Abstract
The cryptographic sponge is a popular method for hash function design. The construction is in the ideal permutation model proven to be indifferentiable from a random oracle up to the birthday bound in the capacity of the sponge. This result in particular implies that, as long as the attack complexity does not exceed this bound, the sponge construction achieves a comparable level of collision, preimage, and second preimage resistance as a random oracle. We investigate these state-of-the-art bounds in detail, and observe that while the collision and second preimage security bounds are tight, the preimage bound is not tight. We derive an improved and tight preimage security bound for the cryptographic sponge construction.
The result has direct implications for various lightweight cryptographic hash functions. For example, the NIST Lightweight Cryptography finalist Ascon-Hash does not generically achieve \(2^{128}\) preimage security as claimed, but even \(2^{192}\) preimage security. Comparable improvements are obtained for the modes of Spongent, PHOTON, ACE, Subterranean 2.0, and QUARK, among others.
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Notes
- 1.
The usage of parameter \(X_1\) in this path, as opposed to \(Y_0\), appears illogical at first sight, but fits the parameter definitions as outlined in Fig. 1.
- 2.
Note that this correctly captures the case \(i=\ell \), as \(|\boldsymbol{Z}_\ell |=2^{n-s}\ge 2^{c'}\).
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Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments, and in particular the reviewer that proposed a fix to the square root loss that was present in an earlier version of the proof. Charlotte Lefevre is supported by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) under grant OCENW.KLEIN.435. Bart Mennink is supported by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) under grant VI.Vidi.203.099.
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Lefevre, C., Mennink, B. (2022). Tight Preimage Resistance of the Sponge Construction. In: Dodis, Y., Shrimpton, T. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2022. CRYPTO 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13510. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15985-5_7
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