Skip to main content

Problems of Transformation of the Defence Establishments in Central and Eastern Europe

  • Chapter
European Security

Abstract

A public relations officer of the US forces used to ask students the following question: ‘What is the purpose of an army?’ The audience was regularly surprised to hear his answer: ‘To kill people and destroy property — in great numbers.’ This statement leads us to two conclusions: Firstly, armed forces are a tool of war, but do not start war themselves; secondly, they are a dangerous instrument in the hands of those who control them.2

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

eBook
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. See G. Hoffmann, ‘Zur Legitimität der Kontrolle’, in R. Brecht and P. Klein, eds, Streitkräfte in der Demokratie (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1994), pp. 11, 17.

    Google Scholar 

  2. Theory founded by Clausewitz; see later: S. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil—Military Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957) p. 7

    Google Scholar 

  3. see M. Mae Johnson, ‘Civil—Military Relations and Military Reform in Bulgaria’, European Security, 4, 3 (Autumn 1995) 489–90.

    Google Scholar 

  4. J. Kornblum, ‘NATO’s Enlargement. A Natural Progression’, in S. Cam-bone, ed., NATO’s Role in European Security (Washington, DC: CSIS, 1995), p. 16.

    Google Scholar 

  5. J. Köpfer, ‘Vertragliche Grundlagen und Strukturen des westlichen und östlichen Bündnisses’, in Bayerische Landeszentrale für politische Bildungsarbeit, NATO—WP (Munich: Bayerische Landeszentrale für politische Bildungsarbeit, 1980), pp. 111–12

    Google Scholar 

  6. Institute of International Relations, Democratic Control Oyer Security Policy and Armed Forces (Prague: Institute of International Relations, 1995), p. 19.

    Google Scholar 

  7. J. Simon, Central European Civil—Military Relations and NATO Expansion, McNair Paper 39, (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1995), p. 154.

    Google Scholar 

  8. R. Joó, The Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Chaillot Paper 23 (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, 1996), pp. 12, 15.

    Google Scholar 

  9. Z. Barany, Soldiers and Politics in Eastern Europe 1945–1990 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), pp. 17, 19

    Google Scholar 

  10. Directorate of Management and Consultancy Services (DMCS), Review of Parliamentarian Oversight of the Hungarian MoD and Control of the Hungarian Defence Forces (London: Ministry of Defence, Study 810, February 1996), p. 51.

    Google Scholar 

  11. L. Starve, ‘Common Interests, Values and Criteria for Action’, in L. Martin and J. Roper, eds, Towards a Common Defence Policy (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies 1995), p. 17.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Copyright information

© 1997 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Manig, W. (1997). Problems of Transformation of the Defence Establishments in Central and Eastern Europe. In: von Bredow, W., Jäger, T., Kümmel, G. (eds) European Security. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25894-9_2

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics