Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Backward-Leak Uni-Directional Updatable Encryption from (Homomorphic) Public Key Encryption

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Public-Key Cryptography – PKC 2023 (PKC 2023)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 13941))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

The understanding of directionality for updatable encryption (UE) schemes is important, but not yet completed in the literature. We show that security in the backward-leak uni-directional key updates setting is equivalent to the no-directional one. Combining with the work of Jiang (ASIACRYPT 2020) and Nishimaki (PKC 2022), it is showed that the backward-leak notion is the strongest one among all known key update notions and more relevant in practice. We propose two novel generic constructions of UE schemes that are secure in the backward-leak uni-directional key update setting from public key encryption (PKE) schemes: the first one requires a key and message homomorphic PKE scheme and the second one requires a bootstrappable PKE scheme. These PKE can be constructed based on standard assumptions (such as the Decisional Diffie-Hellman and Learning With Errors assumptions).

Y. Jiang Galteland—Her work has been co-funded by the IKTPLUSS program of the Research Council of Norway under the scope of and as part of the outcome from the research project Reinforcing the Health Data Infrastructure in Mobility and Assurance through Data Democratization (Health Democratization, 2019–2024, Project No. 288856.

J. Pan—His work is supported by the Research Council of Norway under Project No. 324235.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    This was called uni-directional key updates in [12], but here we follow the more precise terminology of Nishimaki [14] and call it forward-leak uni-directional key updates.

  2. 2.

    except for some end epoch \(\textsf{e} _\textsf{end}\), if \(\textsf{e} _\textsf{exp}\le \textsf{e} _\textsf{end}\).

  3. 3.

    A challenge-equal ciphertext is either a challenge ciphertext or an updated ciphertext of the challenge ciphertext.

References

  1. Alamati, N., Montgomery, H., Patranabis, S.: Symmetric primitives with structured secrets. In: Boldyreva, A., Micciancio, D. (eds.) CRYPTO 2019. LNCS, vol. 11692, pp. 650–679. Springer, Cham (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26948-7_23

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  2. Boneh, D., Eskandarian, S., Kim, S., Shih, M.: Improving speed and security in updatable encryption schemes. In: Moriai, S., Wang, H. (eds.) ASIACRYPT 2020. LNCS, vol. 12493, pp. 559–589. Springer, Cham (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64840-4_19

    Chapter  MATH  Google Scholar 

  3. Boneh, D., Lewi, K., Montgomery, H., Raghunathan, A.: Key homomorphic PRFs and their applications. In: Canetti, R., Garay, J.A. (eds.) CRYPTO 2013. LNCS, vol. 8042, pp. 410–428. Springer, Heidelberg (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40041-4_23

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  4. Boyd, C., Davies, G.T., Gjøsteen, K., Jiang, Y.: Fast and Secure updatable encryption. In: Micciancio, D., Ristenpart, T. (eds.) CRYPTO 2020. LNCS, vol. 12170, pp. 464–493. Springer, Cham (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56784-2_16

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  5. Chen, L., Li, Y., Tang, Q.: CCA updatable encryption against malicious re-encryption attacks. In: Moriai, S., Wang, H. (eds.) ASIACRYPT 2020. LNCS, vol. 12493, pp. 590–620. Springer, Cham (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64840-4_20

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  6. Everspaugh, A., Paterson, K., Ristenpart, T., Scott, S.: Key rotation for authenticated encryption. In: Katz, J., Shacham, H. (eds.) CRYPTO 2017. LNCS, vol. 10403, pp. 98–129. Springer, Cham (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63697-9_4

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  7. Galteland, Y.J., Pan, J.: Backward-leak UNI-directional updatable encryption from (homomorphic) public key encryption. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/324 (2022). https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/324

  8. Gentry, C.: A fully homomorphic encryption scheme. Ph.D. thesis, Stanford, CA, USA (2009)

    Google Scholar 

  9. Jiang, Y.: The direction of updatable encryption does not matter much. In: Moriai, S., Wang, H. (eds.) ASIACRYPT 2020. LNCS, vol. 12493, pp. 529–558. Springer, Cham (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64840-4_18

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  10. Jiang, Y.: The direction of updatable encryption does not matter much. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2020/622 (2020). https://ia.cr/2020/622

  11. Klooß, M., Lehmann, A., Rupp, A.: (R)CCA secure updatable encryption with integrity protection. In: Ishai, Y., Rijmen, V. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2019. LNCS, vol. 11476, pp. 68–99. Springer, Cham (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17653-2_3

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  12. Lehmann, A., Tackmann, B.: Updatable encryption with post-compromise security. In: Nielsen, J.B., Rijmen, V. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2018. LNCS, vol. 10822, pp. 685–716. Springer, Cham (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78372-7_22

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  13. Miao, P., Patranabis, S., Watson, G.: Unidirectional updatable encryption and proxy re-encryption from DDH or LWE. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2022/311 (2022). https://ia.cr/2022/311

  14. Nishimaki, R.: The direction of updatable encryption does matter. In: Hanaoka, G., Shikata, J., Watanabe, Y. (eds.) PKC 2022. LNCS, vol. 13178, pp. 194–224. Springer, Cham (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97131-1_7

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  15. Regev, O.: On lattices, learning with errors, random linear codes, and cryptography. In: Gabow, H.N., Fagin, R. (eds.) 2005 Proceedings of the 37th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 84–93. ACM (2005). https://doi.org/10.1145/1060590.1060603

  16. Slamanig, D., Striecks, C.: Puncture ’em all: Stronger updatable encryption with no-directional key updates. IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch. 268 (2021). https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/268

Download references

Acknowledgements

We thank the anonymous reviewers of Eurocrypt 2022, Crypto 2022, and PKC 2023 for their useful comments. We also thank Christoph Striecks and Daniel Slamanig for their valuable suggestions to improve the previous version of our paper.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Information Security and Communication Technology, NTNU – Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Gjøvik, Norway

    Yao Jiang Galteland

  2. Department of Mathematical Sciences, NTNU – Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway

    Jiaxin Pan

Authors
  1. Yao Jiang Galteland
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Jiaxin Pan
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Yao Jiang Galteland .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA

    Alexandra Boldyreva

  2. Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA

    Vladimir Kolesnikov

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2023 International Association for Cryptologic Research

About this paper

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this paper

Jiang Galteland, Y., Pan, J. (2023). Backward-Leak Uni-Directional Updatable Encryption from (Homomorphic) Public Key Encryption. In: Boldyreva, A., Kolesnikov, V. (eds) Public-Key Cryptography – PKC 2023. PKC 2023. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13941. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31371-4_14

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31371-4_14

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-031-31370-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-031-31371-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Societies and partnerships

Search

Navigation