Abstract
A logic or method for the discovery of new knowledge is an old epistemological dream. Knowledge of general or singular truths of course is not the only possible type of object of discovery. One can discover new things or phenomena, such as sofar undetected quasars or unconquered continents or undescribed species of microorganisms, although it may be argued that such discoveries employ particular classificatory schemes, concepts and some particular language. Technological innovations, especially in the modern information society, occupy a half-way house. Although technology aims at designing (commercially valuable) technical devices and their systems (where systems are in seamless interaction with their human users), these innovations rely heavily on basic and applied research.
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Sintonen, M., Kiikeri, M. (2004). Scientific Discovery. In: Niiniluoto, I., Sintonen, M., Woleński, J. (eds) Handbook of Epistemology. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-1986-9_6
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