Abstract
This paper contains a brief survey of the area of belief revision and its relation to updating of logical databases as it has developed during the last years. A set of rationality postulates for revisions are presented. A couple of semi-algorithmic models of revision and updating are introduced. The models are connected to the postulates via some representation theorems. Finally, the relation between belief revision and nonmonotonic logic is explored.
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© 1992 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Gärdenfors, P. (1992). Belief revision: A vade-mecum. In: Pettorossi, A. (eds) Meta-Programming in Logic. META 1992. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 649. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-56282-6_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-56282-6_1
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