Abstract
We introduce new techniques for generating and reasoning about protocols. These techniques are based on protocol transformations that depend on the nature of the adversaries under consideration. We propose a set of definitions that captures and unifies the intuitive notions of correctness, privacy, and robustness, and enables us to give concise and modular proofs that our protocols possess these desirable properties.
Using these techniques, whose major purpose is to greatly simplify the design and verification of cryptographic protocols, we show how to construct a multiparty cryptographic protocol to compute any given feasible function of the parties’ inputs. We prove that our protocol is secure against the malicious actions of any adversary, limited to feasible computation, but with the power to eavesdrop on all messages and to corrupt any dynamically chosen minority of the parties. This is the first proof of sccurity against dynamic adversaries in the “cryptographic” model of multiparty protocols. We assume the existence of a one-way function and allow the participants to erase small portions of memory. Our result combines the superior resilience of the cryptographic setting of [GMW87] with the stronger (dynamic) fault pattern of the “non-cryptographic” setting of [BGW88,CCD88].
Chapter PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Keywords
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
References
L. Babai, S. Moran. “Arthur-Merlin Games: A Randomized Proof System, and a Hierarchy of Complexity Classes.” J. Comput. System Sci. 36 (1988), 254–276.
J. Bar-Han, D. Beaver. “Non-Cryptographic Fault-Tolerant Computing in a Constant Expected Number of Rounds of Interaction.” Proceedings of PODC, ACM, 1989, 201–209.
D. Beaver. “Secure Multiparty Protocols and Zero Knowledge Proof Systems Tolerating a Faulty Minority.” J. Cryptology. 4:2, 1991, 75–122. An earlier version appeared as “Secure Multiparty Protocols Tolerating Half Faulty Processors” in CRYPTO’ 89, G. Brassard, ed., Springer-Verlag LNCS 435, 1990.
D. Beaver. “Formal Definitions for Secure Distributed Protocols.” Proceedings of the DIMACS Workshop on Distributed Computing and Cryptography, Princeton, NJ, October, 1989, J. Feigenbaum, M. Merritt (eds.).
D. Beaver. Security, Fault Tolerance, and Communication Complexity in Distributed Systems. Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University, Cambridge, 1990.
D. Beaver. “Foundations of Secure Interactive Computation.” Proceedings of Crypto’ 91 (to appear).
D. Beaver, S. Goldwasser. “Multiparty Computation with Faulty Majority.” Proceedings of the 30th FOCS, IEEE, 1989, 468–473.
D. Beaver, S. Micali, P. Rogaway. “The Round Complexity of Secure Protocols.” Proceedings of the 22nd STOC, ACM, 1990, 503–513.
M. Bellare and O. Goldreich. “On Defining Proofs of Knowledge.” Proceedings of Crypto’ 92 (to appear).
M. Ben-Or, S. Goldwasser, A. Wigderson. “Completeness Theorems for Non-Cryptographic Fault-Tolerant Distributed Computation.” Proceedings of the 20th STOC, ACM, 1988, 1–10.
G. Brassard, D. Chaum, C. Crépeau. “Minimum Disclosure Proofs of Knowledge.” J. Comput. System Sci. 37 (1988), 156–189.
D. Chaum, C. Crépeau, I. Damgård. “Multiparty Unconditionally Secure Protocols.” Proceedings of the 20th STOC, ACM, 1988, 11–19.
B. Chor, M. Rabin. “Achieving Independence in a Logarithmic Number of Rounds.” Proceedings of the 6th PODC, ACM, 1987.
U. Feige, A. Fiat, and A. Shamir. “Zero knowledge proofs of identity.” J. of Cryptology, 1:2, 1988, 77–94.
P. Feldman. “One Can Always Assume Private Channels.” Unpublished manuscript, 1988.
P. Feldman, S. Micali. “Optimal Algorithms for Byzantine Agreement.” Proceedings of the 20th STOC, ACM, 1988, 148–161. (The reader of this paper is referred for the relevant result to Feldman’s Ph.D. Thesis, Optimal Algorithms for Byzantine Agreement (MIT, 1988), where it apparently does not appear; but see [15].)
Z. Galil, S. Haber, M. Yung. “Cryptographic Computation: Secure Fault-Tolerant Protocols and the Public-Key Model.” Proceedings of Crypto 1987, Springer-Verlag, 1988, 135–155.
Z. Galil, S. Haber, and M. Yung. “Minimum-Knowledge Interactive Proofs for Decision Problems.” SIAM J. Comput. 18:4 (1989), 711–739.
Z. Galil, S. Haber, and M. Yung. “Interactive public-key cryptosystems.” Submitted for publication, 1991.
S. Goldwasser, S. Micali. “Probabilistic Encryption.” J. Comput. System Sci. 28 (1984), 270–299.
S. Goldwasser, S. Micali, C. Rackoff. “The Knowledge Complexity of Interactive Proof Systems.” SIAM J. Comput. 18:1 (1989), 186–208.
S. Goldwasser, M. Sipser. “Private Coins vs. Public Coins in Interactive Proof Systems.” Proceedings of the 18th STOC, ACM, 1986, 59–68.
O. Goldreich, S. Micali, A. Wigderson. “Proofs that Yield Nothing but Their Validity and a Methodology of Cryptographic Protocol Design.” Proceedings of the 27th FOCS, IEEE, 1986, 174–187.
O. Goldreich, S. Micali, A. Wigderson. “How to Play Any Mental Game, or A Completeness Theorem for Protocols with Honest Majority.” Proceedings of the 19th STOC, ACM, 1987, 218–229.
S. Goldwasser, L. Levin. “Fair Computation of General Functions in Presence of Immoral Majority.” Proceedings of Crypto 1990.
J. Håstad. “Pseudo-Random Generators under Uniform Assumptions.” Proceedings of the 22nd STOC, ACM, 1990, 395–404.
R. Impagliazzo, L. Levin, and M. Luby. “Pseudorandom Generation from One-Way Functions.” Proceedings of the 21st STOC, ACM, 1989, 12–24.
T. Rabin, M. Ben-Or. “Verifiable Secret Sharing and Multiparty Protocols with Honest Majority.” Proceedings of the 21st STOC, ACM, 1989, 73–85.
A. Shamir. “How to Share a Secret.” Communications of the ACM, 22 (1979), 612–613.
M. Tompa and H. Woll. “Random self-reducibility and zero knowledge interactive proofs of possession of information.” Proceedings of the 28th FOCS, IEEE, 1987, 472–482.
A. Yao, “Theory and Applications of Trapdoor Functions.” Proceedings of the 23rd FOCS, IEEE, 1982, 80–91.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1993 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Beaver, D., Haber, S. (1993). Cryptographic Protocols Provably Secure Against Dynamic Adversaries. In: Rueppel, R.A. (eds) Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT’ 92. EUROCRYPT 1992. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 658. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-47555-9_26
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-47555-9_26
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-56413-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-47555-2
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive