Abstract
I argue against an account of scientific representation suggested by the semantic, or structuralist, conception of scientific theories. Proponents of this conception often employ the term “model” to refer to bare “structures”, which naturally leads them to attempt to characterize the relation between models and reality as a purely structural one. I argue instead that scientific models are typically “representations”, in the pragmatist sense of the term: they are inherently intended for specific phenomena. Therefore in general scientific models are not (merely) structures. I then explore some consequences of this pragmatist account of representation, and argue that it sheds light upon the distinction between theories and models. I finish by briefly addressing some critical comments due to Bas Van Fraassen.
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Suárez, M. (1999). Theories,Models,and Representations. In: Magnani, L., Nersessian, N.J., Thagard, P. (eds) Model-Based Reasoning in Scientific Discovery. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4813-3_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4813-3_5
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