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Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science ((BSPS,volume 285))

Abstract

We argue that if everything there is in the world is physical, then time has an objective direction. If the fundamental equations of motion are time reversal invariant we show that the direction of time cannot be explained by anything else in physics (e.g. the direction of processes in time) and therefore must be added to physics. We further argue that the direction of time gives rise to both the thermodynamic and the psychological arrows of time (whenever they exist), and that it is necessary in order to construct a meaningful Past Hypothesis in statistical mechanics.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    We focus here on velocity reversal in kinematics, and we do not address the significance of the symmetry of other theories under velocity reversal. In particular we do not discuss the fact that in order for a particle to return from B to A, if its evolution from A to B was affected by a magnetic field, one needs to reverse not only the velocity but also the field. See discussions on this topic in for example Albert (2000, Chap. 1), Earman (2002), Malament (2004) and Arntzenius and Greaves (2009).

  2. 2.

    One may wonder how to express precisely this reversal, in particular whether the double reversal of sings result in a velocity with the same sign as in the original forward evolution. The answer is that this depends on some conventions, (see our 2012, Chap. 4).

  3. 3.

    One way in which we come to have this knowledge is by memory. But by this we do not mean that we define the events that we remember to be in the past: this is characteristic but not analytic. It is physically possible given the laws of classical mechanics for example to remember events that occur in the future. See our (2012, Chap. 10), and compare Hawking (1985, 1988).

  4. 4.

    Of course this may not be true, but here we wish to assume that everything in the world is physical. Also there are various views about how precisely this physicalist idea should be cashed out, but our argument does not depend on how these differences will be resolved.

  5. 5.

    We assume here that there is a well-defined notion of an instantaneous state that includes velocity. For various approaches to this question, see Arntzenius (2000).

  6. 6.

    The extent to which this probabilistic claim can be justified is addressed in Hemmo and Shenker (2012), especially Chaps. 7,8, and 13.

  7. 7.

    Not of time reversal; as we have shown these are physically distinct notions despite their mathematical equivalence.

  8. 8.

    See Feynman (1967), Albert (2000, Chap. 4), Callender (2003), Earman (2006).

  9. 9.

    Feynman (1967), p. 116.

  10. 10.

    See Hemmo and Shenker (2012, Chap. 10).

  11. 11.

    The fact that we have memories of the past answers Price’s (1996) charge of a double standard since the symmetry between the past and the future is broken. Nevertheless it is a contingent fact that we remember the past rather than the future, but we shall not go into this issue here (see footnote 3 and Hemmo and Shenker 2012, Chap. 10).

References

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Acknowledgements

This research has been supported by the Israel Science Foundation, grant number 713/10, and by the German-Israel Foundation, grant number 1054/09.

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Correspondence to Meir Hemmo .

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Hemmo, M., Shenker, O. (2016). The Arrow of Time. In: Dolev, Y., Roubach, M. (eds) Cosmological and Psychological Time. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, vol 285. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-22590-6_9

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