Introduction

Abstract

“To the things themselves!” Thus sounded the battle cry of the movement of phenomenology, inaugurated in 1900-1901 by Edmund Husserl. Among the philosophers who would subsequently associate themselves with this movement, and eagerly reiterate Husserl’s maxim, was Martin Heidegger. The final story of the personal relationship of these two major figures of twentieth Century philosophy still remains to be told,1 but it is certain that it ended in personal tragedy, at least from Husserl’s point of view. As far as the relation between their philosophical doctrines is concerned, Husserl and the early Heidegger’s agreement that philosophy had to be carried out as phenomenology has not led to consensus among commentators. It has been and remains unclear to what extent “phenomenology” actually means the same thing to Husserl and Heidegger. Opinions ränge from the view that “Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology are radically different, and have virtually nothing to do with each other,”² to the contention that “the whole of Sein und Zeit Springs from an indication given by Husserl,” and amounts to nothing more than a detailed elaboration of a particular Husserlian theme.³

“Away with empty word analyses! We must question the things themselves. Back to experience, to seeing, which alone can give our words sense and rational justification.” Very much to the point! But what, then, are these things? And what sort of experience is it to which we must return [...]?

Husserliana XXV, p. 21.

Whence and how is it determined what must be experienced as “the things themselves” in accordance with the principle of phenomenology? Is it consciousness and its objectivity or is it the being of beings [das Sein des Seienden] in its unconcealedness and concealment?

Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 87.