Abstract
Recent excitement over the emergence of connectionism as a theory of the brain has been muted by a powerful critique advanced by Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn (1988). The position which they develop assumes that an acceptable account of brain structure must be able to sustain an appropriate model of cognitive function. They introduce what they take to be the conditions that must be satisfied by an adequate model of cognitive function and contend that traditional digital machines, based on the concept of Turing machines, can fulfil these requirements, but that newer connectionist machines, based on the concept of neural networks, cannot.
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© 1992 Springer-Verlag London Limited
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Fetzer, J.H. (1992). Connectionism and Cognition: Why Fodor and Pylyshyn Are Wrong. In: Clark, A., Lutz, R. (eds) Connectionism in Context. Artificial Intelligence and Society. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-1923-4_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-1923-4_3
Publisher Name: Springer, London
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-19716-4
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