Abstract
In this paper we study public key encryption schemes of indistinguishability security against receiver selective opening (IND-RSO) attacks, where the attacker can corrupt some receivers and get the corresponding secret keys in the multi-party setting. Concretely:
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We present a general construction of RSO security against chosen ciphertext attacks (RSO-CCA) by combining any RSO secure scheme against chosen plaintext attacks (RSO-CPA) with any regular CCA secure scheme, along with an appropriate non-interactive zero-knowledge proof.
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We show that the leakage-resistant construction given by Hazay et al. in Eurocrypt 2013 from weak hash proof system (wHPS) is RSO-CPA secure.
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We further show that the CCA secure construction given by Cramer and Shoup in Eurocrypt 2002 based on the universal HPS is RSO-CCA secure, hence obtain a more efficient paradigm for RSO-CCA security.
This work is Supported by the National Basic Research Program of China (973 project) (No. 2013CB338002), the National Nature Science Foundation of China (No. 61502484, No. 61379137, No. 61572495).
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Acknowledgments
We are grateful to Yamin Liu and Haiyang Xue for helpful discussions and advice. We also thank the anonymous reviewers of CT-RSA 2017 for their useful comments.
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Jia, D., Lu, X., Li, B. (2017). Constructions Secure Against Receiver Selective Opening and Chosen Ciphertext Attacks. In: Handschuh, H. (eds) Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2017. CT-RSA 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10159. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52153-4_24
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52153-4_24
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