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Towards a Eudaimonistic Virtue Epistemology

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Virtue Epistemology Naturalized

Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 366))

Abstract

This chapter is about the science of vision and memory in relation to virtue epistemology. My argument will turn on the point that the mechanisms underlying vision and knowledge that, according to current neuroscience, remain non-conscious can’t be considered virtuous mechanisms even if they are highly reliable. Hence, I argue, virtue epistemology cannot count these obvious forms of knowledge as true forms of knowledge. Virtue epistemology thus is at best a partial theory of knowledge.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Sosa’s approach can also be considered a mixed approach. Sosa distinguishes between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. Animal knowledge requires the exercise of reliable cognitive faculties or abilities, whereas reflective knowledge requires a more active, or reflective, second-order stance (see e.g. Sosa 2007). Since Sosa does not require responsibility as a condition on knowledge, I shall here treat his approach as a kind of virtue reliabilism.

  2. 2.

    Others have expressed similar misgivings about virtue responsibilism. See e.g. Mark Alfano (Forthcoming). Alfano’s focus is on showing that none of us possesses virtuous character traits, except in particular situations, whereas I am content with showing that even clearly non-virtuous agents possess knowledge. I will not be dealing explicitly with Alfano’s critique, as I had already completed this paper when I became familiar with his. Thanks to Abrol Fairweather for drawing my attention to it.

  3. 3.

    http://csc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1992/1992scr2-871/1992scr2-871.html

  4. 4.

    This example is adapted from Brogaard and Smith (2005).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Philosophy Department, University of Miami, St. Louis, MO, USA

    Berit Brogaard

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  1. Berit Brogaard
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Correspondence to Berit Brogaard .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, CA, USA

    Abrol Fairweather

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Brogaard, B. (2014). Towards a Eudaimonistic Virtue Epistemology. In: Fairweather, A. (eds) Virtue Epistemology Naturalized. Synthese Library, vol 366. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04672-3_6

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