. 62.

    CJEU, case C-246/07, Commission v. Sweden (PFOS), ECLI:EU:C:2010:203, para. 87.

  63. 63.

    Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro to CJEU, case C-246/07, Commission v. Sweden (PFOS), ECLI:EU:C:2009:589, para. 58.

  64. 64.

    Here, Article 344 TFEU (formerly Article 292 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC)) has to be “understood as a specific expression of Member States’ more general duty of loyalty”, CJEU, case C-459/03, Commission v. Ireland (Mox Plant), ECLI:EU:C:2006:345, para. 169; see also CJEU, opinion 2/13, ECHR, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, para. 202.

  65. 65.

    Delgado Casteleiro and Larik (2011).

  66. 66.

    Article 207(1) TFEU. However, for these three areas special procedures apply, which deviate from qualified majority voting, according to Article 207(4) subpara. 2 TFEU.

  67. 67.

    See Larik (2015a), p. 52 et seq.

  68. 68.

    Article 206 TFEU.

  69. 69.

    Article 3(5) TEU.

  70. 70.

    Article 21(2) lit. e TEU.

  71. 71.

    Article 207(1) TFEU; see Vedder (2013) and Dimopoulos (2010).

  72. 72.

    Article 21(3) subpara. 2 TEU; as well as Article 13(1) TEU; see extensively on this issue Engbrink (2014); and also Larik (2016), p. 175 et seq.

  73. 73.

    Article 4(3) subpara. 2 TEU.

  74. 74.

    See European Commission, Global Europe: Competing in the World: A Contribution to the EU’s Growth and Jobs Strategy, COM (2006) 567 final, Brussels, 4 October 2006, pp. 10–12 on trade agreements.

  75. 75.

    See, for example, the Free trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part, OJ 2011 L 127/6; the “mixed” Economic Partnerships Agreements with African, Caribbean and Pacific states, such as the Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States, of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, OJ 2008 L 289/3; and the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part, OJ 2014 L 261/4, especially Article 22 et seq. on the establishment of a free trade area.

  76. 76.

    CJEU, opinion 1/94, WTO, ECLI:EU:C:1994:384, para. 19.

  77. 77.

    CJEU, opinion 1/94, WTO, ECLI:EU:C:1994:384, para. 19.

  78. 78.

    CJEU, opinion 1/75, Local Cost Standard, ECLI:EU:C:1975:145; and CJEU, case 45/86, Commission v. Council (Generalized Tariff Preferences), ECLI:EU:C:1987:163; see further Koutrakos (2015), pp. 17–74.

  79. 79.

    Article 133 TEC; see also Herrmann (2002).

  80. 80.

    CJEU, case C-53/96, Hermès International, ECLI:EU:C:1998:292; CJEU, joined cases C-300/98 and C-392/98, Dior, ECLI:EU:C:2000:688; CJEU, case C-431/05, Merck Genéricos, ECLI:EU:C:2007:496; CJEU, opinion 1/08, GATS, ECLI:EU:C:2009:739; see further Hoffmeister (2013), pp. 386–391.

  81. 81.

    Article 3(1) lit. e TFEU.

  82. 82.

    Article 2(1) TFEU.

  83. 83.

    See Ankersmit (2014). Also in the area of foreign direct investment, interesting legal development can be expected, though rather as part of a long-term process, see Dimopoulos (2012). After opinion 2/15, however, it is clear that non-direct investments and investor-state dispute settlement remain firmly within the domain of shared competences, CJEU, opinion 2/15, EU-Singapore FTA, ECLI:EU:C:2017:376.

  84. 84.

    CJEU, case C-414/11, Daiichi Sankyo and Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland, ECLI:EU:C:2013:520.

  85. 85.

    CJEU, case C-137/12, Commission v. Council (Conditional Access Convention), ECLI:EU:C:2013:675.

  86. 86.

    Opinion of Advocate General Kokott to CJEU, case C-137/12, Commission v. Council (Conditional Access Convention), ECLI:EU:C:2013:441, para. 67.

  87. 87.

    See Hahn and Danieli (2013), p. 49 et seq.

  88. 88.

    By way of analogy, see CJEU, case C-114/12, Commission v. Council (Convention on the Rights of Broadcasting Organizations), ECLI:EU:C:2014:2151, para. 103, where the CJEU found that the adoption of a “hybrid act” (para. 34) by the Council and the Member States to conclude the international agreement in question violated the exclusive competence of the Union according to Article 3(2) TFEU, resulting in the annulment of the decision. Following this finding, the Court refrained from going into the other pleas brought forward by the Commission, one of which claimed a violation of inter-institutional cooperation duties based on Article 13(2) TEU (para. 104). See also CJEU, case C-459/03, Commission v. Ireland (Mox Plant), ECLI:EU:C:2006:345, para. 171, where the CJEU refrained from ruling on an alleged “failure to comply with the general obligations contained in Article 10 EC [now Article 4(3) TEU] that is distinct from the failure, already established, to comply with the more specific Community obligations devolving on Ireland pursuant to Article 292 EC [now Article 344 TFEU]” on the exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU.

  89. 89.

    It should be noted here that also in CJEU, case C-45/07, Commission v Greece (IMO), ECLI:EU:C:2009:81, para. 26, the CJEU did not only find a violation of the duty of loyal cooperation by the Member States in question, but a “breach of that State’s obligations, which, in a case such as the present, arise under Articles 10 EC, 71 EC and 80(2) [TEC]”, which were “likely to affect Community rules promulgated for the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty”.

  90. 90.

    This occurred, by contrast, in the context of shared competences, see CJEU, case C-246/07, Commission v. Sweden (PFOS), ECLI:EU:C:2010:203, where the CJEU found a violation the duty of loyal cooperation in Article 10 TEC (now Article 4(3) TEU), but did not detect any other breach of EU law obligations.

  91. 91.

    Article XI:1 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.

  92. 92.

    CJEU, joined cases 21 to 24/72, International Fruit, ECLI:EU:C:1972:115, para. 18.

  93. 93.

    See as examples for situations in which, despite a complaint launched against a Member State alone, it was the Union that acted as the party to the mutually agreed solution: Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Belgium–Administration of Measures Establishing Customs Duties for Rice, WT/DS210/6, 2 January 2002; and Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Ireland–Measures Affecting the Grant of Copyright, WT/DS82/3 and European Communities–Measures Affecting the Grant of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, WT/DS115/3, 13 September 2002. See in detail Delgado Casteleiro and Larik (2013).

  94. 94.

    See on this concept from political science in the context of EU external relations, Wong (2011).

  95. 95.

    Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016.

  96. 96.

    For the background and process leading to the Global Strategy, see Tocci (2016).

  97. 97.

    European Council, Conclusions, EUCO 26/16, Brussels, 28 June 2016, para. 20.

  98. 98.

    Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016, p. 26.

  99. 99.

    Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016, p. 31. See also p. 36, where it is noted that the EU “will build stronger links between our trade, development and security policies in Africa”.

  100. 100.

    Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016, pp. 26–27.

  101. 101.

    Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016, p. 36.

  102. 102.

    Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016, p. 37. See also p. 38, where the Strategy notes the ambition to work “towards ambitious free trade agreements with strategic partners such as Japan and India, as well as ASEAN member states”.

  103. 103.

    Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016, p. 41.

  104. 104.

    Article 207(1) TFEU.

  105. 105.

    Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016, p. 46.

  106. 106.

    Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016, p. 46.

  107. 107.

    Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016, p. 13.

  108. 108.

    Prime Minister Theresa May seemed to even suggest a “hard Brexit”, stating in her speech to the Conservative Party conference in October 2015: “I want it to give British companies the maximum freedom to trade with and operate within the Single Market – and let European businesses do the same here. But let’s state one thing loud and clear: we are not leaving the European Union only to give up control of immigration all over again. And we are not leaving only to return to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. That’s not going to happen.” As reproduced in: Theresa May’s keynote speech at Tory conference in full, The Independent, 5 October 2016. See also Prime Minister’s Office, The government’s negotiating objectives for exiting the EU: PM speech, London, 17 January 2017, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-speech (last accessed 1 March 2017).

  109. 109.

    See, e.g., Zalan, EU 27 meet for ‘moment of truth’, EUobserver, 16 September 2016, https://euobserver.com/political/135123 (last accessed 1 March 2017).

  110. 110.

    More precisely Article 50(2) TEU.

  111. 111.

    Article 50(3) TEU.

  112. 112.

    Article 50(3) TEU. However, the period after triggering Article 50 TEU and before leaving would be legally even more “complex”, Cremona, Negotiating Trade Deals Before Brexit?, Social Europe, 25 July 2016, https://www.socialeurope.eu/2016/07/negotiating-trade-deals-brexit/ (last accessed 1 March 2017).

  113. 113.

    Article 2(1) TFEU.

  114. 114.

    Theresa May: UK will lead world in free trade, BBC News, 7 September 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-37291832 (last accessed 1 March 2017).

  115. 115.

    CJEU, case C-246/07, Commission v. Sweden (PFOS), ECLI:EU:C:2010:203, para. 104.

  116. 116.

    CJEU, case C-433/03, Commission v. Germany (Inland Waterways), ECLI:EU:C:2005:462; and CJEU, case C-266/03, Commission v. Luxembourg (Inland Waterways), ECLI:EU:C:2005:341.

  117. 117.

    Article 258 and Article 259 TFEU, respectively.

  118. 118.

    Article 50(3) TEU.

  119. 119.

    See the transcript of his remarks in Boris Johnson: I will not be the next Tory leader, The Spectator, 30 June 2016, http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2016/06/boris-johnson-will-not-next-tory-leader/ (last accessed 1 March 2017).

  120. 120.

    Stone, Minister for Brexit David Davis appeared unaware of how EU trade deals actually work, The Independent, 14 July 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/minister-for-brexit-davis-davis-eu-european-union-germany-single-market-trade-deals-unaware-mistake-a7136121.html (last accessed 1 March 2017).

  121. 121.

    See also already Tietje (2006), p. 171 et seq.

  122. 122.

    Judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court (Second Senate) of 30 June 2009, 2 BvE 2/08, para. 375.

  123. 123.

    Judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court (Second Senate) of 30 June 2009, 2 BvE 2/08, para. 376.

  124. 124.

    Judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court (Second Senate) of 30 June 2009, 2 BvE 2/08, para. 376.

  125. 125.

    CJEU, opinion 2/15, EU-Singapore FTA, ECLI:EU:C:2017:376.

  126. 126.

    See European Commission, Press Release: European Commission proposes signature and conclusion of EU-Canada trade deal, IP-16-2371, Strasbourg, 5 July 2016, which includes the following quote from EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström: “Meanwhile, the open issue of competence for such trade agreements will be for the European Court of Justice to clarify, in the near future. From a strict legal standpoint, the Commission considers this agreement to fall under exclusive EU competence. However, the political situation in the Council is clear, and we understand the need for proposing it as a ‘mixed’ agreement, in order to allow for a speedy signature.” After the delay caused by the region of Wallonia, however, the Commission may revisit the idea that mixity contributes to a more “speedy” process.

  127. 127.

    Gstöhl and Hanf (2014), p. 739; Streinz (2015).

  128. 128.

    CJEU, case C-13/00, Commission v. Ireland (Berne Convention), ECLI:EU:C:2002:184; CJEU, case C-239/03, Commission v. France (Étang de Berre), ECLI:EU:C:2004:598.

  129. 129.

    An example for such a development is the membership of the European Convention on the Legal Protection of Services based on, or consisting of, Conditional Access. Several Member States have withdrawn from this agreement after the EU became a party and following the CJEU ruling that the EU had exclusive competence in the area covered by the agreement, see CJEU, case C-137/12, Commission v. Council (Conditional Access Convention), ECLI:EU:C:2013:675. See Larik (2015b), p. 795.

  130. 130.

    Delgado Casteleiro and Larik (2011).

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  1. Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs, Leiden University, Anna van Buerenplein 301, 3595 DG, The Hague, The Netherlands

    Joris Larik

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  1. Faculty of Law, Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany

    Marc Bungenberg

  2. Faculty of Law, University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, Erlangen, Germany

    Markus Krajewski

  3. School of Law, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, United Kingdom

    Christian Tams

  4. Competition and Regulation Institute, Leuphana University of Lüneburg, Lüneburg, Germany

    Jörg Philipp Terhechte

  5. Faculty of Law and Criminal Sciences, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland

    Andreas R. Ziegler

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Larik, J. (2017). Sincere Cooperation in the Common Commercial Policy: Lisbon, a “Joined-Up” Union, and “Brexit”. In: Bungenberg, M., Krajewski, M., Tams, C., Terhechte, J., Ziegler, A. (eds) European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2017. European Yearbook of International Economic Law, vol 8. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-58832-2_4

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