Abstract
Imagine that you have a brilliant idea for a new business. In fact, your experience and expertise lead you to believe that this is a sure-fire winner. You approach the bank with your idea and they only laugh. You also discover that venture capitalists require a very high interest rate (or equity stake) in order to fund your venture. What’s going on here? One explanation is that, because you are an entrepreneur, you are more willing than investors to undertake risk, that is, you are less risk averse. This is a long-standing argument in the literature on what makes an entrepreneur (Brockhaus 1980). An alternative explanation is that entrepreneurs seeking funding think they are selling US treasury bills while investors think they are being offered pre-Castro government bonds.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Fernando Alvarez, private communication.
- 3.
- 4.
See Bates (1990) for an empirical investigation of the effect of investment in human capital on the willingness of investors to invest.
- 5.
See Chandler, Galen, and Hanks (1998) for evidence that human capital and financial capital are partly substitutable.
- 6.
The relationship between attention and risk preferences has also been addressed in March and Shapira (1987, 1992). Their analysis concerns how the focus of attention on aspects of the risky venture affect risk perceptions. Here, I suggest that the allocation of attention affects only the expected value of the venture.
- 7.
Another analogy is useful is to imagine a juggler who is rewarded according to the number of plates he can spin on the tips of long sticks. As soon as one plate is spinning, he can set up another one. However, as he continues to set up additional spinning plates, the first one starts to wobble, threatening to fall. The choice the juggler faces is to either continue to set up new plates or to go back and try to respin old plates. New plates may or may not be balanced and current plates that have fallen may be broken.
- 8.
For a more detailed description of these abilities see Gifford (1993).
- 9.
In some cases, the returns to the venture are received only when it is liquidated (Gifford, 1997).
- 10.
This problem is solvable as long as the one-period return to any venture is bounded. The number of projects is not bounded.
- 11.
Assuming that all else is equal, if one distribution F(x) of a random variable x is a mean preserving spread of another distribution G(x), then these two distributions have the same expected value but F has a greater variance and so is more risky.
- 12.
See Iyigun and Owen (1997) for a macroeconomic analysis of the effects on the economy of investments in human capital.
- 13.
See Levy and Lazarovich-Porat (1995) for an empirical test of the effectiveness of such a “revelation mechanism.”
- 14.
See Gifford (1997).
- 15.
See Bester (1987) for an early paper explaining credit rationing with asymmetric information.
References
Amit, R., Brander, J., & Zott, C. 1998. Why do venture capital firms exist? Theory and Canadian evidence - An essay on the economics of imperfect information. Journal of Business Venturing, 13: 441–466.
Amit, R., Muller, E., & Cockburn, L. 1995. Opportunity costs and entrepreneurial activity, Journal of Business Venturing, 10: 95–106.
Bates, T. 1990. Entrepreneur human capital inputs and small business longevity. Review of Economics & Statistics, 72: 551–59.
Barreto, H. 1989. The Entrepreneur in Microeconomic Theory: Disappearance and Explanation, New York: Routledge.
Baron, R. A. 2000. Counterfactual thinking and venture formation – The psychology of new venture creation. Journal of Business Venturing, 15: 79–91.
Baron, R. A. 1998. Cognitive mechanisms in entrepreneurship - entrepreneurship in the 1990s. Journal of Business Venturing, 13: 275–294.
Becker, G. S. 1965. A theory of the allocation of time. Economic Journal, 75: 493–517.
Bester, H. 1987. The role of collateral in credit markets with imperfect information. European Economic Review, 31 887–99.
Blanchflower, D. G., & Oswald, A. J. 1998. What makes an entrepreneur? Journal of Labor Economics, 16: 26–60.
Brandstätter, H. 1997. Becoming an entrepreneur-A question of personality structure? Journal of Economic Psychology, 18: 157–77
Brockhaus, R. H. Sr. 1980. Risk taking propensity of entrepreneurs. Academy of Management Journal, 23: 509–520.
Chandler, G. N., & Hanks, S. H. 1998. An examination of the substitutability of founders’ human and financial capital in emerging busines ventures. Journal of Business Venturing, 13: 353–370.
Coco, G. 1999. Collateral, Heterogeneity in risk attitude and the credit market equilibrium. European Economic Review, 43: 559–74.
Casson, M. 1982. The Entrepreneur: An Economic Theory. Totowa, NJ: Barnes and Noble Books.
Cheung, J. A. 1999. Probability based approach to estimating costs of capital for small business. Small Business Economics, 12: 331–36.
Cooper, A. C., & Artz, K. W. 1995. Determinants of satisfaction for entrepreneurs. Journal of Business Venturing, 10: 439–457.
Cooper, A. C., Folta, T. B. & Woo, C. 1995. Entrepreneurial information search. Journal of Business Venturing, 10: 107–120.
Cramer, J. S., Hartog, J., Jonker, N., & Van Praag, C. M. 2002. Low risk aversion encourages the choice for entrepreneurship: An empirical test of a truism. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 48: 29–36.
Evans, D. S., & Jovanovic, B. 1989. An estimated model of entrepreneurial choice under liquidity constraints. Journal of Political Economy, 97: 808–827.
Fiet, J. O. 1996. The informational basis of entrepreneurial discovery. Small Business Economics, 8: 419–30.
Gifford, S. 1993. Heterogeneous ability, career choice and firm size. Small Business Economics, 5: 249–259.
Gifford, S. 1997. Limited attention and the role of the venture capitalist. Journal of Business Venturing, 12: 459–482.
Gifford, S. 1998. The Allocation of Limited Entrepreneurial Attention. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Gifford, S. 1999. Efficient moral hazard. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organizations, 40(1999): 427–442.
Hai, Y. T., & See, L. F. 1997. Moderating effects of tolerance for ambiguity and risk-taking propensity on the role conflict-perceived performance relationship: Evidence from Singaporean entrepreneurs. Journal of Business Venturing, 12: 67–81.
Hart, O., & Moore, J. 1994. A theory of debt based on the inalienability of human capital. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109: 841–879.
Hayek, F. A. 1945. The use of knowledge in society. American Economic Review, 35: 519–530.
Hebert, R. F., & Link, A. N. 1988. The Entrepreneur: Mainstream Views and Radical Critiques, New York: Praeger.
Hillier, B. 1998. The borrower’s curse: Comment. Economic Journal, 108: 1772–1774.
Holmstrom, B. 1984. On the theory of delegation. In M. Boyer, & R. Kihlstrom (Eds.), Bayesian Models of Economic Theory. Amsterdam: Noth-Holland.
Hyrsky, K., & Tuunanen, M. 1999. Innovativeness and risk-taking propensity: A cross-cultural study of finnish and U.S. Entrepreneurs and small business owners. Liiketaloudellinen Aikakauskirja, 48: 238–256.
Iyigun, M., & Owen, A. L. 1997. Risk, entrepreneurship, and human capital accumulation, board of governors of the federal reserve system.
Jennings, R., Cox, C., & Cooper, C. L. 1994. Business Elites: The Psychology of Entrepreneurs and Intrapreneurs. London and New York: Routledge.
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 305–360.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. 1991. Loss aversion in riskless choice: A reference dependent model. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106: 1039–1061.
Khalil, E. L. 1997. Buridan’s ass, risk, uncertainty, and self-competition: A theory of entrepreneurship. Kyklos, 50(2): 147–163.
Kihlstrom, R. E., & Laffont, J. J. 1979. A general equilibrium theory of firm formation based on risk aversion. Journal of Political Economy, 87: 719–748.
Kirzner, I. M. 1997. Entrepreneurial discovery and the competitive market process: An Austrian approach. Journal of Economic Literature, 35: 60–85.
Knight, F. 1921. Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. New York: Houghton Miffin.
Levy, H., & Lazarovich-Porat, E. 1995. Signaling theory and risk perception: An experimental study. Journal of Economics & Business, 47: 39–56.
Lin, T. H. 1996. The certification role of large block shareholders in initial public offerings: The case of venture capitalists. Quarterly Journal of Business & Economics, 35: 55–65.
Manove, M., & Padilla, A. J. 1999. Banking (conservatively) with optimists. RAND Journal of Economics, 30: 324–350.
March, J. G., & Shapira, Z. 1987. Managerial perspectives on risk and risk-taking. Management Science, 33: 1404–1418.
March, J. G., & Shapira, Z. 1992. Variable risk preferences and the focus of attention. Psychological Review, 99: 172–183.
Marchionatti, R. 1999. On keynes’ animal spirits. Kyklos, 52(3): 415–439.
Palich, L. E., & Bagby, D. R. 1995. Using cognitive theory to explain entrepreneurial risk-taking: Challenging conventional wisdom. Journal of Business Venturing, 10: 425–438.
Pattillo, C. 1998. Investment, uncertainty, and irreversibility in Ghana. International Monetary Fund Staff Paper, 45: 522–553.
Rees, H., & Shah, A. 1986. An empirical analysis of self-employment in the U.K. Journal of Apllied Econometrics, 1: 95–108.
Sarasvathy, D. K., Simon, H. A., & Lave, L. 1998. Perceiving and managing business risks: Differences between entrepreneurs and bankers. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 33: 207–225.
Schiller, B. R., & Crewson, P. E. 1997. Entrepreneurial origins: A longitudinal inquiry. Economic Inquiry, 35: 523–531.
Scholtens, B. 1999. Analytical issues in external financing alternatives for SBEs. Small Business Economics, 12: 137–148.
Simon, M., Houghton, S. M. & Aquino, K. 2000. Cognitive biases, risk perception, and venture formation – implications of interfirm (mis)perceptions for strategic decisions. Journal of Business Venturing, 15: 113–134.
Starmer, C. 2000. Developments in non-expected utility theory: The hunt for a descriptive theory of choice under risk. Journal of Economics Literature, 38: 332–382.
Stewart, W. H., Jr., Warren, E. W., Joann, C. C., & James W. C. 1999. A proclivity for entrepreneurship: A comparison of entrepreneurs, small business owners, and corporate managers. Journal of Business Venturing, 14: 189–214.
Sykes, H. B., & Dunham, D. 1995. Critical assumption planning: A practical tool for managing business development risk. Journal of Business Venturing, 10: 413–424.
Van Praag, C. M., & van Ophem, H. 1995. Determinants of willingness and opportunity to start as an entrepreneur. Kyklos, 48: 513–540.
Wiggins, S. N. 1995. Entrepreneurial enterprises, endogenous ownership, and the limits to firm size. Economic Inquiry, 33: 54–69.
Witt, U. 1998. Imagination and leadership-the neglected dimension of an evolutionary theory of the firm. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 35(2): 161–177.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2010 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Gifford, S. (2010). Risk and Uncertainty. In: Acs, Z., Audretsch, D. (eds) Handbook of Entrepreneurship Research. International Handbook Series on Entrepreneurship, vol 5. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-1191-9_12
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-1191-9_12
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY
Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-1190-2
Online ISBN: 978-1-4419-1191-9
eBook Packages: Business and EconomicsBusiness and Management (R0)