Abstract
Tax evasion is a topic widely explored by the microeconomic literature, both from the theoretical and the experimental perspective. The theoretical approach to tax evasion started with the seminal paper by Allingham and Sandmo (1972), which treated it within the expected utility maximisation frame a la Von Neumann Morgenstern. The experimental approach includes a large number of works, mainly devoted to the verification of theoretical results and to the discussion of behavioural assumptions.
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Mittone, L., Patelli, P. (2000). Imitative Behaviour in Tax Evasion. In: Luna, F., Stefansson, B. (eds) Economic Simulations in Swarm: Agent-Based Modelling and Object Oriented Programming. Advances in Computational Economics, vol 14. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4641-2_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4641-2_5
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