Abstract
There are two sets of agents which we may think of as firms and workers. For each pair (f, w) there is a non-negative number a fw representing the amount of income which the pair (f, w) can generate if they work together. The natural economic question is then to determine (A) which partnerships would be formed and (B) if a partnership (f, w) is formed how should the income a fw be divided between the partners.
I am grateful to David Gale for the careful reading of an earlier draft of this study and for his suggestions. I would also like to thank Alvin Roth for his comments and his hospitality at the University of Pittsburgh, where part of this work was done.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Blair, Charles (1988) ‘The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners’, Mathematics of Operations Research, 13, pp. 619–28.
Crawford, Vincent P. and Elsie M. Knoer (1981) ‘Job Matching with Heterogeneous Firms and Workers’, Econometrica, 49, pp. 437–50.
Demange, Gabrielle (1982) ‘Strategyproofness in the Assignment Market Game’, Laboratorie d’Econometrie de l’Ecole Polytechnique (Paris) (mimeo).
Demange, Gabrielle (1987) ‘Nonmanipulable Cores’, Econometrica, 55, pp. 1057–74.
Demange, Gabrielle and David Gale (1985) ‘The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets’, Econometrica, 53 (4) pp. 873–88.
Demange, Gabrielle, David Gale, and Marilda Sotomayor (1986) ‘Multi-Item Auctions’, Journal of Political Economy, 94 (4) pp. 863–72.
Dubins, L. E. and D. A. Freedman (1981) ‘Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm’, American Mathematical Monthly, 88 pp. 485–94.
Gale, David (1960) The Theory of Linear Economic Models (New York: McGraw-Hill)
Gale, David (1984) ‘Equilibrium in a Discrete Exchange Economy with Money’, International journal of Game Theory, 13 (1) pp. 61–4.
Gale, David and Lloyd Shapley (1962) ‘College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage’, American Mathematical Monthly, 69, pp. 9–15.
Hall, P. (1935) ‘On Representation of Subsets’, Journal of the London Mathematical Society, 10.
Kelson, A. S. Jr and V. P. Crawford (1982) ‘Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes’, Econometrica 50, pp. 1483–1504.
Leonard, Herman B. (1983) ‘Elicitation of Honest Preferences for the Assignment of Individuals to Positions’, Journal of Political Economy 91, pp. 461–79.
Roth, Alvin (1984b) ‘stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching’, Econometrica, 52, pp. 47–57.
Roth, Alvin (1985a) ‘Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions’, Mathematics of Operations Research, 10, pp. 379–89.
Roth, Alvin (1985b) ‘Common and Conflicting Interests in Two-Sided Matching Markets’, European Economic Review, 27, pp. 79–96.
Roth, Alvin (1985c) ‘The College Admissions Problem is not Equivalent to the Marriage Problem’, Journal of Economic Theory, 36, pp. 277–88.
Roth, Alvin and Marilda Sotomayor (1990) Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game Theoretic Modelling and Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Shapley, Lloyd S. and Martin Shubik (1972) ‘The Assignment Game I: The Core’, International Journal of Game Theory, 1, pp. 111–30.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 1992 Mukul Majumdar
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Sotomayor, M. (1992). The Multiple Partners Game. In: Majumdar, M. (eds) Equilibrium and Dynamics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-11696-6_17
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-11696-6_17
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-11698-0
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-11696-6
eBook Packages: Palgrave Economics & Finance CollectionEconomics and Finance (R0)