Abstract
The puzzle of thought experiments is a hot topic in the philosophy of science. The chapter raises the puzzle with respect to pragmatics as follows: How is it possible that thought experiments in pragmatics yield new experiential information about communication, although they are carried out entirely in one’s head? The chapter shows, first, that the structure of thought experiments in pragmatics consists of a series of plausible inferences. Second, the function of thought experiments is to serve as the initial step in the process of plausible argumentation as well as to test the plausibility of rival hypotheses. Third, while on the one hand, thought experiments and real experiments may be continuous, on the other hand, the former may be also indispensable components of the latter. Fourth, these properties provide a solution to the puzzle of thought experiments in pragmatics. The key idea of the solution is that thought experiments in pragmatics cannot generate new experiential information; rather, during the process of plausible argumentation they contribute to the retrospective re-evaluation of experiential information already given.
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Notes
- 1.
For state-of-the-art overviews of current approaches to experimental pragmatics see e.g. Breheny (2011), Katsos and Cummins (2010), Noveck and Reboul (2008), Noveck and Sperber (2004a, b), Noveck and Sperber (2007), Németh T. (2006), Sauerland and Yatsushiro (2009), Meibauer and Steinbach (2011), Németh T. and Bibok (2010).
- 2.
- 3.
“How, […] relying upon familiar data, can thought experiment lead us to new knowledge or to new understanding of nature?” (Kuhn 1977: 241).
- 4.
The terminology in the literature on thought experiments is vague. For example, the terms ‘empirical’ and ‘experiential’ are not defined, and very often they are used interchangeably. Since the definition of ‘empirical’ is highly controversial and we cannot discuss it here, we will use the notion ‘experiential’ in a pre-explicative sense. We will apply this term to pieces of information which are rooted in a person’s ‘experiences’ whatever the latter may be. For example, the results of real experiments or communicative situations in which one has already taken part, count as experiences and statements about such experiences are called ‘experiential’.
- 5.
- 6.
We will divide the quotations into smaller units which makes it easier to refer to parts of the quotation to be analysed. The units do not necessarily correspond to paragraphs in the original text.
- 7.
For their precise definitions and numerous applications to different linguistic theories see the work mentioned. A first attempt to apply this approach to thought experiments is Kertész (2010).
- 8.
A well-known example is inductive inferences, in which the set of the explicit premises has to be supplemented by the background assumption that the cases not examined also possess the characteristics that could be found in the investigated ones. The conclusion states the presence of these characteristics as a generalisation.
- 9.
“The sort of ‘self-criticism’ at issue does not reflect any vicious or vitiating circularity, but in effect amounts simply to a feedback process that uses later, more refined stages of the analysis to effect revisionary sophistications in the materials from which earlier stages proceeded. One indeed returns to ‘the same point’ but does so at a different cognitive level” (Rescher 1976: 119; emphasis as in the original).
- 10.
However, we will see later that this impression needs to be refined.
- 11.
Latent background assumptions are set within ‘<’ and ‘>’. Moreover, we accept ‘the weakest link principle’ which says that the conclusion of a plausible inference takes its plausibility value from that of the ‘weakest’ explicit premise or latent background assumption (see e.g. Rescher 1976: XI f., 15, Kertész and Rákosi 2012). We also remark that the expressions ‘it is plausible that’ and ‘it is certain that’ merely indicate a very simplified representation of plausible statements. Kertész and Rákosi (2012) uses numerical scales of plausibility values whose introduction in the present paper would be beside the point.
- 12.
The pattern of both inferences corresponds to that of plausible modus ponens: {it is plausible that if A then B; A is plausible} ⇒ B is plausible.
- 13.
Of course, this applies to our reconstruction of Grice’s argumentation in (6), (7), (9) and (10), too.
- 14.
A detailed analysis of this structure, using the terminology of the framework we proposed above, would transgress the limits of the present paper.
- 15.
- 16.
Here we use the notion of ‘evidence’ pre-explicatively. For its explication within the present metascientific framework, see Kertész and Rákosi (2012).
- 17.
See also Searle (1969: 43–45).
- 18.
Carston (2002a) criticises Levinson’s approach because, according to her, he does not offer an overall solution to Grice’s circle. Rather, he merely assumes that his approach to generalised conversational implicature, which he developed independently of the circularity issue, may soften its harmfulness. Carston also remarks that there are particularised conversational implicatures which influence propositional meaning, while others do not.
- 19.
The issue of the relationship between ‘philosophical’ and ‘scientific’ thought experiments is an important one, but discussing it would transgress the limits of the present paper.
- 20.
See (iv) in Sect. 2.4 for these notions.
- 21.
In fact, it is not the experiment itself, but the experimental report that is to be considered as plausible argumentation. The experimental report is for example part of Noveck and Sperber (2007) and thus the argumentation cycles it consists of are comparable to the argumentation cycles including the thought experiments. In this context we remark that, first, it would be necessary to ask questions with respect to pragmatic experiments in analogy to (P2) and (P3)—that is, what kind of structure they have and what their functions are. However, for lack of space we refer to Kertész and Rákosi (2012) where these questions are raised and partially answered in an extensive case study within the framework of plausible argumentation. Second, the philosophical literature also discusses the fact that every real experiment has to be carried out in thought before it is carried out in reality (see e.g. Buzzoni 2008).
- 22.
- 23.
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Acknowledgments
András Kertész’ contribution to the present paper was supported by the Research Group for Theoretical Linguistics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences as well as the projects OTKA K 77823 and TAMOP 4.2.1./B-09/1/KONV-2010-0007. We are grateful to Enikő Németh T. and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
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Kertész, A., Kiefer, F. (2013). From Thought Experiments to Real Experiments in Pragmatics. In: Capone, A., Lo Piparo, F., Carapezza, M. (eds) Perspectives on Pragmatics and Philosophy. Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01011-3_3
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