Abstract
Although the equivalence of some cryptographic computational assumptions (e.g., the existence of one-way functions, that of pseudo-random generators, and that of secure signature schemes) has been studied extensively, little study has been done on the equivalence of cryptographic physical assumptions.
This paper initiates research in this direction. It shows that three physical cryptographic assumptions about channels are equivalent. The three physical assumptions are the existence of anonymous channels, that of direction-indeterminable channels, and that of secure channels.
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© 1993 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Okamoto, T. (1993). On the relationship among cryptographic physical assumptions. In: Ng, K.W., Raghavan, P., Balasubramanian, N.V., Chin, F.Y.L. (eds) Algorithms and Computation. ISAAC 1993. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 762. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-57568-5_268
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-57568-5_268
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