Abstract
We present an actively secure threshold scheme in the setting of Hard Homogeneous Spaces (HHS) which allows fine-grained access structures. More precisely, we elevate a passively secure isogeny-based threshold scheme to an actively secure setting. We prove the active security and simulatability of our advanced schemes. By characterising the necessary properties, we open our schemes to a significantly wider field of applicable secret sharing schemes. Furthermore, we show that Shamir’s scheme has our generalised properties, and thereby our approach truly represents a less restrictive generalisation.
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Acknowledgements
We thank Lena Ries, Luca De Feo, and Michael Meyer for inspiring discussions. Philipp Muth was funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) – SFB 1119 – 236615297.
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Campos, F., Muth, P. (2022). On Actively Secure Fine-Grained Access Structures from Isogeny Assumptions. In: Cheon, J.H., Johansson, T. (eds) Post-Quantum Cryptography. PQCrypto 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13512. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-17234-2_18
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