Abstract
This chapter proposes a new criterion of theory choice. I begin with a criticism on a traditional criterion of theory choice. Contra the traditional approach, I argue that theory choice is a situation where scientists are reasoning what theory should be favoured as the most promising theory in the area rather than the one where scientists choose a theory among all the alternatives to be the best theory in the area. Then, I elaborate the concept of promisingness of theories in terms of potential usefulness. Moreover, I compare promisingness with other diachronic criteria, such as Popper’s potential progressiveness, Lakatos’ predictive novelty, McMullin’s P-fertility, Laudan’s fertility-promise, Ivani’s fruitfulness, and Šešelja et al’s pursuit worthiness. Finally, I argue for the promisingness criterion from a normative viewpoint.
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Notes
- 1.
It has been recognised that theory choice is not a best phrase if theory is construed narrowly, given that choice in scientific change usually involves the commitment to some non-theoretical elements (e.g. values and experimental procedure). Thus, theory here should be understood in a broad sense, referring to a unit of scientific consensus which encompasses both the theoretical and the non-theoretical elements. Thomas Kuhn’s “paradigm (as disciplinary matrix)” (1970), Imre Lakatos’ “research programme” (1968), Larry Laudan’s “research tradition” (1977), and Hasok Chang’s “system of practice” (2014) are among the most famous attempts to articulate such a unit of scientific consensus. In order to avoid making any commitment by adopting the phrases like “paradigm choice” and “system choice”, I wish to follow the traditional phrase “theory choice”, where theory is construed loosely. Accordingly, theories in the chapter refer to scientific consensuses based on some exemplary practices. For example, when talking of the Mendelian theory, I refer it to a scientific consensus based on some exemplary practices in the study of heredity (e.g. Bateson 1902).
- 2.
- 3.
Here I mean early Weldon (1902–1904). For a detailed analysis of Weldon’s view on inheritance, see Chap. 4.
- 4.
That being said, I would like to highlight that my argument should be not understood in the way that scientists did not look for the best theory at the time in theory choice. They did work hard to look for the best available theory sometimes but by doing so, they ultimately aimed at the most promising theory.
- 5.
As I have shown in Sect. 4.3, Weldon’s work on inheritance in the first decade of the twentieth century can be divided into two periods: 1901–1904 and 1904–1906. The works in the first period were basically the criticisms of Mendelism.
- 6.
Note that Weldon accepted that there were the phenomena of discontinuous variation, but he did not think that discontinuous variation played any significant role in the process of evolution. In other words, what Weldon differed from Bateson was the significance of discontinuous variation in the study of evolution.
- 7.
It should be noted that by arguing that simplicity and external consistency are two virtues that typically project prominsingness, I am not offering an algorithm of theory choice.
- 8.
Pearson founded the world’s first statistics department at UCL in 1911 and has been widely credited as the founder of modern statistics.
- 9.
In addition, Weldon’s professional experience influenced his adoption of the statistical approach. Since 1895, Weldon had closely collaborated with the Marine Biological Association, where the research carried out would well fit with the statistical approach. Moreover, Weldon’s close collaboration and friendship with Pearson also reinforced his commitment to the statistical approach.
- 10.
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Shan, Y. (2020). Promisingness in Theory Choice. In: Doing Integrated History and Philosophy of Science: A Case Study of the Origin of Genetics. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, vol 320. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50617-9_10
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