Abstract
The “tragedy of the commons” (Ref. 1) has proved particularly difficult to counteract in the case of marine fishery resources (Refs. 2–4), where the establishment of individual property rights is virtually out of the question. Common ownership is the fundamental fact affecting almost every regime of fishery management.
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© 1980 Plenum Press, New York
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Clark, C.W. (1980). Restricted Access to Common-Property Fishery Resources: A Game-Theoretic Analysis. In: Liu, PT. (eds) Dynamic Optimization and Mathematical Economics. Mathematical Concepts and Methods in Science and Engineering. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-3572-6_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-3572-6_7
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