Abstract
In this chapter the author employs Antonio Damasio’s frame about the three levels of the self in order to understand the general characteristics and dynamics of inauthentic experiences and its biological, social and intellectual bases. This approach also leads me to explain certain fundamental traits of the dynamic between so-called practical identities and moral identities. Parallel to this, I offer a model of how contradictory normative ideas can co-exist at the same level (horizontal dislocation or experiences of alienation) or at that of different levels (vertical dislocation or, strictly speaking, phenomenon of inauthenticity). The main conclusions are that (a) ideals and conflicts may be beyond conscious processing and (b) inadequate social inputs could damage the experience of subjectivity at each of Damasio’s three levels. The third conclusion, which is derived from the second one, is that, at present, we used to underestimate the powerful effect of technology as well as others’ opinions on our own system of values. This error (very frequent in individualistic lifestyles) is the major cause of IE and, ultimately, of the emergence of a growing vulnerable group.
It seems, in fact, as though the second half of a man’s life is made up of nothing but the habits he has acquired during the first half.
–Fyodor Dostoevsky
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Notes
- 1.
C.-M. Korsgaard, Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 25.
- 2.
I use the expression center of narrative gravity in the sense used by Daniel Dennett in the following reference: D. Dennett, Consciousness Explained, Boston, Little, Brown, 1992, p. 410. I offer a critical analysis of this notion in L. Echarte, ‘Teleological markers: Seven lines of hypotheses around Dennett’s theory of habits’, Scientia et Fides, No. 2, 2014, pp. 135–184.
- 3.
See in this respect C. Elliott, Bioethics, culture, and identity, New York, Routledge, 1999.
- 4.
Damasio’s framework has clear limitations. One of its weaknesses is that he tries to criticize representationalism but without providing any alternative explanation of the relation between consciousness and knowledge. However, this insufficiency does not affect in any essential way the core of the ideas that I am discussing here. I perform an in-depth analysis of Damasio’s anti-representationalism in M. Grijalba, L. Echarte, ‘Homeostasis and intellectual representations: an approach to moral behavior from Antonio Damasio’s theory of emotion’, Persona y Bioética, No.15, 2015 (in press).
- 5.
A. Damasio, Looking for Spinoza. Joy, Sorrow and the feeling brain, Orlando, Harcourt, 2003, p. 215.
- 6.
Damasio, Looking for Spinoza,… p. 30.
- 7.
In a similar way, Aristotle claims that “Life is the being of living things” (Aristotle, De anima 415b 13). There are, however, essential differences between the two conceptions. For example, Damasio, in contrast to Aristotle, claims that living processes are not teleological; that is to say, they are pure blind mechanisms.
- 8.
See in this respect A. Damasio, Self comes to mind. Constructing the conscious brain, London, Vintage Books, 2010, p. 9.
- 9.
Hence, it is still not a self in the full sense because it is lacks the necessary information about how the perception of the object changes the body.
- 10.
A. Damasio, The feeling of what happens: Body and emotion in the making of consciousness, New York, Harcourt Brace, 1999, p. 154.
- 11.
Damasio, Looking for Spinoza,… p. 28.
- 12.
Damasio classifies emotions into three categories: primary emotions (such as anger, disgust, surprise, etc.), social emotions (sympathy, embarrassment, guilt, pride, envy, gratitude, contempt, etc.) and background emotions (edginess, tranquility, energy, enthusiasm, etc.)
- 13.
Korsgaard, Self-Constitution,… p. 20.
- 14.
F. Kraemer, ‘Authenticity Anyone? The Enhancement of Emotions via Neuro-Psychopharmacology’, Neuroethics, No. 4, 2011, p. 59.
- 15.
Damasio, The feeling of what happens,… p. 174–175.
- 16.
See in this respect Damasio, Looking for Spinoza,… p. 112.
- 17.
Neurophysiologist Marc Jeannerod has similar ideas on the subject. He uses the term motor representations for brain images that connect goals with all the information necessary for implementing and monitoring them. Besides, explicit motor images arise from motor representations when these latter are voluntarily or involuntarily interrupted. See in this regard M. Jeannerod, ‘Mental imaging of motor activity in humans’, Current Opinion in Neurobiology, No. 9, 1999, pp. 735–9; M. Jeannerod, ‘The representing brain: neural correlates of motor intention and imagery’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, No. 17, 1994, p. 187–202.
- 18.
Damasio, Self comes to mind,… p. 10.
- 19.
Classically, the difference between temperament and character lies in the degree of plasticity existing among mental dispositions.
- 20.
Damasio, Looking for Spinoza,… pp. 29.
- 21.
John Searle, following Wittgenstein’s unique pragmatism, shares Damasio’s view about the role of action. His theory about the relation between intention-in-action and prior intention offers insight into this idea. See inter alia J.-R. Searle, Intentionality, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- 22.
For further information about IE-a, b, c and d, please see previous chapter.
- 23.
However, coherence and autonomy are not two sides of the same coin: the second cannot be sustained without the former, but not the other way around.
- 24.
See in this respect Damasio, Looking for Spinoza,… p. 275.
- 25.
See reference in Damasio, Self comes to mind,… p. 23.
- 26.
See reference in Damasio, Self comes to mind,… p. 38.
- 27.
Religious conversions or philosophical discoveries, sometimes associated with traumatic events, can also evoke feelings of losing or betraying oneself. See in this respect B.-J. Braman, Meaning and Authenticity: Bernard Lonergan and Charles Taylor on the Drama of Authentic Human Existence, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2008, pp. 59–63 and 67–72.
- 28.
See in this respect A. Damasio, Descartes’ error. Emotion, reason and the human brain, New York, Avon Books, 1995, pp. 245–252; Damasio, Looking for Spinoza,… pp. 157–158.
- 29.
For further information about aims and limits of Clinical Ontology, please see previous chapter.
- 30.
R. Spaemann, The difference between ‘someone’ and ‘something’, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 158–159.
- 31.
Spaemann, The difference between ‘someone’ and ‘something’,… p. 159.
- 32.
Spaemann, The difference between ‘someone’ and ‘something’,… p. 165.
- 33.
See in this respect A.-M. González, ‘Aristotle and Kant on Practical Reason. An Annotation to Korsgaard’, Acta Philosophica, No. 1, pp. 99–112; and Aristotle, Nicomachean ethics, II, 6, 1106 b 34.
- 34.
Spaemann, The difference between ‘someone’ and ‘something’,… p. 161.
- 35.
See in this respect A. Juarrero, Dynamics in action. Intentional Behavior as a Complex System, Cambridge MA, The MIT Press, 1999, pp. 119–130.
- 36.
See in this respect Damasio, Self comes to mind,… p. 171.
- 37.
Damasio, Looking for Spinoza,… p. 38.
- 38.
Damasio, The feeling of what happens,… pp. 155–156.
- 39.
See in this respect P.-L. Harris, H.-J. Leevers, ‘Pretending, imagery and self-awareness in autism’, In S. Baron-Cohen, H. Tager-Flusberg, D.-J. Cohen (eds.), Understanding other minds: Perspectives from autism and cognitive neuroscience, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 182–202.
- 40.
See in this respect E. Pacherie, ‘Action’, in K. Frankish, W.-M. Ramsey (eds), The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Sciences, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 98.
- 41.
For a comprehensive overview see C.-D. Frith, The cognitive neuropsychology of schizophrenia, Hoves, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1992.
- 42.
See reference in J. Russell, ‘How executive disorders can bring about an inadequate “theory of mind”’, in J. Russell (ed), Autism as an executive disorder, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 256–304.
- 43.
See inter alia E. Schopler, G.-B. Mesibov, Learning and Cognition in Autism, New York, Springer, 1995; S. Baez, A. Ibanez, ‘The effects of context processing on social cognition impairments in adults with Asperger’s syndrome’, Front Neurosci, 2014, No. 3; article 270.
- 44.
See inter alia E. Schopler, G.-B. Mesibov, High-Functioning Individuals with Autism, New York, Springer, 1992; M. Melloni, V. Lopez, A Ibanez, ‘Empathy and contextual social cognition’, Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci, 2014, No. 14, pp. 407–25; A. Baez, A. Rattazzi, M.-L. Gonzalez-Gadea, T. Torralva, N.-S. Vigliecca, J. Decety, F. Manes, A. Ibanez, ‘Integrating intention and context: assessing social cognition in adults with Asperger syndrome’, Front Hum Neurosci, 2012, No. 8, article 302.
- 45.
See in this respect P. Byrne, ‘Stigma of mental illness and ways of diminishing it’, Advances in Psychiatric Treatment, 2000, No. 6, pp. 65–72.
- 46.
See in this respect R. Brown, R.-P. Hobson, A. Lee, J. Stevenson, ‘Are There “Autistic-like” Features in Congenitally Blind Children?’, Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, No. 38, 1997, pp. 693–703.
- 47.
Mirror neurons have been linked to the ability to understand the actions of other agents, feeling empathy, learning toward imitation, etc. M. Dapretto, M.-S. Davies, J.-H. Pfeifer, A.-A. Scott, M. Sigman, S.-Y. Bookheimer, M. Iacoboni, ‘Understanding emotions in others: mirror neuron dysfunction in children with autism spectrum disorders’, Nature Neuroscience, 2005, No. 9, pp. 28–30.
- 48.
See references M. Rutter, L. Andersen-Wood, C. Beckett, D. Bredenkamp, J. Castle, C. Groothues, J. Kreppner, L. Keaveney, C. Lord, T.-G. O’Connor, ‘Quasi-autistic Patterns Following Severe Early Global Privation’, Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 1999, No. 40, pp. 537–549; U. Frith, Autism: Explaining the Enigma, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, pp. 16–35.
- 49.
The modern phenomenon of ghetto formation – Chinatowns, Little Italies, Latino neighborhoods, etc. – would, in this context, involve finding not only a place where one is welcome but also where one can have an authentic life – provisionally, until one has learned, valued and integrated the new social codes. If this is right, micro-communities would be not an obstacle but rather a springboard for social integration and intercultural dialogue, to the extent that these communities can freely emerge and enjoy a certain degree of autonomy. The flip side of the coin is that many of these ghettos are the consequence of racist discrimination or else as a perverse tool for political control, and may continue to be so in the future under the pretext of respect for culture or even integration. See in this respect inter alia E. Rothe, D. Tzuang, A.-J. Pumariega, ‘Acculturation, development, and adaptation’, Child Adolesc Psychiatr Clin N Am, No. 19, 2010, pp. 681–96; A.-M Miller, D. Birman, S. Zenk, E. Wang, O. Sorokin, J. Connor, ‘Neighborhood immigrant concentration, acculturation, and cultural alienation in former Soviet immigrant women’, Journal of Community Psychology, No. 37, 2009, pp. 88–105; D. Baolian, ‘“Our Child Doesn’t Talk to Us Anymore”: Alienation in Immigrant Chinese Families’, Anthropology & Education Quarterly, No. 37, 2006, pp. 162–179; J. Achotegui, ‘Emigration in hard conditions: the Immigrant Syndrome with chronic and multiple stress (Ulysses’ Syndrome)’, Vertex, No. 16, 2005, pp. 105–13; T.-D. Barry, C.-M. Grilo, ‘Cultural, self-esteem, and demographic correlates of perception of personal and group discrimination among East Asian immigrants’, American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, No. 73, 2003, pp. 223–229.
- 50.
It is revealing, for instance, that immigrants show higher risks of developing delusions. On this issue see B.-J. Sadock, V.-A. Sadock, P. Ruiz, Kaplan & Sadock’s Study Guide and Self-Examination Review in Psychiatry (ninth edition), Philadelphia, Lippincontt Williams & Wilkins, 2011, pp. 137–138; J.-M. Taub, ‘Demography of DSM-III borderline personality disorder (PD): a comparison with Axis II PDs, affective illness and schizophrenia convergent and discriminant validation’, Int J Neurosci, No. 82, 1995, pp. 191–214; E. Hales, J.-A. Yudofsky (eds), The American Psychiatric Press Textbook of Psychiatry, Washington, DC, American Psychiatric Publishing, 2003; K.-S., Kendler, ‘Demography of paranoid psychosis (delusional disorder): a review and comparison with schizophrenia and affective illness’, Arch Gen Psychiatry, No. 39, 1982, pp. 890–902.
- 51.
See in this respect Damasio, The feeling of what happens,… p. 201.
- 52.
Damasio, The feeling of what happens,… pp. 179–182.
- 53.
L. Postmes, H.-N. Sno, S. Goedhart, J. van der Stel, H.-D. Heering, L. de Haan, ‘Schizophrenia as a self-disorder due to perceptual incoherence’, Schizophrenia Research, No. 152, 2014, pp. 41–50.
- 54.
See, among the vast amount of narratives about the internal and external selves in schizophrenia, C. Knowles, Bedlam on the stress, London, Routledge, 2005, pp. 123–124.
- 55.
It is worth pointing out that this kind of IE is not so different from those experienced with face transplants. In this case, the patient has an autobiographical memory of facial features and gestures, which do not correspond to what he or she sees in the mirror. For an illustrative description of the facial IE see F. Baylis, ‘Changing Faces: Ethics, Identity, and Facial Transplantation’, in D. Benatar (ed), Cutting the core. Exploring the ethics of contested surgeries, Oxford, Rowman & Littlefield, 2006, pp. 155–162.
- 56.
The absence of the Autobiographical Self does not always imply IE. A patient who suffers anosognosia, for instance, seems unaware of his or her own state of disease. This denial seems due to the patient’s forgetting of what he or she was attempting to do. For example, if I do not remember my intention to lift my arms, I will also fail to perceive that they are entirely paralyzed because of a stroke.
- 57.
In contrast, depersonalization, which consists in feelings of detachment, should be classified together with the group suffering a genuine vertical dislocation between the Autobiographical Self and the Core Self.
- 58.
For a comprehensive overview of the recent research literature in medicine, see P.-F. Dell, J.-A. O’Neil, Dissociation and dissociative disorders. DSM-V and beyond, New York, Routledge, 2011.
- 59.
See references, inter alia G.-A. Boysen, A. VanBergen, ‘A review of published research on adult dissociative identity disorder: 2000–2010’, J Nerv Ment Dis, No. 20, 2013, pp. 5–11; M.-L. Manning, R.-L. Manning, ‘Convergent paradigms for visual neuroscience and dissociative identity disorder’, J Trauma Dissociation, No. 10, 2009; pp. 405–19; K.-A. Forrest, ‘Toward an etiology of Dissociative Identity Disorder: a neurodevelopmental approach’, Consciousness and Cognition, No. 10, 2001, pp. 259–293.
- 60.
Paradoxically, streams of unconsciousness may be accompanied, if they last long enough, by subjective experiences – perhaps perturbing, perhaps not.
- 61.
See the references in L. Festinger, ‘Some attitudinal consequences of forced decisions’, Acta Psychologica, No. 15, 1959, pp. 389–390.
- 62.
Damasio, The feeling of what happens,… p. 227.
- 63.
Thus, somatic markers are not innate drives but have to be learned. See the references in Damasio, Descartes’ error,… pp. 165–204.
- 64.
Adler is probably one of the first authors to link the idea of unconscious mechanisms with global existential beliefs. See the reference in A. Adler, What life should mean to you, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1931.
- 65.
Another reason is that it is still very controversial whether unconscious levels deserve the status of selves, ie whether they are high-order coherent and operative maps in themselves.
- 66.
I will say a few words about the pathological group in the next section.
- 67.
For Adler, the inherent goals attained in childhood are what strongly constrain the lifestyle of an adult. See for an overview of the issue V. Sar, O. Taycan, N. Bolat, M. Ozmen, A. Duran, E. Oztürk, H. Ertem-Vehid, ‘Childhood trauma and dissociation in schizophrenia’, Psychopathology, No. 43, 2010, pp. 33–40; T.-H. Diseth, ‘Dissociation in children and adolescents as reaction to trauma -an overview of conceptual issues and neurobiological factors’, Nordic Journal of Psychiatry, No. 59, 2005, pp. 79–91; U. Oberst, V. Ibarz, R. León, ‘La psicología individual de Alfred Adler y la Psicosíntesis de Olivér Brachfeld’, Revista de Neuro-Psiquiatría, No. 67, 2004; pp. 31–44.
- 68.
See in this respect J.-A. Teske, ‘The Social Construction of the Human Spirit’. In N.-H. Gregersen, W.-B. Drees, U. Gorman (eds), The Human Person in Science and Theology, Edinburgh, Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2003, pp. 189–211; J.-A. Teske, ‘Cognitive Neuroscience, Temporal Ordering, and the Human Spirit’, Zygon. Journal of Religion and Science, No. 36, 2001, pp. 665–676.
- 69.
A similar idea is proffered by Andrew Newberg: spiritual transcendence and religious beliefs and practices have neurobiological roots and may play a role in supporting biological functions. See reference in A.-B. Newberg, Principles of Neurotheology, Surrey, Ashagate, 2010, p. 200–203.
- 70.
The influence of culture on the more basic and non-conscious processes of the self is, according to Damasio, stronger than we usually think. “In all probability, development and culture superpose the following influences on the preset devices: first, they shape what constitutes an adequate inducer of a given emotion; second, they shape some aspects of the expression of emotion; and third, they shape the cognition and behavior which follows the deployment of an emotion” (Damasio, The feeling of what happens,… p. 66).
- 71.
For Damasio, writing, like memory, has had, and continues to have, a crucial role in the construction of the meta-biographical perception of the human self. “Once autobiographical selves can operate on the basis of knowledge etched in brain circuits and in external records of stone, clay or paper, humans become capable of hitching their individual biological needs to the accumulated sapience. Thus begins a long process of inquiry, reflection, and response, expressed through human history in myths, religions, the arts, and various structures invented to govern social behavior—constructed morality, justice systems, economics, politics, science, and technology. The ultimate consequences of consciousness come by way of memory. This is memory acquired through a filter of biological value and animated by reason” (Damasio, Self comes to mind,… p. 290).
- 72.
The cultural turn may be due to the effect of direct changes in the lifestyles of the population (vertical down-top causation) or due to the effect of changes in the minds of those who control or influence social institutions: mass media celebrities, directors of schools, ministers in churches, etc. (vertical top-down causation) – Core and Historical, respectively.
- 73.
For Charles Wright Mills, a revealing sign in such critical periods is the massive spread of cynicism, in his words: “[the perception of a] lack of connection between merit and nobility, between virtue and success. It is a sense of the immorality of accomplishment, and it is revealed in the prevalence of such views as: ‘it’s all just another racket,’ and ‘it’s not what you know but who you know.’ ” C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, New York, Oxford University Press, 1956, p. 350. See also, for an overview of the issue, J. Newman, Inauthentic Culture and Its Philosophical Critics, Quebec, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1997.
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Echarte, L.E. (2016). Paradoxes of Authenticity: A Neuroscientific Approach to Personal Identity. In: Masferrer, A., García-Sánchez , E. (eds) Human Dignity of the Vulnerable in the Age of Rights. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 55. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32693-1_7
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Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-32691-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-32693-1
eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)