Abstract
1. overview. A mechanism is a specification of how economic decisions are determined as a function of the information that is known by the individuals in the economy. In this sense, almost any kind of market institution or economic organization can be viewed, in principle, as a mechanism. Thus mechanism theory can offer a unifying conceptual structure in which a wide range of institutions can be compared, and optimal institutions can be identified.
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© 1989 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited
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Myerson, R.B. (1989). Mechanism Design. In: Eatwell, J., Milgate, M., Newman, P. (eds) Allocation, Information and Markets. The New Palgrave. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20215-7_20
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20215-7_20
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