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The Politics of Resource Bargaining, Social Relations and Institutional Development in Zimbabwe Since Independence

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The Politics of Domestic Resource Mobilization for Social Development

Part of the book series: Social Policy in a Development Context ((SPDC))

Abstract

This chapter traces the evolution of domestic resource mobilization in Zimbabwe since independence in 1980. It adopts an historical-comparative approach to explore changes in the balance of forces among actors, and institutional constraints associated with the formulation of successive resource mobilization strategies. Three case studies of divergent resource mobilization innovations underscore the complexity of challenges faced by a government whose actions are shaped by uneven state capacity and weakened policy autonomy. The chapter concludes that the relative strength of established business interests have enabled business actors to continue to wield significant power and influence, while diminished state capacity, declining political legitimacy and a chronic state fiscal crisis have fuelled social contestation over resource mobilization.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This chapter draws on the findings of three United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) working papers and unpublished research commissioned for the Zimbabwe study; see Saunders (2017, 2018) and Mate (2018). Key research sources included official policy, budget and report documents issued by government departments and statutory institutions. Reports and research produced by business, civil society, donor institutions, media and academic researchers are also cited. Interviews for the working papers by the UNRISD Zimbabwe project team were conducted in 2013–2016 with government officials, business representatives, civil society actors and key informants for case studies.

  2. 2.

    For example, Bebbington et al. (2018), Whitfield et al. (2015) and Khan (2010).

  3. 3.

    See Hammar et al. (2003), Moyo (2011), Scoones et al. (2010), and Rutherford (2012).

  4. 4.

    More than 70 per cent of the population was classified as poor and Zimbabwe’s Human Development Index slid to 173 out of 187 countries by 2011 (World Bank 2018).

  5. 5.

    Inflation rose close to 600 per cent by the end of 2005 before exploding in late 2007, reaching approximately 230 million per cent before official calculations were suspended (RBZ 2008).

  6. 6.

    “Fiscalization” refers to the recording of VAT transactions using electronic devices linked directly to ZIMRA (ZEPARU 2015).

  7. 7.

    Tax effort is a measure of tax collection efficiency. The ratio is derived by dividing the actual tax share by an estimate of how much revenue could be collected, given the structural characteristics of an economy.

  8. 8.

    Zimbabwe’s Revenue/GDP ratio was significantly higher than the 21.2 per cent average for sub-Saharan Africa over the period 1997–2002 (UNDP 2008). As Kanyenze (2014) noted, Zimbabwe also enjoyed a similarly high ratio of tax/GDP at 22.7 per cent, compared to the sub-Saharan Africa’s average of 16.5 per cent.

  9. 9.

    The Public Finance Management Act (2009) introduced specific provisions (Section 18) for the collection and retention of levies, licenses, user fees and other revenues by diverse public institutions.

  10. 10.

    In the 2010s electronic payments for goods and services using mobile telephones and domestic cash cards became the dominant form of financial transaction for most Zimbabweans in the absence of ready access to paper currency.

  11. 11.

    For example, intense enforcement of traffic fines by the police was widely disparaged as motivated by the desire to finance salaries, not protect road safety, and taxpayer boycotts of rising electricity tariffs and municipal property taxes in protest at poor delivery of services became commonplace.

  12. 12.

    This case study is based on two UNRISD Politics of Domestic Resource Mobilization Working Papers on the Zimbabwe minerals sector: Saunders (2017, 2018).

  13. 13.

    These included Special Mining Leases, which reduced corporate taxation from 25 per cent to 15 per cent on projects of USD 100 million and exempted them from several other taxes (Government of Zimbabwe 2019).

  14. 14.

    The African Mining Vision is a regulatory framework adopted in 2009 by 54 member states of the African Union and endorsed by international business and donor institutions (African Union 2009). Key studies funded by donors include Government of Zimbabwe (2013). McMahon et al. (2012), Hawkins (2009), Jourdan et al. (2012), Kanyenze et al. (2011) and ZELA (2012).

  15. 15.

    Mining tax revenue fell to USD 75.7 million (2.2 per cent of all revenue) in 2016, from USD 245.8 million (7 per cent) in 2012; see Government of Zimbabwe (2017).

  16. 16.

    Reforms included increases in the gold purchase price, payment in foreign exchange, purchasing from unlicensed producers and loans to small producers to enable investment.

  17. 17.

    The NAC was established by the National AIDS Council Act of 1999 [Chapter 15: 14], while the AIDS Levy was established under the Finance Act [Chapter 23: 04] the following year.

  18. 18.

    For example, NAC rules stipulated that 55 per cent of revenues be allocated to purchasing antiretroviral medication. Spending targets could be revised, but only with the approval of NAC structures (SADC 2008).

  19. 19.

    The Act stipulated that Action Committees include representatives of ministries, Chiefs and Local Authorities, HIV-positive people, non-governmental organizations, faith-based organizations and the business sector.

  20. 20.

    For example, the Levy funded the domestic production of antiretroviral medications, specialist training and employment of nurses, provision of food for AIDS-affected communities, and payment of school fees and other expenses for school-going AIDS orphans.

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Saunders, R. (2020). The Politics of Resource Bargaining, Social Relations and Institutional Development in Zimbabwe Since Independence. In: Hujo, K. (eds) The Politics of Domestic Resource Mobilization for Social Development. Social Policy in a Development Context. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37595-9_12

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37595-9_12

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