Abstract
This paper analyzes the process of automated negotiation between two competitive agents that have firm deadlines and incomplete information about their opponent. Generally speaking, the outcome of a negotiation depends on many parameters—including the agents’ preferences, their reservation limits, their attitude toward time and the strategies they use. Although in most realistic situations it is not possible for agents to have complete information about each of these parameters for its opponent, it is not uncommon for agents to have partial information about some of them. Under such uncertainty, our aim is to determine how an agent can exploit its available information to select an optimal strategy. Here, in particular, the optimal strategies are determined considering all possible ways in which time can effect negotiation. Moreover, we list the conditions for convergence when both agents use their respective optimal strategies and study the effect of time on negotiation outcome.
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Fatima, S.S., Wooldridge, M., Jennings, N.R. (2002). Optimal Negotiation Strategies for Agents with Incomplete Information. In: Meyer, JJ.C., Tambe, M. (eds) Intelligent Agents VIII. ATAL 2001. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 2333. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45448-9_28
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45448-9_28
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