Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Strongly Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Exchange

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Topics in Cryptology - CT-RSA 2016 (CT-RSA 2016)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 9610))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocols have been widely deployed in many real-world applications for securing communication channels. In this paper, we make the following contributions. First, we revisit the security modelling of leakage-resilient AKE protocols, and show that the existing models either impose some unnatural restrictions or do not sufficiently capture leakage attacks in reality. We then introduce a new strong yet meaningful security model, named challenge-dependent leakage-resilient eCK (\(\mathsf {CLR\text{- }eCK}\)) model, to capture challenge-dependent leakage attacks on both long-term secret key and ephemeral secret key (i.e., randomness). Second, we propose a general framework for constructing one-round \(\mathsf {CLR\text{- }eCK}\)-secure AKE protocols based on smooth projective hash functions (SPHFs). Finally, we present a practical instantiation of the general framework based on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption without random oracle. Our result shows that the instantiation is efficient in terms of the communication and computation overhead and captures more general leakage attacks.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    In the rest of paper, all the SPHFs are referred to as the extended SPHF and defined by algorithms (\(\mathsf {SPHFSetup},\mathsf {HashKG}, \mathsf {ProjKG}, \mathsf {WordG}, \mathsf {Hash}, \mathsf {ProjHash}\)).

  2. 2.

    In this paper, we denote the space of a certified long-term public key (such as \(\widehat{\mathcal {A}}\)) by \(\varLambda _k\).

References

  1. Entity authentication mechanisms-part3: Entity authentication using asymmetric techniques. ISO/IEC IS 9789–3 (1993)

    Google Scholar 

  2. Akavia, A., Goldwasser, S., Vaikuntanathan, V.: Simultaneous hardcore bits and cryptography against memory attacks. In: Reingold, O. (ed.) TCC 2009. LNCS, vol. 5444, pp. 474–495. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  3. Alawatugoda, J., Boyd, C., Stebila, D.: Continuous after-the-fact leakage-resilient key exchange. In: Susilo, W., Mu, Y. (eds.) ACISP 2014. LNCS, vol. 8544, pp. 258–273. Springer, Heidelberg (2014)

    Google Scholar 

  4. Alawatugoda, J., Stebila, D., Boyd, C.: Modelling after-the-fact leakage for key exchange. In: ASIACCS, pp. 207–216 (2014)

    Google Scholar 

  5. Alwen, J., Dodis, Y., Wichs, D.: Leakage-resilient public-key cryptography in the bounded-retrieval model. In: Halevi, S. (ed.) CRYPTO 2009. LNCS, vol. 5677, pp. 36–54. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  6. Bellare, M., Canetti, R., Krawczyk, H.: A modular approach to the design and analysis of authentication and key exchange protocols (extended abstract). In: ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, pp. 419–428 (1998)

    Google Scholar 

  7. Bellare, M., Rogaway, P.: Entity authentication and key distribution. In: Stinson, D.R. (ed.) CRYPTO 1993. LNCS, vol. 773, pp. 232–249. Springer, Heidelberg (1994)

    Google Scholar 

  8. Bitansky, N., Canetti, R., Halevi, S.: Leakage-tolerant interactive protocols. In: Cramer, R. (ed.) TCC 2012. LNCS, vol. 7194, pp. 266–284. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  9. Boyle, E., Segev, G., Wichs, D.: Fully leakage-resilient signatures. J. Cryptology 26(3), 513–558 (2013)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  10. Canetti, R., Krawczyk, H.: Analysis of key-exchange protocols and their use for building secure channels. In: Pfitzmann, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2001. LNCS, vol. 2045, pp. 453–474. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  11. Choo, K.-K.R., Boyd, C., Hitchcock, Y.: Examining indistinguishability-based proof models for key establishment protocols. In: Roy, B. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2005. LNCS, vol. 3788, pp. 585–604. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  12. Chow, S.S.M., Dodis, Y., Rouselakis, Y., Waters, B.: Practical leakage-resilient identity-based encryption from simple assumptions. In: CCS, pp. 152–161 (2010)

    Google Scholar 

  13. Cramer, R., Shoup, V.: Universal hash proofs and a paradigm for adaptive chosen ciphertext secure public-key encryption. In: Knudsen, L.R. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2002. LNCS, vol. 2332, pp. 45–64. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  14. Cremers, C.: Examining indistinguishability-based security models for key exchange protocols: the case of CK, CK-HMQV, and eCK. In: ASIACCS 2011, pp. 80–91 (2011)

    Google Scholar 

  15. Dodis, Y., Haralambiev, K., López-Alt, A., Wichs, D.: Efficient public-key cryptography in the presence of key leakage. In: Abe, M. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2010. LNCS, vol. 6477, pp. 613–631. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  16. Dodis, Y., Kalai, Y.T., Lovett, S.: On cryptography with auxiliary input. In: STOC, pp. 621–630 (2009)

    Google Scholar 

  17. Dodis, Y., Ostrovsky, R., Reyzin, L., Smith, A.: Fuzzy extractors: how to generate strong keys from biometrics and other noisy data. SIAM J. Comput. 38(1), 97–139 (2008)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  18. Goldreich, O., Goldwasser, S., Micali, S.: How to construct random functions. J. ACM 33(4), 792–807 (1986)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  19. Halderman, J.A., Schoen, S.D., Heninger, N., Clarkson, W., Paul, W., Calandrino, J.A., Feldman, A.J., Appelbaum, J., Felten, E.W.: Lest we remember: cold boot attacks on encryption keys. In: USENIX Security Symposium, pp. 45–60 (2008)

    Google Scholar 

  20. Halevi, S., Lin, H.: After-the-fact leakage in public-key encryption. In: Ishai, Y. (ed.) TCC 2011. LNCS, vol. 6597, pp. 107–124. Springer, Heidelberg (2011)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  21. Katz, J., Vaikuntanathan, V.: Signature schemes with bounded leakage resilience. In: Matsui, M. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2009. LNCS, vol. 5912, pp. 703–720. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  22. Krawczyk, H.: SIGMA: the ‘SIGn-and-MAc’ approach to authenticated Diffie-Hellman and its use in the IKE protocols. In: Boneh, D. (ed.) CRYPTO 2003. LNCS, vol. 2729, pp. 400–425. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  23. LaMacchia, B.A., Lauter, K., Mityagin, A.: Stronger security of authenticated key exchange. In: Susilo, W., Liu, J.K., Mu, Y. (eds.) ProvSec 2007. LNCS, vol. 4784, pp. 1–16. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  24. Marvin, R.: Google admits an android crypto prng flaw led to bitcoin heist, August 2013. http://sdt.bz/64008

  25. Micali, S., Reyzin, L.: Physically observable cryptography. In: Naor, M. (ed.) TCC 2004. LNCS, vol. 2951, pp. 278–296. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  26. Moriyama, D., Okamoto, T.: Leakage resilient eCK-secure key exchange protocol without random oracles. In: ASIACCS, pp. 441–447 (2011)

    Google Scholar 

  27. Naor, M., Segev, G.: Public-Key cryptosystems resilient to key leakage. In: Halevi, S. (ed.) CRYPTO 2009. LNCS, vol. 5677, pp. 18–35. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  28. Okamoto, T.: Authenticated key exchange and key encapsulation in the standard model. In: Kurosawa, K. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2007. LNCS, vol. 4833, pp. 474–484. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  29. Shumow, D., Ferguson, N.: On the possibility of a back door in the NIST SP800-90 dual Ec Prng. http://rump2007.cr.yp.to/15-shumow.pdf

  30. Yang, G., Mu, Y., Susilo, W., Wong, D.S.: Leakage resilient authenticated key exchange secure in the auxiliary input model. In: Deng, R.H., Feng, T. (eds.) ISPEC 2013. LNCS, vol. 7863, pp. 204–217. Springer, Heidelberg (2013)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  31. Yu, Y., Standaert, F., Pereira, O., Yung, M.: Practical leakage-resilient pseudorandom generators. In: CCS, pp. 141–151 (2010)

    Google Scholar 

  32. Yuen, T.H., Zhang, Y., Yiu, S.M., Liu, J.K.: Identity-based encryption with post-challenge auxiliary inputs for secure cloud applications and sensor networks. In: Kutyłowski, M., Vaidya, J. (eds.) ICAIS 2014, Part I. LNCS, vol. 8712, pp. 130–147. Springer, Heidelberg (2014)

    Google Scholar 

  33. Zetter, K.: How a crypto ‘backdoor’ pitted the tech world against the NSA. http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/09/nsa-backdoor/all/

Download references

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Janaka Alawatugoda and the anonymous reviewers for their invaluable comments on a previous version of this paper. The work of Yi Mu is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 61170298). The work of Guomin Yang is supported by the Australian Research Council Discovery Early Career Researcher Award (Grant No. DE150101116) and the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 61472308).

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Computing and Information Technology, Centre for Computer and Information Security Research, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, Australia

    Rongmao Chen, Yi Mu, Guomin Yang, Willy Susilo & Fuchun Guo

  2. College of Computer, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha, China

    Rongmao Chen

Authors
  1. Rongmao Chen
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Yi Mu
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  3. Guomin Yang
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  4. Willy Susilo
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  5. Fuchun Guo
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding authors

Correspondence to Rongmao Chen or Yi Mu .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. NEC Cloud Systems Research Laboratories, Kawasaki, Japan

    Kazue Sako

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this paper

Cite this paper

Chen, R., Mu, Y., Yang, G., Susilo, W., Guo, F. (2016). Strongly Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Exchange. In: Sako, K. (eds) Topics in Cryptology - CT-RSA 2016. CT-RSA 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9610. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29485-8_2

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29485-8_2

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-29484-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-29485-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation