Abstract
My dictionary tells me that the primary meaning of ‘famine’ is: ‘serious, acute shortage of foodstuffs in a given area, at a particular time’. Such definitions can vary in their usefulness, but this one makes a good start. What makes a shortage of foodstuffs acute or serious? The assumption is that many people in the area in question go hungry or suffer starvation because of the lack of food. This lack of food may be very severe in that there is literally not enough to go round everyone in the area, or it is relatively severe in that many people do not have the access they normally have to food, whilst others may still have reserves which they do not share but hoard, openly if they are powerful enough, or secretly if they are not.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
Singer, P. (1972) ‘Famine, Affluence and Morality’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 1, no. 3; reprinted, for example, in W. Aiken and H. LaFollette (eds), World Hunger and Moral Obligation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), 1977.
A modified version appears in ‘Rich and Poor’, ch. 7 in P. Singer, (1977) Practical Ethics (Cambridge University Press). Some of the details are taken from the later version.
See, for example, articles in W. Aiken and H. LaFollette (eds) (1977), World Hunger and Moral Obligation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
See Singer, Practical Ethics, ch. 8. This raises a new set of issues to do with economic violence that I do not pursue here. For the ‘negative actions/negative violence’ theme, see, for example, J. Harris (1980) Violence and Responsibility (London: Routledge).
See O. O’Neill’s work in (1986) The Faces of Hunger (London: Allen & Unwin) for the Kantian approach.
H. Shue (1980) Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and US Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
See T. Pogge (1989) Realising Rawls, Part III (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press); and
C. Beitz (1979) Political Theory and International Relations, part III (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
See, for example G. Harman (1977) The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (Oxford University Press).
R. Nozick (1977) Anarchy, State and Utopia (Basic Books), ch. 7.
I. Kant (1948) The Ground Work of the Metaphysic of Morals, ch. 2.
(many editions: see, for example, H. Paton (ed.) (1947) The Moral Law (London: Hutchinson).
See, for example, Harman, The Nature of Morality, and C. Brown (1992) International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches (Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf) and
J. Thompson (1992) Justice and World Order (London: Routledge) for useful discussions of ‘communitarian’ approaches contrasted with the ‘cosmopolitan’ approaches underlying the ‘global ethics’ position advocated here.
See, for example, Harman, The Nature of Morality, R. Brandt (1967) ‘Relativism’, in P. Edwards (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (London: Macmillan); and
C. Beitz, for an extended discussion of the realist position in (1979) Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press); and
H. Bull (1977) The Anarchical Society (London: Macmillan) for a useful account of the ‘internationalist’ position and alternatives.
Here I adopt the useful distinction used by Hedley Bull in H. Bull (1979) ‘Human Rights and World Order’, in R. Pettman (ed.), Moral Claims in World Affairs (London, Croom Helm).
Quoted from P. Hein in F. Barnaby (ed.) (1988) Gaia Peace Atlas (London: Pan), p. 192. I prefer to say: we are global citizens with local souls.
See, for example, P. Bauer (1984) Reality and Rhetoric (London: Weidenfeld…Nicolson), and other writings for a variety of arguments against aid.
R. Riddell (1987) Foreign Aid Reconsidered (London: James Currey).
G. Hardin (1977) ‘Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor’, in W. Aiken and H. La Follette (eds), World Hunger and Moral Obligation (1st edn) (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall).
See, for example, J. Fletcher (1977) ‘Give If It Helps but Not If It Hurts’, in W. Aiken and H. La Follette (eds), World Hunger and Moral Obligation.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 1998 Development Studies Association
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Dower, N. (1998). A World without Hunger: An Ethical Imperative. In: O’Neill, H., Toye, J. (eds) A World without Famine?. Palgrave Development Studies Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-26229-8_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-26229-8_2
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-26231-1
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-26229-8
eBook Packages: Palgrave Economics & Finance CollectionEconomics and Finance (R0)