Abstract
This paper examines the performance of U.S. bank holding companies before, during, and after the 2007–2012 financial crisis. Fully nonparametric methods are used to estimate technical, cost, and input allocative efficiencies. Recently developed statistical results are used to test for changes in efficiencies as well as productivity over time, and to test for changes in technology over time. I find evidence of non-convexity of banks’ production set is found. In addition, the data reveal that mean technical efficiency declined during the financial crisis, but recovered in the years after, ending higher in 2016 than in 2006, while both cost and input allocative efficiencies declined from 2006 to 2016. Statistical tests indicate that technology shifted downward throughout the period 2006–2016.
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Notes
- 1.
Gorton (2018) refers to the financial crisis of 2007–2008, while Bolt et al. (2012) and others refer to the crisis of 2008. The National Bureau of Economic Research lists the corresponding peak-to-trough business cycle contraction as fourth-quarter 2007 through second-quarter 2009. Many of the effects of the recent financial crisis lasted beyond 2009.
- 2.
See Hördahl and King (2008), Bernanke (2018) and Gorton (2018) for additional discussion. See also the comprehensive timeline of the financial crisis provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis at https://www.stlouisfed.org/financial-crisis/full-timeline.
- 3.
Total loans and leases, net of unearned income for U.S. commercial banks reached a peak of 6.807 trillion dollars in 2008Q3, fell to 6.415 trillion dollars by 2009Q4, and did not reach the level of 2008Q3 until 2012Q4. All real estate loans reached a peak of 3.835 trillion in July 2009, fell to 3.491 trillion in September 2011, and did not reach the July 2009 level until November 2015. Commercial real estate loans reached a peak of 1.730 trillion in December 2008, fell to 1.419 trillion in January 2012, and did not reach the level of December 2008 again until September 2015. The levels of loans outstanding reflect in large part past loan-making activity; i.e., there is a good deal of inertia reflected in the values given here. The decline in values of loans originating during the financial crisis is likely far larger than the levels of loans outstanding, but is harder to measure.
- 4.
Carry trades are those trades with an initial return or “carry,” but with large tail risks involving losses in the future which have low probability but which are perhaps catastrophically large.
- 5.
An unintended consequence of burdensome capital requirements may be to induce movement of financial intermediation out of regulated entities into weakly or unregulated entities. This in large part gave rise to shadow banking that existed by 2007.
- 6.
Patel (2014) reports that JP Morgan Chase & Co.’s chief executive officer, Jamie Dimon, stated in mid-2014 that JP Morgan would hire 13,000 new staff in compliance, audit, and other areas by year-end, increasing the bank’s risk control staff by 30%. The number of audit staff at Bank of America Corp. roughly doubled from mid-2011 to mid-2014. Between the end of 2011 and mid-2014, Citigroup Inc. increased its staff working on regulatory and compliance issues by 33% for a total of about 30,000 employees, representing 12.3% of Citi’s 244,000 total employees at the end of second-quarter 2014. Patel (2014) observes that these increases represent “the new normal for banks as they grapple with a host of new regulations and capital requirements in the wake of the financial crisis, according to analysts.”
- 7.
- 8.
Additional assumptions are needed for CRS efficiency estimators. See Kneip et al. (2015) for additional discussion.
- 9.
In other words, standard CLT results hold in the FDH case if and only if p = 1 and output is fixed and constant, or q = 1 and input is fixed and constant.
- 10.
Conceivably one could estimate the shadow price of equity capital, but for inefficient firms this is problematic since the estimated shadow price would depend on the particular direction in which an inefficient firm is projected onto the estimated frontier.
- 11.
Note that equity capital can arguably be viewed as a free source of financial capital for banks. In each year 2006, 2008, …, 2016, the median value of X 4∕X 1 varies between 0.1005 and 0.1144, while the first quartiles range between 0.0802 and 0.0977 and the third quartiles range between 0.1229 and 0.1362. Hence equity capital typically amounts to around 10–11% of the financial capital of banks in the sample. One should perhaps not expect large differences between results from the two different specifications.
- 12.
The situation becomes even worse if equity capital is included. Then the effective parametric samples sizes for the FDH, VRS, and CRS estimators are 3, 36, and 66 (respectively) for n = 533. Of course, the notion of effective parametric sample size defined by Wilson (2018) presupposes that one has a correctly specified parametric model. As Robinson (1988) notes, the root-n parametric convergence rate means that estimators converge quickly to the wrong thing in a mis-specified model, leading the author to refer to root-n inconsistency.
- 13.
Consequently, the statistic I use for the input orientation is the negative of the statistic appearing in equation (18) of Kneip et al. (2016).
- 14.
Since standard CLT results apply here, one can use sample covariance to account for dependence across periods among observations for banks observed in both periods. There is, however, some subtlety. Details are given in Appendix.
- 15.
What has come to be known as the Shannon number, i.e., 10120, is a conservative lower bound on the game-tree complexity of chess calculated by Shannon (1950).
- 16.
A number of papers in the banking literature have regressed DEA efficiency estimates on some explanatory variables including categorical variables to capture differences in regulatory environments across countries. As far as I know, none of these tests the separability condition discussed by Simar and Wilson (2007, 2011b). Here, banks face the same regulatory environment at a given point in time, but the regulatory environment changes with passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010. Rejection of separability with respect to time amounts to a rejection with respect to the different regulatory regimes before and after 2010. Hence my results cast some doubt on results from cross-country analyses that attempt to control for differing regulatory regimes across countries in second-stage regressions.
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Acknowledgements
An early version of this work was presented at the North American Productivity Workshop, University of Miami Business School, Miami, Florida, 12–15 June 2018. I thank conference participants and Shirong Zhao for helpful comments.
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Appendix: Technical Details
Appendix: Technical Details
As discussed in Sect. 5, with dimension reduction productivity can be measured by simple ratios. In addition, since neither FDH nor DEA estimators are involved, the usual Lindeberg-Feller CLT can be used to make inference about differences in mean productivity between two periods. However, the samples in each period are unbalanced, and care must be taken to properly account for covariance.
Suppose banks are observed in two periods t ∈{1, 2}. Let n t be the number of banks observed only in period t, and let n 0 be the number of banks observed in both periods (here, n 1 and n 2 are defined differently than in the discussion about testing differences in mean technical efficiency in Sect. 5). Then the total numbers of observations in periods 1 and 2 are given by (n 1 + n 0) and (n 0 + n 1). Let P jti denote productivity (measured by output/input or output/cost after reducing dimensionality to p = q = 1) for bank i in group j ∈{0, 1, 2} in period t ∈{1 2}. Group 0 consists of banks observed in both periods, while groups 1 and 2 consist of banks observed only in periods 1 and 2 (respectively). We have sample means \(\widehat \mu _1\), \(\widehat \mu _2\) for periods 1 and 2, with
for t = 1 or 2.
Due to Assumption 24, the Ps are independent within a given period, but may be dependent across periods. Hence any covariance between \(\widehat \mu _1\) and \(\widehat \mu _2\) can result only from the n 0 banks observed in both periods. Let
and
for all i. Then
The variances \(\sigma _t^2\) and covariance σ 12 can be estimated by the corresponding sample moments, i.e.,
for t = 1 or 2 and
Then the test statistic
as (n 1 + n 0 →∞ and (n 0 + n 2) →∞ by the Lindeberg-Levy CLT. For a two-sided test of size α, the null hypothesis H 0: μ 1 = μ 2 is rejected in favor of H 1: μ 1≠μ 2 whenever \(|\widehat \tau |>\Phi ^{-1}(1-\frac {\alpha }{2})\) where Φ−1(⋅) is the standard normal quantile function.
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Wilson, P.W. (2021). U.S. Banking in the Post-Crisis Era: New Results from New Methods. In: Parmeter, C.F., Sickles, R.C. (eds) Advances in Efficiency and Productivity Analysis. NAPW 2018. Springer Proceedings in Business and Economics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47106-4_11
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