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Layering Quantum-Resistance into Classical Digital Signature Algorithms

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Information Security (ISC 2021)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 13118))

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Abstract

It is proven that asymmetric key cryptographic systems that rely on Integer Factorization or Discrete Logarithm as the underlying hard problem are vulnerable to quantum computers. Using Shor’s algorithm on a large-enough quantum computer, an attacker can cryptanalyze the public key to obtain the private key in O(logN) time complexity. For systems that use the classical Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) algorithm or Elliptic-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), it means that authentication, data integrity and non-repudiation between the communicating parties cannot be assured in the post-quantum era.

In this paper, we present a novel approach using zero-knowledge proofs on the pre-image of the private signing key to layer in quantum-resistance into digital signature deployments that require longer-term post-quantum protection while maintaining backward compatibility with existing implementations. We show that this approach can extend the cryptographic protection of data beyond the post-quantum era and is also easy to migrate to. An implementation of this approach applying a ZKBoo zero-knowledge proof on ECDSA signatures is realized using a RFC3161-compatible time-stamp server with OpenSSL and an Adobe Acrobat Reader DC.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Source codes can be made available upon request.

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Acknowledgement

This project is supported by the Ministry of Education, Singapore, under its MOE AcRF Tier 2 grant (MOE2018-T2-1-111).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Singapore University of Technology and Design, Singapore, Singapore

    Teik Guan Tan & Jianying Zhou

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  1. Teik Guan Tan
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  2. Jianying Zhou
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Correspondence to Teik Guan Tan .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Monash University, Clayton, VIC, Australia

    Joseph K. Liu

  2. Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Gjøvik, Norway

    Sokratis Katsikas

  3. Technical University of Denmark, Kongens Lyngby, Denmark

    Weizhi Meng

  4. University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia

    Willy Susilo

  5. Petra Christian University, Surabaya, Indonesia

    Rolly Intan

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Tan, T.G., Zhou, J. (2021). Layering Quantum-Resistance into Classical Digital Signature Algorithms. In: Liu, J.K., Katsikas, S., Meng, W., Susilo, W., Intan, R. (eds) Information Security. ISC 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 13118. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-91356-4_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-91356-4_2

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